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Foreword
The knowledge that poor systems can cause harm is not new, but the size of this 
problem has not been established systematically. This report provides groundbreaking 
evidence of the extent to which important clinical systems and processes fail, and the 
potential these failings have to harm patients.
This study forms part of the Health Foundation’s work to help healthcare organisations 
improve the quality of services they offer. Our Safer Patients Initiative has highlighted 
the need to take a clinical systems approach to improving safety, since it is failings in 
these systems that often contribute to breakdowns in patient safety.
The work also supports our Safer Clinical Systems programme by providing a much-
needed evidence base. It systematically identifies and documents the different defects 
in specific points of the care pathway, the extent that they vary and their potential for 
patient harm.
The results of this study identify the variation across healthcare in the reliability of five 
key systems and processes:
 – availability of information when making clinical decision
 – prescribing
 – handover
 – availability of equipment in operating theatres
 – availability of equipment for inserting intravenous lines.
We cannot continue to treat the levels of risk identified in this report as acceptable or 
inevitable. More research is required to investigate the underlying factors affecting the 
reliability of healthcare systems and processes, and the impact on patient safety. 
However, translating this into practice is not simple. The Health Foundation is taking 
this work forward with our Safer Clinical Systems programme to improve the safety 
and reliability of healthcare. We would encourage NHS leaders and practitioners to use 
these findings to consider how to improve reliability in their own organisations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and summary of 
findings
1.1 Introduction
‘Rather than being the instigators of an accident, 
operators tend to be the inheritors of system defects 
…their part is usually that of adding the final 
garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have 
already been long in the cooking’ (James Reason, 
1990) 
This study was commissioned by the Health 
Foundation as part of its work to examine how 
systems reliability affects patient safety, and how 
this can be improved. 
The purpose of the research was to describe the 
nature, type, extent and variation in the reliability 
of five healthcare systems that have the potential to 
cause harm to patients in UK hospitals. 
These are: the availability of clinical information in 
outpatient clinics, prescribing for inpatients on 
hospital wards, clinical handover between doctors, 
equipment availability in the operating theatre, and 
systems for inserting intravenous lines. 
Seven hospitals from across the UK participated in 
the research. Each clinical system was studied in 
three hospital organisations. The research began in 
January 2009 and, including the time taken to gain 
ethical approval, was completed within a year.
1.2 This report
The first part of this report sets out the context and 
background for the research, giving an overview of 
the Health Foundation’s Safer Clinical Systems 
programme. 
We then describe our general approach to the 
research methods and theoretical framework used. 
In part 2, each of the five clinical systems is then 
considered in turn, detailing the specific methods 
used and discussing the findings in the context of 
other reported research. 
In the final part, the results are drawn together into 
conclusions and recommendations arising from the 
study as a whole.
We would like to take this opportunity to thank the 
participating organisations for their cooperation 
and support in conducting this research. 
We hope that the results and our recommendations 
will help to drive further improvements in patient 
safety.
1.3 The research team
The research was led by Professor Bryony Dean 
Franklin, Director, Centre for Medication Safety 
and Service Quality, The School of Pharmacy, 
University of London and Imperial College 
Healthcare NHS Trust, supported by a team of 
researchers from the Centre for Patient Safety and 
Service Quality at Imperial College, in 
collaboration with the Clinical Systems 
Improvement Team at Warwick University. 
As a research team we have experience in patient 
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safety research, methods for improving patient 
safety, reliability in healthcare systems, clinical 
systems improvement approaches, process and 
outcome measurement, and knowledge capture 
and transfer. 
The study was generally referred to by the acronym 
WISeR (the Warwick and Imperial Study of 
Reliability in healthcare).
1.4 Key findings
Failures in reliability pose a real risk to 
patient safety
A significant proportion of the reliability failures 
identified in this research were associated with risks 
to patient safety. 
For example, we found that 15% of outpatient 
appointments were affected by missing clinical 
information at our study sites. 
In 20% of these cases, the doctors involved judged 
the patients to be exposed to risk.
Important clinical systems and 
processes are unreliable 
Fully reliable systems would function as intended 
under expected conditions. 
The four clinical systems for which reliability could 
be measured had an average failure rate of 13% - 
19%.
There are wide variations in reliability 
between organisations 
Significant variation was found between 
organisations, ranging from 63% for equipment 
availability in organisation D, to 96% for availability 
of clinical information in organisation A.
Unreliability is the result of common 
factors
Across the five systems and organisations, 
unreliability was usually the result of the same 
factors. These included: a lack of feedback 
mechanisms for both individuals and systems; poor 
communication; and a widespread acceptance on 
the part of clinical staff that systems are going to be 
unreliable, and that this is not their responsibility.
It is possible to create highly reliable 
systems
The variation between and within organisations 
suggests that it is possible to create systems that 
have higher reliability. 
1.5 References
Reason J (1990). Human error. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
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Chapter 2
Context of the research 
by Matthew Cooke and Mark-Alexander Sujan
2.1 Patient safety in the UK and 
worldwide
The extent to which healthcare can endanger 
patient safety is now acknowledged worldwide. In 
the UK, a case note review confirmed that 11.7% of 
admissions in two UK hospitals led to an adverse 
event, similar to adverse event rates previously 
reported in Australia and the US (Vincent et al, 
2001). The Chief Medical Officer’s review of patient 
safety in England estimated that ‘one in 10 patients 
admitted to hospitals in developed countries will 
unintentionally be the victim of an error’ and 
reported that ‘the UK was one of the first countries 
to give priority to tackling patient safety’ 
(Department of Health, 2006). 
The need to address patient safety by tackling 
healthcare systems was made abundantly clear to 
the NHS in 2001, with the report of an external 
inquiry into the death of a young man, Wayne 
Jowett, in the Queen’s Medical Centre in 
Nottingham (Toft, 2001). He died because a 
chemotherapy drug was mistakenly injected into 
his spine rather than a vein. The inquiry found over 
40 errors in the chain of events leading up to the 
final mistake. Each part of the medication system 
was unreliable in some way. 
While considerable efforts have been made to 
improve patient safety in the NHS since Mr Jowett’s 
death, the challenge of how to improve patient 
safety across an entire system of healthcare on a 
sustainable basis remains, made more difficult by 
the fact that there is little quantifiable evidence 
about the reliability of healthcare systems generally, 
and on how this affects patient safety.
2.2 This research
The Health Foundation commissioned this 
research to strengthen the evidence base relating to 
the impact of healthcare systems reliability on 
patient safety, and in doing so, create a compelling 
case that a systems focus in patient safety is 
required to avoid the negative impact that defects in 
this area can cause.
This is the first UK study to examine the reliability 
of healthcare systems and the impact of poor 
reliability on patient care in a range of 
organisations. It was commissioned by the Health 
Foundation against the backdrop of previous work 
on patient safety, outlined below.
2.3 Patient safety work by the 
Health Foundation 
The Safer Patients Initiative (SPI) was set up by the 
Health Foundation in 2004, to test the use of an 
organisation-wide approach to patient safety. 
The participants were provided with educational 
opportunities to develop knowledge and expertise 
in patient safety, combined with skills in change 
management and measurement of improvement. 
SPI introduced a number of initiatives aimed at 
improving the reliability of certain clinical working 
practices, together with interventions to improve 
the safety culture of an organisation. 
SPI also focused on gaining executive engagement 
in patient safety as a key issue on the strategic 
agenda, to bring about wider organisational 
change. It addressed issues in diverse areas with 
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many projects based in critical care, theatres and in 
detecting deterioration. For example care bundles 
were used to reduce ventilator-associated 
pneumonias, central venous catheter infection, and 
cardiac arrest rates. An evaluation is due to be 
published shortly. Research is currently underway 
to evaluate the longer term impact of the changes as 
well as the sustainability of the SPI programme.
Following the widely recognised short-term impact 
of the introduction of care bundles in SPI, national 
campaigns were launched by the Health 
Departments in England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland aimed at spreading such learning 
to the wider NHS. 
While the SPI approach had success in certain areas 
of the hospital, tackling specific concerns about 
patient safety, the issue of how to address system-
wide influences on patient safety remained. It 
became clear that further work was needed in this 
area. 
As a result, the Health Foundation launched the 
Safer Clinical Systems (SCS) programme in 2008. 
This programme has a focus on reliability in 
systems of care. SCS looks at wider systems so that 
changes should have a much broader impact. The 
first phase of the programme aimed to develop ‘the 
SCS approach’ to enable health organisations to 
diagnose problems, analyse the system, develop 
redesign strategies, reduce risk and develop 
resilience in the system. 
The approach is a unique combination of 
philosophies and uses tools from both 
improvement science and safety engineering. It 
focuses on the wider system, defined as ‘the 
arrangement of resources, which can exist on many 
levels, to achieve objectives that have a single goal’. 
SCS has a greater emphasis on human factors, 
safety culture, understanding the concepts of risk 
and reliability, and the need to develop resilience, 
when compared with earlier initiatives. 
The SCS programme is also aiming to develop an 
approach that is more risk-based as opposed to the 
existing harm-based approaches. The aim is to 
result in improvements that will reduce harm by 
controlling relevant risks to an acceptable level, by 
continuously measuring and monitoring 
performance levels and by creating resilience that 
allows the system to withstand unforeseen 
disturbances.
There has also been an appreciation that more 
complex measurement systems are needed, which 
combine numeric measures with narrative to 
explain if and why risk has been reduced.
In June 2009, the Health Foundation set up the 
Safer Patient’s Network (SPN) with membership 
from the SPI sites to create a ‘network as a self-
sustaining, member-driven community of practice 
to catalyse improvements to patient safety’ (The 
Health Foundation, 2009). It currently consists of 
18 NHS organisations which are supported by the 
Health Foundation and the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement. The evaluation of the network is 
being carried out by a consortium between Cardiff 
University and the York Health Economic 
Consortium.
The concept of reliability in healthcare has been a 
major focus of the developing approach to 
improving patient safety in the SCS programme. 
Therefore, in the following section, we review the 
notion of reliability and examine the different 
meanings that this concept has been given in 
health, in order to clarify the context in which the 
present research has been carried out. 
2.4 Reliability in healthcare
The aim of WISeR was to contribute towards 
enhancing the reliability with which care is 
delivered to patients in the NHS. Owing to the 
interconnectedness and degree of complexity of 
many healthcare systems, the notion of reliability 
needs to be applied carefully and with 
terminological precision in order to be able to 
compare findings of different studies. At present, it 
is very difficult to perform such a comparison due 
to the different ways in which the concept of 
reliability has been interpreted and applied. A brief 
literature review next provides some evidence for a 
reliability shortfall (in its different meanings) in the 
delivery of care. 
Definition of reliability 
In the engineering and safety communities, 
reliability has received a lot of attention due to the 
initial unreliability of early electronic components 
that frequently only had a lifespan of a few hours. 
With the increasingly pervasive use of computer 
software, the reliability of software systems has also 
become an increasing cause for concern. In these 
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communities, where the study of reliability is an 
established mathematical science, reliability is 
commonly defined in the following way (for 
example,  Storey, 1997): 
‘Reliability is the probability of a component, or 
system, functioning correctly over a given period of 
time under a given set of operating conditions.’ 
In this context, ‘functioning correctly’ refers to 
functioning according to a given specification. 
Reliability is usually expressed in terms of failure 
rate per hour for systems operating in continuous 
mode, or probability of failure on demand for 
demand-based systems. In a healthcare context, the 
US Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) 
similarly defines reliability as ‘failure-free operation 
over time’(Resar, 2006).
The above represents an intuitive and seemingly 
simple definition of the notion of reliability. In 
healthcare we often intuitively equate reliability to 
doing the right things for patients, or (as Don 
Berwick put it) as ‘keeping a promise’. However, 
when transferring the concept of reliability to 
healthcare, attention needs to be given to some 
detail ‘hidden’ in the above definition: electronic 
and software systems possess a clear specification 
and the reliability of these systems is assessed 
against this specification in terms of defined inputs 
and outputs. 
In healthcare systems, as opposed to purely 
technical systems, it is more complicated to define 
with precision what ‘functioning correctly’ means 
at a specific moment in time and for a particular 
patient. 
Often, the ideal course of treatment emerges only in 
hindsight when all the facts are known; also, in 
healthcare there are still many different ways of 
getting things right, frequently depending on 
personal preference, style or other local 
circumstances. 
As a result, it is usually not possible to provide the 
level of exact specification which can be applied in 
the study of reliability in technical systems, unless 
the healthcare system under consideration is 
broken down to components with much lower 
levels of complexity, allowing the elimination of 
uncertainty, ambiguity and variation. In this case, 
the concept of reliability can be applied most 
meaningfully to those aspects of healthcare systems 
that are characterised by a higher degree of 
agreement and standardisation.  
Characteristics of ‘high reliability organisations’ 
have also been identified in other industries. These 
include a preoccupation with failure, reluctance to 
simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, 
commitment to resilience, and deference to 
expertise (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). However, it 
has been suggested that that such characteristics 
apply only to industries where core processes are 
already at least 98% reliable, and that applying such 
an approach is less applicable to healthcare where 
these high levels of reliability are rarely achieved 
(Resar, 2006). In the work which follows, we 
therefore did consider the ‘high reliability 
organisation’ approach. Instead, we focused on 
measuring the reliability of the processes 
concerned (Resar, 2006). 
Reliability and harm 
In high-risk industries such as the nuclear industry 
or aviation, the distinction between reliability and 
safety is properly understood and acknowledged. 
Reliability contributes to safety, but is concerned 
only with the probability of occurrence of a failure, 
not with the severity of its consequences. 
For healthcare systems this implies that the 
reliability of care delivery is an important aspect in 
reducing patient harm, but consideration also 
needs to be given to the following:
(a) failures may still occur and need to be dealt with
(b) the ‘specification’ may be inappropriate (for 
example, because the patient is an exception to a 
rule) or incomplete. In technical systems a 
common form of incomplete specification is a 
situation where the behaviour of the system has 
been defined only for a subset of inputs (usually, the 
set of expected inputs) and on encountering an 
input outside of this subset the system may produce 
random and potentially harmful outputs (e.g. the 
random behaviour of some infusion pump 
interfaces when the user produces unexpected 
inputs such as two decimal points in succession). 
In healthcare, a similar situation may arise when a 
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protocol only deals with the most common set of 
patients. For example, a protocol that assumes adult 
patients and fails to specify what to do in the case of 
paediatric patients.   
Reliability and quality of care 
Many aspects contribute to the quality of care that 
is delivered, e.g. the provision of safe, effective, 
patient-centred, timely, efficient and equitable care 
(Institute of Medicine, 2001).
Reliability contributes to these dimensions of 
quality of care, but the two concepts are not 
synonymous. For example, the provision of safe 
and timely care is affected by the reliability of 
healthcare systems and processes, but it depends 
also on the means of dealing with failures where 
they occur (affecting safety) and on the ease with 
which the system can be restored to normal 
operation (affecting timeliness). For example, if we 
are dealing with an x-ray machine that can be 
replaced easily in case of failure, then we can accept 
lower levels of reliability and still provide timely 
care. If, on the other hand, we are dealing with 
radiation therapy equipment that will suffer severe 
downtimes for maintenance in case of failure, 
higher levels of reliability are required. 
Reliability and standardisation 
The assessment of reliability requires clearly 
specified processes (i.e. a specification) and is 
linked to the notion of failure. However, in 
healthcare many processes are not properly 
specified and have evolved rather than having been 
designed explicitly according to a predefined 
specification. 
As a result, there is a lot of variation in the way care 
is delivered without necessarily any ‘failures’ in the 
provision of care. For example, on a ward where 
patients tend to be well-known to nursing staff and 
with stable staffing situations, each nurse may 
follow a different practice to identify patients and 
the process is supported by their personal 
acquaintance with the patients. As such, the 
identification of patients may be extremely reliable 
(judged by the outcome). 
A measure of the adherence to the formal patient 
identification protocol (the use of multiple patient  
identifiers), on the other hand, may be low. In such 
situations, it may be more intuitive and useful to 
refer to the level of standardisation rather than the 
reliability of the process. It also illustrates the need 
to consider measures of the reliability of process as 
well as outcome. 
Reliability shortfall in health 
There is increasing evidence in the literature that 
patients often do not receive high quality care. 
Studies address different aspects of quality or use 
reliability in slightly different ways as described 
above. 
Outcome based studies, such as the well-known 
Harvard Medical Practice study (Brennan et al., 
1991), the Utah and Colorado studies (Thomas et 
al, 2000), and the London study (Vincent et al, 
2001) indicate that preventable adverse events 
affect around 1.5 - 5.4% of patients within a system 
that creates an overall adverse event rate of 11.7%.
This provides an estimate of the failure rate of the 
‘hospital system’. 
Further outcome-based studies focus on specific 
processes or conditions. A study reviewing 182 
deaths in twelve US hospitals estimated that 14% - 
27% of these were preventable (Dubois et al, 1988). 
A study of 44,603 patients undergoing surgery at a 
large medical centre between 1977 and 1990 
estimated that 2.7% of patients had complications 
due to error (McGuire, 1992). A UK study of 
complications in surgery estimates that 7% - 10% of 
major complications are avoidable (Vincent et al, 
2004). 
In the area of medicines management and 
prescribing in particular, there are many studies 
that focus on the incidence or prevalence of errors, 
rather than on adverse outcomes. Prescribing 
errors occur in 1.5-9.2% of medication orders 
written for hospital inpatients in the UK (Vincent et 
al, 2009); this wide range of figures is partly due to 
differences in settings, definitions and data 
collection methods. A median error rate of 7% was 
reported in a recent international systematic review 
of prescribing errors in hand-written medication 
orders for hospital inpatients (Lewis et al, 2009).
In a major study in the USA, the degree to which 
patients received care consistent with basic quality
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 standards was assessed by measurement against a 
number of quality indicators for 30 common 
conditions (McGlynn et al., 2003). The study found 
that patients received scientifically recommended 
care in only 55% of the cases. There was large 
variability among clinical conditions. For some 
conditions, patients received 78.7% of 
recommended care (senile cataract) where as for 
others only as little as 10.5% (alcohol dependence). 
This use of quality indicators has become a popular 
study design to assess adherence to evidence-based 
guidelines and practice, albeit as a proxy indicator 
for patient outcomes. A US study using quality 
indicators for melanoma care found that adherence 
to indicators varied from 11.8% to 96.5% at the 
individual patient level (Bilimoria et al, 2009a). A 
similar study design was followed in a US study 
assessing the quality of pancreatic cancer care.
This study found that patient-level adherence with 
individual indicators ranged from 49.6% to 97.2% 
(Bilimoria et al, 2009b). A study attempting to 
assess whether participation in a quality 
improvement programme for the management of 
coronary artery disease in women and the elderly 
would lead to improvement in the quality of care 
found that adherence to quality indicators rose 
from 86.5% in 2002 to 97.4% in 2007 (Lewis et al, 
2009). All of these studies demonstrate that there is 
great variability in adherence to evidence-based 
quality indicators.
2.5 How this research will be 
used
This research into the reliability of healthcare 
systems, and its effect on patient safety, was 
designed to run in parallel with phase one of the 
SCS project outlined above, which ran from 2008 
until 2010, and to support the activities of the four 
organisations selected for phase one of SCS. The 
findings from the research will also be used to:
 – Inform the design of phase two of SCS, 
including demonstrating whether phase one 
SCS organisations are representative of the 
wider NHS.
 – Support the Health Foundation’s work to build 
the will for change using a systems approach.
 – Encourage NHS Organisations to apply for 
phase two of the SCS programme.
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Chapter 3
Aims, objectives and approach 
by Bryony Dean Franklin 
In this section we set out the study’s aims and 
objectives and present the theoretical framework 
used. We then give an overview of our 
methodological approach, followed by a brief 
account of the choice of study organisations and 
topics. 
The section concludes by summarising the ethical 
considerations taken into account when designing 
the study.
The research began in January 2009 and was 
completed within a year, including the time taken 
to gain ethical approval.
3.1 Aims and objectives
The overall aims of the research were twofold: 
(1) To describe the nature, type, extent and 
variation of defects in healthcare system reliability 
that have the potential to cause patient harm.
 (2) To provide research support for phase 1 and the 
design of phase two of the SCS programme. The 
original brief is given in appendix 1.
The objectives were to:
 – Apply a systematic research approach to the 
identification and definition of a number of 
safety critical care processes and specific points 
in care delivery, targeted by SCS, in which to 
explore defects in the reliability of care. 
 –  Explore their nature, extent and variation, both 
within and between organisations.
 – Identify the systems factors involved, in order to 
make recommendations for improving system 
reliability.
 – Predict the potential for the spread of the good 
practice developed in phase 1 to the wider NHS 
in subsequent stages, by understanding the 
present state of reliability in a sample of NHS 
organisations.
 – Combine the learning of phase 1 and this 
research to help in developing SCS phase two.
 – Support the evidence base in the production of 
safety briefings being created by the Support 
Team in SCS phase one. 
 – Assist the work of the award holders in SCS 
phase one.
3.2 Theoretical framework
In understanding the causes of poor reliability and 
systems failure, we used Reason’s accident 
causation model (Reason, 1990). It is now widely 
recognised that errors and human behaviour 
cannot be understood in isolation, but must be 
considered in the context or system in which 
people are working. 
Clinical staff are influenced by a wide range of 
system factors such as the technology available, the 
team and staffing levels, their hours of work, the 
design of their work areas, distractions in the work 
place, and, of course, patient factors. This is 
illustrated by the accident causation model (Figure 
1) which has more recently been adapted for use in 
healthcare (Vincent et al, 1998).
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Reason’s model argues that in modern systems with 
several lines of defence, an accident is usually the 
result of numerous failures, both active and latent, 
rather than being caused by a single human error. 
Active failures by frontline staff can be regarded as 
symptoms of underlying systems defects. These 
underlying systems defects are the result of 
practices and decisions that are removed in time 
and space from the actual accident (‘latent 
conditions’), but create the conditions in which 
accidents happen. 
In the past, the approach to improving safety in 
healthcare has been to take one type of adverse 
event and try to reduce its frequency by addressing 
the immediate active failures. However, as research 
has shown, it is important that we look at the whole 
system to reveal the true picture, and create 
opportunities for preventive actions. Reason (1990) 
puts this very succinctly: 
‘Rather than being the instigators of an accident, 
operators tend to be the inheritors of system defects 
…their part is usually that of adding the final 
garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have 
already been long in the cooking’. 
A potentially more effective alternative is to address 
the underlying systems factors, since these can be 
identified and managed systematically and will 
have an impact on many paths to failure. 
Within the patient safety literature, Vincent et al 
(1998) identified seven main categories of factors 
that could affect the safety of the healthcare system.
These factors have been conceptualised in an 
operational framework and are as follows: 
 – the institutional context
 – organisational and management factors
 – work environment
 – team factors 
 – individual (staff) factors 
 – task factors 
 – patient characteristics.
The resulting operational framework (Figure 2) was 
developed based on the accident causation model 
(Reason, 1990) and the medical literature on errors, 
adverse outcomes and risk management (Cook and 
Woods, 1994; Cooper et al, 1984; Eagle et al, 1992; 
Leape, 1994; Vincent and Bark, 1995). 
The framework integrates a number of key 
contributing factors, in recognition that adverse 
events or patient safety incidents are generally the 
result of a whole concatenation of events or failures 
(active and latent) within the healthcare system, in 
which human error by frontline staff is only the 
final element. 
Figure1: The accident causation model
Latent 
conditions
Figure 1: e accident causation model
Error
producing
conditions
Active failures
Ð slips
Ð mistakes
Ð violations
Defenses Accident
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In studying the systems factors that contribute to 
defects in healthcare system reliability, we therefore 
used the following framework.
Figure 2: Factors that influence clinical practice,  
from Vincent et al (1998)
1.  Institutional context  
Economic and regulatory context 
2.  Organisational and management factors 
Financial resources and constraints  
Organisational structure  
Policy standards and goals  
Safety culture and priorities 
3.  Work environment  
Staffing levels and skills mix 
Workload and shift patterns  
Design, availability & maintenance of equipment 
Administrative and managerial support 
4.  Team factors 
Verbal communication  
Written communication  
Supervision and seeking help  
Team structure 
5.  Individual (staff) factors  
Knowledge and skills  
Motivation Physical and mental health 
6.  Task factors  
Task design and clarity of structure  
Availability and use of protocols  
Availability and accuracy of test results 
7.  Patient characteristics  
Condition (complexity and seriousness)  
Language and communication  
Personality and social factors 
3.3 Overview of methodology
In this section we describe our general approach to 
the study; further details specific to each selected 
topic will be described later in the report.
The study employed a mixed methods approach 
using both qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
based around specific topics. For each of our topics, 
data collection took place in three stages, each of 
which will next be described. 
Analysis of the process and 
environment 
For each of our topics, we began by finding out how 
the process was intended to operate. This was done 
by reviewing local or national (or both) guidelines 
and procedures (as appropriate), as well as 
observation and discussion with the staff involved. 
This resulted in one or more process maps of the 
systems concerned. The process maps were 
relatively high level and were intended to describe 
the key elements of the process concerned at each 
organisation, rather than details of individual tasks. 
Measurement of systems reliability 
We identified key areas within each process in 
which to collect data relating to the reliability issues 
identified. The data relating to this phase was 
quantitative, and allowed us to explore the extent of 
variability between the study organisations. Where 
applicable we also explored variability between 
clinical areas within each study organisation. 
Specific methods for data collection were 
determined according to the topic concerned, and 
through discussion with the study organisations. 
Some data were collected directly by the research 
team, and some were collected locally by 
nominated leads. Members of the research team 
trained staff in participating organisations in the 
methods of data collection where needed, and 
conducted all analysis. 
Causes of reliability failures
For each topic, we then explored the causes of the 
reliability failures identified using qualitative 
semi-structured interviews with key informants 
from each study organisation. Potential 
interviewees were identified by local study co-
ordinators, given a participant information sheet 
and invited to sign a consent form if they were 
willing to participate in a 20 to 30 minute interview. 
These interviews were mainly conducted face-to-
face, although some were also conducted by 
telephone, depending on the availability and 
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preference of the interviewee. Face-to-face 
interviews were conducted at a venue of their 
choice. 
We made audio-tapes of interviews if possible, or 
took detailed notes if interviewees preferred not to 
be taped. 
These interviews were then transcribed and 
analysed using the accident causation model as the 
theoretical framework. For each topic, a sample of 
at least one in four interview transcripts was 
checked by a second researcher.
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: The study organisations
Organisation Country
Teaching / Non-
teaching SPI site
Primary / Secondary 
care
Phase one SCS organisations
NHS Lothian Scotland Teaching No Both
Bolton Hospitals Trust / Bolton 
PCT
England Non-teaching No Both
Hereford Hospitals NHS Trust England Non-teaching No Secondary
Plymouth Hospitals NHS Trust England Teaching No Secondary
Additional organisations
Cardiff and Vale University Health 
Board 
Wales Teaching Yes Both
Imperial College Healthcare NHS 
Trust
England Teaching No Secondary 
Heart of England NHS Foundation 
Trust
England Teaching No Secondary 
Winchester and Eastleigh 
Healthcare NHS Trust
England Non-teaching No Secondary
SPI: Safer Patients Initiative
3.4 Choice of organisations
The four organisations participating in phase 1 of 
SCS represented a large teaching hospital 
integrated with primary care and mental health 
services within one organisation (NHS Lothian); a 
large acute organisation and associated primary 
care organisation (Bolton Hospitals Trust / Bolton 
PCT), each managed separately; a large teaching 
hospital taking tertiary referrals from a wide 
geographical area (Plymouth Hospitals NHS 
Trust); and a small district general hospital 
organisation serving a rural area (Hereford 
Hospitals NHS Trust). 
The three features common to each were:
– Acknowledged experience in use of  ‘lean 
thinking’ approaches.
– An interest and expertise in systems redesign.
– A commitment to improving patient safety. 
Four additional organisations were selected to 
provide a broad match in terms of organisational 
structure and size, and increase the breadth of the 
sample in terms of geographical spread and other 
characteristics. The four additional organisations 
recruited were:
– Cardiff and Vale University Health Board 
– comprising one large and eight smaller 
hospitals, plus associated primary care services.
– Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust – 
comprising three large teaching hospitals and 
two smaller specialist hospitals.
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 – Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust – a 
large teaching Trust with one large hospital with 
some regional services, one medium district 
general, one small hospital with limited on-site 
services. One of which is a new addition to the 
Trust.
 – Winchester and Eastleigh Healthcare NHS 
Trust – a medium sized district general hospital.
 – Characteristics of the eight selected 
organisations are given in Table 1 (page 14). 
Organisations represent a wide range of types, 
from around the UK. 
3.5 Choice of topics
Six specific topics were initially selected for study. 
Four of these were selected in conjunction with the 
four organisations participating in phase one of 
SCS, to correspond to the broad areas that they had 
chosen to study. From each of these broad areas, we 
selected more specific aspects for detailed study, 
focusing on areas that we felt would be both 
practical and relevant for multi-centre study. We 
also chose two additional topic areas, to broaden 
the range of topics studied, giving a total of six 
topics (Table 2). 
The SCS site associated with communication 
between healthcare sectors for older people was 
subsequently unable to participate in the study; this 
topic and the associated site were therefore 
excluded. We completed the study for the five 
remaining topics. For the remainder of this report, 
organisations will be given codes from A to H to 
preserve anonymity in relation to the results.
We allocated topics to ensure that data on each one 
would be collected in three different organisations. 
Wherever possible the three organisations were 
selected to represent a wide range of organisations. 
We initially planned to select an additional topic for 
each of the four SCS organisations with the aim of 
supporting them in their second SCS project. 
However as the SCS programme progressed, it 
became apparent that organisations would not start 
a second project within the timescale of the WISeR 
study. We therefore reallocated some of these topics 
to other organisations. Table 3 summarises the final 
allocation of the five topics to the five organisations 
participating in the WISeR study.
3.6 Comparison of organisations
Organisations were recruited with the aim of 
having a sample that was representative of the UK. 
To explore the extent to which this was achieved, 
we accessed a range of patient safety measures for 
the participating organisations (Table 4). 
This information is all publicly available from the 
National Patient Safety Agency, Dr Foster 
Intelligence, Department of Health, Health 
Protection Agency or the organisations’ internet 
sites. Some clinical audit data, relating to treatment 
of myocardial infarction and stroke, are also shown 
in Table 5. Some of the information was not 
available for all organisations .
These data demonstrate that the organisations 
selected for this study and for the SCS programme 
represent a diverse range of organisations with 
respect to their safety performance as represented 
by these measures. It is therefore likely that the 
results obtained may be applicable to the wider 
NHS across the UK. It is recognised that there has 
been debate about several of these measures but 
they still serve our purpose in demonstrating 
variation among participating organisations and 
therefore establishing that we used a reasonably 
representative sample.
3.7 Ethical considerations
At the start of the research we applied for ethical 
approval for the entire study (appendix 2). 
Approval was granted initially only for the 
quantitative data collection and we were asked to 
submit separate substantial amendment forms for 
each of the topics studied, with further details of the 
interviewees, interviewers, and interview 
questions. The main ethical issues involved 
maintaining confidentiality of the participating 
interviewees, while ensuring that any specific cases 
of serious breaches of practice were reported via the 
appropriate channels at the study organisations. 
To ensure interviewees’ confidentiality, we offered 
them the opportunity to read their interview 
transcript or handwritten notes and to identify any 
sections which they did not wish to be used as 
direct quotes in any reports and publications. 
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Table 2: The six topics selected for study
Topics selected by the four SCS 
organisations
Availability of information at the point of clinical decision making
Communication between healthcare sectors for older people admitted via 
urgent care pathway *
Prescribing errors in hospital inpatients
Communication and handover within acute medicine
Additional topics selected Equipment/ technology failures in the operating theatre
Safe systems for insertion of IV lines
* This topic was subsequently dropped from the study.
Table 3: Allocation of topics to organisations
Organisation A B C D E F G
Availability of information ◆ ◆ ◆
Prescribing errors ◆ ◆ ◆
Communication and handover ◆ ◆ ◆
Equipment in the operating theatre ◆ ◆ ◆
IV line insertion ◆ ◆ ◆
◆ represents the topic being studied in that organisation.
We also gave our assurance that we would not 
use the names of any people, departments or 
organisations in association with any of the 
interview data. 
To address the need to ensure that any serious 
errors or examples of poor practice were 
reported, we informed interviewees that if we 
identified any incidents that had resulted in 
patient harm or resulted from a serious breach 
of practice, we would ensure that they were 
reported on the relevant organisation’s incident 
reporting system as per local procedures. 
Sample participant information leaflet and 
consent forms are given in appendix 3 and 
appendix 4 respectively. Ethical approval was 
subsequently gained for each individual topic 
(appendix 2). 
We gained approval from each local research 
and development office to conduct the study at 
each organisation, first for the quantitative data 
collection and then for the interviews relating 
to each topic once ethical approval was gained. 
The next section describes each of the five 
clinical processes studied in turn.
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Table 4: Comparative patient safety data for organisations
Site A B C D E F G H
SCS site? No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Dr Foster Safety Score1 90 10 50 30 NA 70 NA 30
PEAT Environment score Good Good Good Good Excellent NA
HSMR all1 80 90 90 100 90 120
HSMR non-elective1 80 90 90 100 90 120
HSMR stroke1 80 130 120 100 110 110
Low mortality CCS groups 0.0009 0.0024 0.0019 0.0019 0.0013 0.0015
NRLS report 2.81 0.38 1.76 7.53 1.39 5.82
Dr Foster Commit-ment to safety 1 70 80 90 80 90 100
MRSA rates per 1,000 bed days 8 0 4 6 3 4
1.  Scores have been rounded to nearest 10 to maintain anonymity. Scores range from 0 (poor) to 100 (excellent) and represent an overall 
score based on a number of safety indicators. 
NA:  not applicable - data not available
PEAT:  patient environment action team
HSMR:  hospital standardised mortality ratio
CCS:  clinical classification system
NRLS:  National Patient Safety Agency’s national reporting and learning system. Incidents reported per 100 admissions 
MRSA:  Multi-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infection.
Table 5: Comparative clinical audit data for organisations
Prescription of medication for secondary prevention following 
myocardial infarctiona
Overall stroke 
audit scoreb
Aspirin 
(%)
Beta 
blocker
Statins ACE 
inhibitor
Clopidogrel
National average 98% 93% 97% 92% 94% Middle half
Organisation A 99% 91% 99% 93% 94% Upper quartile
Organisation B 92% 88% 93% 89% 83% Middle half
Organisation C 97% 93% 96% 70% n/a Middle half
Organisation D 100% 98% 100% 97% 99% Upper quartile
Organisation E Data not Available Lower quartile
Organisation F 100% 100% 99% 99% 98% Upper quartile
Organisation G Data not available
Organisation H 98% 92% 97% 87% 96% Upper quartile
a. Data are from year 2008-2009 (MINAP, 2009)
b. National sentinel audit of stroke care. Data from 2008 (Royal College of 
Physicians, 2009)
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Five studies of system processes
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Chapter 4: 
Reliability of clinical information 
availability in outpatient clinics 
by Susan Burnett
4.1 Introduction
Clinicians are often faced with making clinical 
decisions in the absence of patient records and 
associated information, and missing clinical 
information has been found to be a contributory 
factor in medical errors. 
For example in the review of 2,353 adverse events 
reported in the Quality in Australian Health Care 
Study (QAHCS), Wilson et al (Ross McL Wilson, 
1999) found 1.8% of these were due to ‘acting on 
insufficient information’ with 26.4% of these 
leading to permanent disability. 
In 2007, over 36,000 reports were received by the 
NPSA relating to failures in documentation (NRLS 
Data Summary Issue 8). 
The Health Service Journal (HSJ) analysis of over 
two million outpatient appointments in 49 
hospitals from 2006-08 revealed that 54,000 took 
place without the patient’s full records. 
The HSJ suggested that if this rate was replicated 
across the NHS, approximately 1.2 million 
outpatients in England would be seen without their 
medical records every year (Gainsbury, 2008). 
Despite these high numbers, the impact of missing 
records had not previously been reported for 
outpatients in the UK. We did not know how 
clinicians proceeded in the absence of key 
information, or what kind of disruption patient 
care or risks to patient safety resulted.
This topic was chosen by one of the Safer Clinical 
Systems organisations to support their work to 
improve the reliability of core information being 
available at the point of clinical consultation and 
was also studied in two additional organisations.
The topic focuses on the prevalence of missing 
clinical information in surgical outpatient clinics in 
three hospital organisations, looking at what 
information is missing, and why and how the 
doctor proceeded in the absence of this 
information. 
The risks to patient safety are assessed together with 
the impact on the patient’s care pathway. 
4.2 Objectives
 – To create a process map describing how clinical 
information is assembled and made available at 
the time of the patient’s appointment.
 – To measure the prevalence of missing clinical 
information for patients attending outpatient 
clinics in general surgery in each of three 
organisations.
 – To describe the types of clinical information 
that is missing, the action taken by clinicians in 
the absence of this information and the 
associated risk to patients.
 – To identify any variation in the type of missing 
clinical information between organisations.
 – To explore the systems factors involved.
 – To make recommendations for improving the 
reliability of the clinical information process in 
outpatient clinics.
20    THE HEALTH FOUNDATION
4.3 Methods
Organisation selection and access
This topic was selected by organisation G for 
investigation as part of the SCS project and was also 
studied in organisations A and E. 
In each organisation we worked with a nominated 
coordinator and a lead surgeon to develop the core 
information for the study and to identify suitable 
clinics for inclusion in the study. 
In organisation G no systems changes were made as 
part of SCS prior to or during our data collection 
period.
The study was undertaken in one or more of the 
following clinics at each site: general surgery, 
gastro-intestinal surgery, colorectal and vascular 
surgery. 
The specific clinics studied at each site varied 
depending on local practice and clinical specialties. 
Process mapping
A process map was drafted based on the processes 
for gathering information for surgical outpatients 
in organisation G, and then sent to the lead for the 
project in organisations A and E for comment and 
to identify any additional features or differences 
that needed to be included. 
The researcher visited each organisation and 
consulted with staff in outpatients and medical 
records to understand the processes and produce 
individual process maps for each organisation. 
The process maps were used to help identify the 
potential failure points for the data collection and 
later analysis.
Developing a core data set
We began the work with the surgeons in 
organisation G to agree a core data set for clinical 
information that should be available at a surgical 
outpatient appointment if required by the surgeon. 
Following discussion about whether it was relevant 
to distinguish between new and follow-up patients, 
or between patients who were long or short-term 
follow-ups, pre or post-operative and so on, it was 
agreed that all patients would be included and the 
core data set should be developed to encompass 
this. 
A list of key clinical information needed during a 
typical outpatient consultation was drawn up by the 
surgeons in organisation G and comments were 
sought from organisations A and E. 
The list was then reduced to a core list in 
consultation with the organisations to ensure that it 
was sufficient for the purposes of the study but not 
overly onerous for completion by the surgeons. 
It was agreed that information would be considered 
‘missing’ if the surgeon looked for it during the 
appointment but could not find it either in the 
written record or on the hospital’s computer 
systems. 
In this way the doctors only recorded the 
information that they considered should have been 
available, but was not. 
The final agreed list of clinical information required 
for a typical surgical outpatient appointment that 
might cause a problem if the surgeon looked for it 
but could not find it, was:
 – past medical history
 – referral letter/other specialty letter
 – discharge summary 
 – current medication
 – allergies
 – radiology/imaging results
 – diagnostic test results
 – procedure notes/anaesthetic record 
 – electrocardiogram (ECG) report
 – blood laboratory results
 – outpatient medical records/last clinic letter.
Sampling and sample size
We worked with the organisations to determine the 
most appropriate sample size, taking into account 
the practicalities of data collection whilst running 
busy clinics. We calculated the sample size based on 
a primary binomial outcome of whether required 
information was available or not. 
     21 HOW SAFE ARE CLINICAL SYSTEMS? 
A target of 400 patients in each organisation was 
agreed. This sample size enables the observed 
proportions across the whole sample to be 
estimated to the nearest 5% at a 95% confidence 
level, recognising that the subsets within the sample 
will have wider confidence intervals. 
Data collection and analysis
We worked with the organisations to develop the 
most practical method for data collection and 
agreed on a form to be completed by the doctor for 
each patient where either the whole medical record 
or the identified information was judged by them to 
be missing. 
The data collection form is included in appendix 5. 
In brief, doctors were asked to record details of: 
 – What was required, but missing (test results, 
images, referral letter etc.). 
 – Whether or not they relied on the patient for 
any of the clinical information that was missing.
 – Whether they made a clinical decision without 
the information being present in the medical 
records or available on a computer.
 – Whether or not the patient required another 
appointment because the information was 
missing.
 – The impact on patient care (delay in 
management, cancellation of procedure etc) as 
judged by the doctor using a four point scale 
(none, minor, moderate, severe).
 – The potential risk of harm to the patient as 
judged by the doctor using a five point scale (no 
threat, minor, moderate, potential adverse 
event, potential serious adverse event).
Each record was entered into SPSS for analysis. The 
total number of patients attending each clinic 
studied was obtained from the clinic records. Data 
were collected between July and September 2009. 
At organisation A, a researcher briefed the surgeons 
involved. At organisation E, we explained the 
requirements for data collection to a local project 
lead who then recruited auxiliary nurses to prompt 
the surgeons to complete the forms. 
At organisation G, a local project lead co-ordinated 
the data collection and briefed the clinic nurses 
who then gave the forms to the surgeons for 
completion. At organisations E and G, the medical 
directors also sent an email to surgeons regarding 
the data collection.
Exploring variability in systems 
failures
We conducted an exploration of the variation 
between organisations. In completing the process 
maps it became clear that there was little, if any 
variation in the way information was handled in 
each organisation for each clinic and so we did not 
explore variation between clinics in the same 
organisation. 
Exploring the systems failures involved
Following data collection in each organisation we 
identified the number and types of information that 
was missing and explored the reasons for this, using 
interviews with key staff involved. 
It was important to find out about the causes of the 
failure – why the information was missing and the 
reasons for any variability.
Participants were selected to be interviewed if they 
were involved in the delivery or use of clinical 
information in the outpatient setting. 
Our aim was to interview a sample of staff with an 
understanding of the issues in clinical records 
management and the booking and dispatching of 
clinical investigation results, as well as surgeons 
using the information in clinics. 
The local collaborator in each organisation 
suggested the appropriate staff and helped to invite 
them to participate. 
A standardised semi-structured research topic 
guide was used and all interviews conducted by the 
same interviewer. 
Interviews comprised of questions exploring the 
likely causes of information not being available 
when needed for clinical decision making in the 
outpatient setting, and any recommendations for 
improving the reliability of these systems. 
The interview guide is set out in appendix 6. 
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Figure 3: Process map showing preparation of medical records for outpatient clinics, organisation A
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Figure 4: Process map showing preparation of medical records for outpatient clinics, organisation E
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Figure 5: Process map showing preparation of medical records for outpatient clinics, organisation G
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Interviews were held between September and 
November 2009 and lasted between 20 and 30 
minutes. All interviewees consented, for their 
interviews to be recorded and transcribed 
verbatim.
We performed qualitative analysis of content with 
the aid of NVIVO (version 8) qualitative analysis 
software. Thematic analysis was undertaken using 
the accident causation model. 
Associated sub-themes were then drawn from these 
data. Comparison and refinement was carried out 
between two researchers. 
4.4 Results
Process maps
The process maps for the preparation of medical 
records for clinics in each of the three sites are 
shown in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5.
In each organisation, the process of finding medical 
records for each clinic began two weeks before the 
clinic date. 
The first part of the process was undertaken by staff 
in the medical records departments and involved 
retrieving the records from the library, and, if not 
available, finding them through the tracking 
systems in use in each organisation. 
A second tracking was undertaken around one 
week before the clinic to find the records for newly 
booked appointments, last minute changes and any 
that had not been found in the first search. 
While each organisation had a system in place to 
track the location of medical records, this was not 
always followed. 
As a result, medical records staff had to spend time 
visiting the various locations where medical 
records might be kept and phoning secretaries, 
doctors and staff in other departments such as 
clinical audit to search for the missing records. 
The process for requesting investigations differed 
between organisations. In organisation A, most of 
the requests for investigations were done 
electronically, with hand written requests used as a 
backup.
In organisation E, all requests were hand written 
and sent to the relevant departments for the 
investigations to be performed. 
In organisation G, some were hand written but 
most were done electronically; this depended on 
factors such as the type of test, and whether or not 
the doctor had a computer terminal available. 
A new computer system was being introduced at 
the time of the study and so paper and electronic 
systems were being run in parallel
At organisation A, most of the investigations were 
reported electronically. About 24 to 48 hours prior 
to each clinic, the outpatient nurses prepared or 
‘prepped’ the records, looking at the referral or last 
clinic letter. Any results required were printed out 
and filed in the medical records. 
The doctors in clinic could therefore review the 
results either on the computer or in the paper 
health records. In organisations E and G most of 
the results were reported electronically. 
Hard copies of the results were sent to the relevant 
consultant’s secretary, who filed them (if the 
medical records were available). 
Health records were prepared between six days and 
one day prior to clinic by coordinators based in the 
outpatient clinic. Results were printed and filed in 
the medical records (if not already done by the 
secretary). As in organisation A, the doctors could 
review the results either on the computer or in the 
paper records.
The prevalence of missing information 
in surgical outpatient clinics
From the total sample of 1,161 patients across three 
organisations, 175 (15%) had missing information 
reported by their doctors during the surgical 
outpatient appointment. This corresponds to a 
reliability of 85%. 
For 122 of these patients the doctor also recorded 
the type of information that was missing. For the 
remaining 53 patients, the type of missing 
information was not recorded, 47 of whom were in 
organisation E. As a result of this difference the 
results will be presented, where relevant, both 
including and excluding these 53 patients. Where 
the data for organisation E are of interest but 
conclusions cannot be drawn, this will be noted.
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Table 6: Number of patients with missing information in each organisation
Organisation
Total number 
of patients in 
the sample
Number of patients with missing 
information (percentage of all 
patients in sample)
Number with type of missing 
information recorded (percentage 
of those with missing information)
A 411 18 (4%) 17 (94%)
E 423 113 (27%) 66 (58%)
G 327 44 (13%) 39 (88%)
Total 1161 175 (15%) 122 (70%)
Table 7: Availability of entire medical record in each organisation
Organisation Records unavailable Percentage unavailable for whole sample
A 1 0.2%
E 3 0.7%
G 14 4.3%
Total 18 1.5%
Frequency
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Figure 6: Frequency of missing information by type, across all organisations
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Table 6 shows the number of patients with missing 
information for the total sample and where the type 
of missing information was also recorded. 
A chi-squared test with a null hypothesis that there 
is the same proportion of missing data across all 
organisations, enables us to reject this hypothesis 
for both the number of patients with missing 
information (n=175) and the number of patients 
where the missing information was recorded 
(n=122). There is a highly significant difference 
between the organisations (p=0.000) for both sets 
of data. 
A pair-wise comparison of differences in 
proportions between organisations establishes that 
the proportion of missing records in organisation A 
was statistically different from those found in both 
E and G (p<0.000 in both cases), with less 
information missing in organisation A than in the 
other two organisations. TABLE 7
Table 7 displays the availability of the entire 
medical record for patients in each organisation. 
The entire medical record was available for 98.5% of 
patients in the sample.
Conducting a chi-squared test, we can conclude 
(p=0.000) that the organisations are different in the 
proportions of missing medical records (in every 
use of the chi-squared test for this topic the 
expected values were at least 5). A pair-wise 
comparison of differences in proportions 
establishes that the proportion of cases in 
organisation G was statistically different from that 
found in both A and E (p<0.001 in both cases), 
where organisation G had a higher incidence of the 
entire medical record being missing. Organisations 
A and E were not significantly different from each 
other (p=0.330).
Type of missing information
Where information was missing and recorded, the 
average number of items missing per patient was 
1.8 in organisation A; 1.7 in organisation E; and 2.4 
in organisation G. The frequency of the 
information that was missing is set out in Figure 6. 
This information is presented by organisation in 
Figure 7: Frequency of missing information by 
type, in each organisation. 
Figure 7 presents the data from Figure 6 separated 
for each organisation. Figure 8 presents these data 
as a proportion of the total sample in each 
organisation. Figure 9 presents the data as a 
proportion of the number of patients in each 
organisation with missing information. 
In organisation E a further 47 patients (not 
included in these figures) had missing information 
noted, but the type of missing information was not 
recorded. 
From our results, and these tables, it can be seen 
that in organisation A when information was 
missing it was most likely to be radiology/imaging 
and diagnostic test results. Organisation E similarly 
had these items missing most often with the 
addition of blood laboratory results. In 
organisation G written communication was more 
frequently missing (discharge summary, procedure 
notes, referral letter and outpatient notes). 
Organisation A had information missing less 
frequently than in organisations E and G. 
Figure 10 summarises the number of items of 
missing information per patient for the 122 patients 
where the type of missing information was 
recorded. The majority (68) had only one piece of 
information missing, but three had seven items 
missing and one had ten items missing. 
Impact on patient care
The doctors perceived there to have been an impact 
on patient care - such as delays in patient 
management, cancellation of operation etc - in 55 
patients (4.7% of the whole sample, or 32% of those 
patients with missing information). This is 
summarised in Table 8 (page 33).
The three cases where the impact on patient care 
was deemed to be severe had the following specific 
items of information missing: diagnostic test results 
(n=1); both radiology/imaging results and 
diagnostic test results (n=1); and procedure notes 
(n=1). 
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Figure 7: Frequency of missing information by type, in each organisation
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Figure 8: Frequency of missing information by type as a proportion of all attendances in 
each organisation (A=411, E=423, G=327)
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Figure 9: Frequency of missing information by type as a proportion of those patients  
with missing information in each organisation (A=17, E=66, G=39)
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Figure 10: Number of items of missing information per patient
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Extra clinic appointment needed
Twenty patients were given a second appointment 
because of missing information (1.7% of all patients 
in the sample). Of these 11 were in organisation A; 
7 in organisation E; and 2 in organisation G. The 
most common types of missing information for 
these patients were radiology/imaging and 
diagnostic test results, followed by the referral 
letter.
Risk of harm
When information was missing, the doctors were 
asked to rate their perception of the risk of harm to 
the patient. In 35 patients (3% of the whole sample, 
and 20.5% of those with missing information), 
doctors perceived there to be a risk of harm from 
the missing information ranging from a minor 
threat to the risk of a serious adverse event (Table 
9). The risk of a serious adverse event was recorded 
for a patient whose diagnostic test results were 
missing. 
Reliance on patients for missing 
information 
Where information was missing, we asked the 
doctors whether or not they relied on patients for 
this information. When information was missing, 
the doctors relied on their patients for help on more 
than half of all occasions (58%). 
Table 8: Perceived impact on patient care of missing clinical information 
Perceived impact on 
patient care of missing 
information Number 
Percentage (%) of 
patients with missing 
information (n=175)
Percentage (%) of total 
sample (n=1161)
None 104 59%
Minor 34 20% 3%
Moderate 18 10% 1.5%
Severe 3 2% 0.2%
Not recorded 16 9%
Total 175 100%
Table 9: Risk of harm associated with missing clinical information
Risk of harm 
associated with missing 
information Number of patients
Percentage (%) of 
patients with missing 
information
Percentage (%) of total 
sample (n=1161)
No threat 54 31%
Minor threat 22 13% 2%
Moderate threat 12 7% 1%
Potential adverse event 0 0
Potential serious adverse 
event 1 0.5%
Not recorded 86 49%
Total 175 100%
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Table 10: Reliance on the patient when clinical information is missing
Organisation 
Reliance on patient where 
clinical information was 
missing
Percentage (%) of patients 
with missing information 
(n=175) 
Percentage (%) of total 
sample in each organisation 
(n=1161)
A 12 67% 3%
E 58 51% 14%
G 32 72% 10%
Total 102 58% 9%
Table 11: Making clinical decisions without key Information
 Organisation
Made a clinical decision 
where clinical information 
was missing
Percentage (%) of patients 
with missing information 
(n=175)
Percentage (%) of 
total sample in each 
organisation  
(n=1161)
A 6 33.3% 1.5%
E 13 11.5% 3.0%
G 18 41.0% 5.5%
Total 37 21.1% 3.2%
Table 12: Participants roles in each organisation
Participant
Profession
Organisation A Organisation E Organisation G
1 Medical Secretary Radiology Administration 
Manager
Radiologist
2 Outpatient Sister Surgeon Surgeon
3 Medical Records Manager Outpatient Sister Health Records supervisor
4 Radiology Secretary Pathology Manager Medical Secretary
5 Surgeon Medical Records Outpatient Staff Nurse
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Table 10 sets out the number of times doctors relied 
on their patients to provide missing information. 
Conducting a chi-squared test we can conclude 
(p=0.255) that there were no significant differences 
between organisations in the proportion of cases 
where doctors relied on patients to provide missing 
information.
Making a clinical decision when 
information is missing
Doctors were asked if they had to make a clinical 
decision without key information and in 37 cases 
(21% of those with missing information) the 
answer was yes (Table 11). 
When a doctor made a clinical decision without key 
information, the most common types of 
information missing were diagnostic test results 
and blood laboratory results, with ECGs being the 
least common.
4.5 Results from system failures 
analysis
Fifteen people were interviewed, five from each of 
the three organisations including surgeons, 
radiologists, administrators and nursing staff, as set 
out in Table 12. The two surgeons interviewed at 
organisations E and G had previously assisted with 
data collection. 
The problems associated with missing information 
relate both to making clinical decisions, and to the 
effect it can have in the confidence and trust the 
patient has in the surgeon. This was described by 
one participant:
‘The difficulty is if you see the person without the 
letter ... the patient’s perception of why they’re in 
the clinic may be different to the reasons that the 
GP stated or there may be pertinent facts which... 
the patient doesn’t describe ... if you see somebody 
without the episode that pertains to their recent 
admission, when they’re coming back to clinic 
having been in for the emergency, you’re relying on 
your memory which is obviously not reliable, or 
you have to ask the patient and that is a very 
awkward thing to do when you have a patient in 
front of you who clearly knows you and remembers 
you but if you have to ask them details of their care 
they lose a lot of trust in you because you can’t 
remember. Now if I have 150 admissions in a week I 
can’t remember them all but that individual patient 
is left feeling quite insecure.’
Causes of unreliability
From the analysis, the causes of unreliability could 
be grouped into those pertaining to paper based 
systems, issues with computer systems, and the 
problems of running both paper based and 
computer systems in parallel. The causes that were 
common to all three organisations were: 
 – The difficulties of aligning a patient’s complex 
pathway to ensure all tests are completed and 
reported before the patient returns for a follow-
up outpatient appointment.
 – Patients having multiple hospital numbers 
arising from hospital mergers (each hospital 
having had its own numbering system prior to 
the merger).
 – Problems associated with running parallel 
computer and paper based systems, which 
means staff do not know where to find relevant 
information.
 – Short notice bookings and changes to 
appointments – making it difficult to find 
medical records in time and assemble the 
required information.
 – Temporary staff (including locum doctors, 
nurses and administrative staff) being 
unfamiliar with the systems. 
 – Medical records tracking systems not being 
used or not being used properly in the 
organisation.
 – Records being misfiled or not filed at all.
The following sections describe in more detail the 
causes of missing clinical information in surgical 
outpatients appointments, grouped into the 
accident causation model factors. Where relevant 
these are subdivided into the findings as they relate 
to paper based systems, computer systems and 
running both in parallel. 
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Organisation and management factors
In all organisations the difficulties of aligning a 
patient’s complex pathway were cited as a particular 
problem, ensuring that all tests are all completed 
and reported before patient returns for their follow 
up appointment:
‘Where the patient needs either a biopsy, maybe 
they need some form of staging scan, may need 
something else ... you want everything lined up in 
the right order, and organisationally, that can be 
logistically very difficult.’ Participant 2, 
organisation E
‘Because of the time, it might be, they may have 
been sent for something that will take longer than 
their next clinic appointment.’ Participant 3, 
organisation E
Hospital mergers have brought a number of 
organisational problems to medical records 
including patients having multiple hospital 
numbers. Also, patients can have appointments in 
two different hospitals in the same organisation on 
the same day, bringing logistical problems in the 
transfer of the medical records for the 
appointments. 
‘It comes full circle back to our staff who are pulling 
the clinics. Quite often they then have two or three 
different numbers that they need to look through as 
well as having two or three different places, whether 
it’s still in the pre file or the file, they might then 
have the six, number that begins with a six to look 
at but then if it had been merged into one of the 
other hospital sites you’ve got to check that number 
as well because it could be changed into that one.’ 
Participant 3, organisation G 
The lack of accountability or ownership of the 
medical record was noted as a problem by two 
organisations, who noted that sometimes no one 
staff member takes particular care of a patient’s 
records, throughout the process of tracking, filing, 
storing in offices etc. One example given was of 
inpatients who are allocated beds on a ward in 
another specialty (outliers); in a case like this it was 
felt that the patient’s records are not stored carefully 
and they are given lower priority, and as a result 
their records go missing more often.
‘Some of the doctors do tend to put them [the 
medical records] in places that we are unaware. But 
I don’t think they do that intentionally. I think they 
pick them up, off they go, do their thing and they 
just leave them and walk out, unaware that other 
people could be looking for their notes.’ Participant 
5, organisation E
‘Who’s accountable for looking after the notes 
upstairs?’ Participant 5, organisation G
‘If a surgical patient is boarding in a vascular ward 
or a medical ward, it’s [the attitude amongst staff] 
very much, well, it’s not one of our patients, it’s not 
our problem.’ Participant 4, organisation G
The ongoing problems with missing information 
have led to staff lacking confidence in hospital 
systems and accepting this as normal, so for 
particularly important cases the doctors kept 
records locked in drawers or found workarounds 
rather than using the internal post. Keeping records 
locked away was reported as a particular problem 
when patients were admitted as an emergency 
outside normal working hours.
‘And medical records has found quite a lot of notes 
in the drawers in the doctors’ offices. They’re not 
keeping back for the sake of keeping it, they need it 
because if the patients needs to be discussed at the 
MDT.’ Participant 2, organisation A 
Work/Environment factors
Design, availability and maintenance of 
systems and equipment
Paper systems
Problems with paper systems were wide ranging, 
including poor storage facilities in offices and 
clinics meaning medical records were stored on the 
floor, to problems with tracking medical records, 
and knowing where the medical records are in the 
organisation. Poorly fixed folders were cited by two 
organisations as a problem, with descriptions of 
thicker folders (‘fat folders’) for sick patients often 
falling apart. 
‘Our case notes lie on the floor, we just do not have 
enough room to keep our case notes.’ Participant 4 
organisation G
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‘What we call ‘fat folders’...they’re obviously used a 
lot of the time because the patient is ill. So they 
become broken ... ripped...’ Participant 5, 
organisation E
The design of the systems to transfer paper records 
included insufficient fax machines and problems 
with the multiplicity of forms to fill in which are 
different for each test or investigation. 
‘The difficulty with faxes is that often they’re 
relatively inaccessible, so if you’re in a clinic and 
somebody has to fax something through then the 
clinic staff have to go all the way back along to 
another clinic to be able to actually get the paper 
copy..’ Participant 2, organisation G
Computer systems
The problems with computer systems included the 
design of the software, the age and availability of 
terminals, problems with passwords and logins 
with multiple systems and universal access to the 
information.
Poorly designed software led to staff not being able 
to find out if tests had been requested and not being 
alerted when results are available. Old technology 
means that some surgeons cannot view electronic 
images from scans and X-rays during an 
appointment because they take too long to load. 
Some clinics do not have enough terminals for the 
doctors to access information during the clinic. 
‘The paper requests should be filed in the notes, if 
they’re not then there’s the computers. Computers 
aren’t in every room ... we have a computer in the 
nurses’ station, which is quite a busy area [and so it 
can be difficult to access results]’ Participant 3, 
organisation E 
Passwords and logins to multiple systems were 
highlighted as a problem in accessing information 
that staff knew was available – both in terms of the 
time to login and also forgetting or not being 
allocated passwords:
‘Some of the doctors forget their password or they 
haven’t got a password so they can’t always access 
the system... the x-ray system it’s a different 
password.’ Participant 3, organisation E
‘The problem with the computer data is it is, it 
seems to be stored in different systems in different 
programmes so there’s not a unified or united 
software that brings all the things together. So this 
does not really help, it makes things even more 
complicated.’ Participant 5, organisation A
In organisation E, there was universal access to the 
records on the computer system so sensitive results 
were not entered and showed a nil return, with 
obvious implications:
‘Because it’s globally available, we can’t put sensitive 
results on there, because there’s no way of 
controlling access ... You can get them on the 
clinical portal because when it was designed it had 
a break glass function built into it, such that you can 
break that and you can access that particular result. 
So again, if a result is considered to be sensitive, if 
somebody tries to view that ... on [the hospital’s 
main computer system], they won’t find it. Now 
whether they know that it’s not there or whether 
they think it should be there and don’t know ... it 
will give them a nil return, and they could conclude 
from that, the report hasn’t come back. It is there, 
it’s just that you can’t access it on that particular 
system.’ Participant 4, organisation E
Mixed computer and paper systems
Running both paper and computer systems in 
parallel was given as a problem in all three 
organisations, with staff not knowing where to look 
for information
‘One thing is operating notes. Operating notes from 
previous operations are sometimes very important 
and I find it hard in this hospital sometimes to find 
these. And the problem is maybe I don’t know 
where they are but I have the feeling they are 
handwritten notes’ Participant 5, organisation A
Workload and shift patterns
The particular issue here is one of time – time for 
doctors to review a patient’s medical records before 
a clinic, time during the appointment to log in and 
review results, time to look for information before 
the clinic starts. Reviewing the medical records 
before clinic is often allocated to junior staff who 
may be inexperienced, not knowing from reading 
the medical records what tests have been ordered. 
‘Half the time we don’t see the notes at all until the 
patient arrives at clinic. We don’t do anything with 
the notes, they’re all dealt with by the clerical staff 
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prior to the patient arriving at clinic.’ Participant 5 
organisation G 
The design of work systems in two organisations 
meant that the patient’s medical records may still be 
on the porter’s trolley when the patient arrives for 
their appointment.
‘Sometimes new patients will be arriving...but their 
case notes have not yet arrived. They’ve left medical 
records and they’re out on a porter’s trolley 
somewhere round the hospital and if you wait long 
enough they will arrive.’ Participant 2, organisation 
G 
Administrative and management systems
Paper systems
Across all organisations the problems of finding 
paper based medical records at short notice was 
described as a problem. The reasons for short notice 
bookings included urgent appointments, re-
bookings and waiting list initiative clinics. 
‘It’s all about the government waiting list times, 
trying to get the waiting list down, to get the times 
down you have to see more people obviously 
quicker, so the clinics that we pull are building up 
and it’s just putting pressure on the folk that are here 
to pull extra notes without any extra help.’ 
Participant 3, organisation G
The internal post combined with the time taken to 
type letters was described as a problem in 
organisation E: 
‘I think the letter is probably the slowest. Because 
you’ve obviously got a secretary waiting to type a 
letter etc and I think that they hold things up.’ 
Participant 1, organisation E
Mixed computer and paper systems
Delays in returning test results on computer systems 
were given as a cause of missing information in 
organisation E, where clinical staff may dictate their 
reports for a secretary to type and enter on the 
computer system.
Staffing issues
In two organisations staff shortages have meant that 
work, such as pulling medical records, may not be 
completed in time for clinics. In one organisation a 
shortage of IT staff had led to only junior doctors 
being trained in how to use the computer system:
‘But the doctors...there were not enough staff to 
train them all to be up to speed in terms of 
requesting electronic requests from the outpatient 
department...the junior doctors on the wards ... 
have been taught how to do it ... but as the older 
doctors in the hospital are not as au fait with 
electronic ...they have tended to stick to the old 
fashioned paper format.’ Participant 1, organisation 
G
In all three organisations problems were 
experienced with temporary staff or staff covering 
shifts and being unfamiliar with the local systems. 
This led to problems with them being unable to find 
information when required, not having access to 
certain computer systems, or filling in forms 
wrongly:
‘It could be somebody is asked to sit in at the last 
minute and wouldn’t necessarily know the routine 
of a clinic or what results were needed.’ Participant 
3, organisation E
‘And [if] it’s an inexperienced coordinator on it then 
possibly something will get missed.’ Participant 5, 
organisation E
Tests can be delayed and results not accessed due to 
doctors being on call or new into post or locums 
being unfamiliar with the systems:
‘The other week I was working in emergency 
radiology and a doctor brought some inpatient 
request down and there was no consultant at the 
top. So I said, well who’s the consultant looking after 
the patient? I don’t know, I’m just on call...and I said, 
well I’m sorry but I can’t process the form without a 
consultant’ Participant 1, organisation E
‘And with new doctors that come in they don’t 
always get a password so you’re looking on there.’ 
Participant 3, organisation E
Team factors
Communication and team stability were the main 
factors here. Communication related in particular 
to doctors being clear about why a patient is coming 
to the clinic and informing the team about the test 
2.2 Reliability of prescribing for hospital inpatients
Bryony Dean Franklin
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results that should be available:
‘Medically we need to be more explicit, say this 
person’s coming for a biopsy result therefore we 
need to make sure the biopsy result is available.’ 
Participant 2, organisation G
‘Sometimes if you read the last doctor’s letter it’s not 
always clear what’s been requested…’ Participant 3, 
organisation E
‘If they don’t state in their last clinic letter that, oh 
I’ve sent this patient off for whatever, then we really 
wouldn’t have any idea.’ Participant 5, organisation 
E 
Poor communication of changes to procedures for 
ordering tests in one organisation created delays in 
the test being done and hence delays in the results 
being available: 
‘Our big problem at the moment is that they’ve 
changed the rules for bowel preparation for barium 
enema and you have to ... sign another form to say 
the patient’s fit...but they haven’t redesigned the 
form yet because there’s going to be a box to tick, so 
at the moment we’re sending them off, we keep 
forgetting and then we get ... a fax back.’ Participant 
2, organisation E 
Poor writing also created delays in tests being 
conducted, particularly poor form filling:
 ‘On a daily basis we are contacting GP surgeries and 
saying, can you fax a form through, no one 
completed this or, you know, we send quite a few 
back. The writing is very poor, often you can’t read 
the writing.’ Participant 1, organisation E
‘It’s very much dependent on who fills the form in, 
and one of the privileges of being a consultant is, an 
awful lot is done on your behalf, so they write your 
name at the top and then fill in inadequately. Either 
they haven’t given sufficient information such that 
the radiologist doesn’t feel that the bar is high 
enough for them to justify an x-ray or whatever it is, 
or it’s illegible or it was the wrong investigation.’ 
Participant 2, organisation E 
Finally, team stability was seen as necessary in 
getting to know what tests a doctor might order so 
that clinic staff automatically know what to look for:
‘A lot of our coordinators only work...for the same 
consultants all the time so I think they tend to know 
what happens with their patients. They know if they 
go for bloods regular, and things like that, so they 
might just automatically look.’ Participant 5, 
organisation E
Individual staff factors
The individual staff factors mainly related to human 
error with wrong numbers entered for fax 
machines, wrong patient numbers entered when 
booking appointments, tests sent to the wrong 
department, placed in the wrong envelope or 
entered on the computer system wrongly and 
reported in the wrong place so the doctor cannot 
find the result.
Paper systems
Items being misfiled was described as a problem in 
all three organisations:
‘There’s an element of what we call a misfile. They’ve 
gone into the library but they’ve been filed wrong.’ 
Participant 5, organisation E
‘I don’t doubt that we make mistakes handling the 
amount of paper that we do. We may well misfile 
something into an envelope for outpatients. We may 
end up slipping in something for A&E or 
something, by mistake.’ Participant 4,  
organisation E 
Computer systems
Entering the wrong numbers or not looking in the 
right place for the results can cause information to 
go missing or not be available when needed:
‘In terms of electronic reporting there really is only 
two reasons that it wouldn’t get back to them. And 
that is, a) if they didn’t even bother to look for it 
electronically, and second is, if the location at the 
point of entry was wrong. So if it was sent up to us 
and it was wrong, or if we entered it wrong, it will go 
into electronic space, but the wrong electronic 
space.’ Participant 4, organisation E 
The GP entering the wrong patient number when 
booking an appointment for a patient can be a cause 
of that patient’s records not being available in 
outpatients:
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‘Because with the Choose and Book system, if you 
don’t get it exactly right [it] will reregister the 
patient. So we put in place ways to monitor that, but 
some get through. So, you could go to a clinic with a 
Choose and Book number and the clinician will 
then, ... say, but we know you and we will then have 
to find the old notes.’ Participant 3 organisation A
In one organisation attitude was cited as a factor 
that meant that the medical records tracking 
system was not used properly: 
‘I’ve genuinely had someone say to me on the phone 
that tracking’s beneath me, that’s what they said to 
me on the phone, and we’re thinking, it was beneath 
you? You’re not high and mighty, you’re not 
excused from doing the same, and again it comes 
down to patient care because we phone a certain 
secretary for a set of notes, this one in particular 
that I spoke to, she then didn’t send, or she did send 
the notes sorry but didn’t track them and she’d sent 
it somewhere else and I’m phoning her to get the 
notes back and she started moaning at me and 
saying, why are you phoning me, I don’t have them 
and stuff, but well because they’re tracked to you.’ 
Participant 3 organisation G
Task Factors
Task factors related to protocols and systems being 
inadequate or not used appropriately - for example, 
doctors not following protocol for requesting 
X-rays for their patients. In one organisation some 
doctors physically hand the radiologist a request 
card rather than using the formal system. Having 
different systems running in parallel for requesting 
tests was also a cause of missing information. 
‘The requesting side I think is that, I think 
everybody should use the same method. I think 
that when you’ve got consultants writing letters to 
maybe specific radiologists, ...I think that can cause 
a problem. I think there should be just one route in. 
And then that could come in to a central place and 
then be distributed to the people who need to check 
the forms.’ Participant 1 organisation E 
Medical records tracking systems were often 
described as not being used properly, sometimes 
deliberately and sometimes through lack of 
knowledge:
 ‘Where they’ve gone? Sometimes the notes is not 
tracked. They take the notes and then they don’t 
track them. Where do you expect us to find them?’ 
Participant 2, organisation A
Patient characteristics
Three factors summarise the patient characteristics 
that create problems for hospitals in ensuring all 
information is available to a doctor in a clinic. 
Patients who are being seen by many different 
specialties:
‘There are some patients they go to about ten 
different clinics, so you could imagine this ...’ 
Participant 2, organisation A
‘The only time that possibly we couldn’t get the 
notes is if the patient’s got an appointment in 
another hospital ... on the same morning. So it’s 
getting the notes from one site to another ...’ 
Participant 5, organisation E
Patients cancelling the tests that have been ordered: 
‘Or patients are phoning and cancelling 
investigations, so when you’re looking for results 
for the consultant we’ve not actually had the 
investigations and the department is not telling you 
that, as the requestor, that it’s been cancelled.’ 
Participant 4, organisation G
Patients re-booking appointments to suit their 
personal circumstances with problems for medical 
records in finding medical records at short notice:
‘Because there are so many short term 
appointments and that is a problem ... somebody 
phones up and somebody’s just cancelled an 
appointment, they could make the appointment the 
day before, and that’s where you get the biggest level 
of information that would be missing, because it’s 
such last minute.’ Participant 3, organisation A 
Recommendations for improving reliability 
With the complexity of the issues causing 
information to be missing in outpatients, it was not 
surprising to hear some interviewees saying they 
could think of no solutions because the problems 
were too big:
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Question: Do you want to add anything, any 
solutions ...? 
‘I can’t really, no, I really don’t know. I think 
because, sometimes I think it’s so big. ‘ Participant 
3, organisation E
Medical records staff proposed solutions such as 
working night shifts to avoid interruptions when 
searching for records, together with more training 
for secretaries and doctors to resolve the problems 
of medical records tracking not being used, and 
misfiling:
‘Most of it is training, it’s training and monitoring, 
and the more we monitor the more we train, and 
the more there is, people take responsibility of, 
Health Records is like the nucleus, we can get the 
majority right’ Participant 3, organisation A 
Many of the solutions proposed, such as re-
designing forms, having one computer system and 
one hospital number, or more space to store paper 
records, or extending the air tube system addressed 
specific problems in each organisation. Whilst 
these solutions may address very local problems, 
the complexity of how each inter-relates and affects 
other parts of the system is more difficult to 
envisage. For example many of the computer 
systems have been installed to improve the 
reliability of information being available but each 
has brought other problems such as the need for 
multiple passwords or too much time required to 
log in to every department’s system to get results, or 
wrong information being entered. Interviewees 
said that one solution would be to reduce paper and 
electronic systems running in parallel:
‘In terms of the referrals ... if I was an autocratic 
dictator I would from right now issue a statement 
saying that we will accept nothing but electronic 
referrals.’ Participant 1, organisation G
‘We should be having GPs emailing in referrals so 
that, a), it gets to wherever it’s going far faster, and 
b), it has to be typed, because believe it or not, 2009, 
we still have terrible handwritten referrals, and it’s 
quicker. And then if it’s electronic it’s less likely to 
be lost.’ Participant 2, organisation E
Using the patient’s NHS number as standard across 
all NHS organisations was supported as a way of 
reducing problems with patients with common 
names or who have appointments with different 
doctors in different hospitals within the same 
organisation. 
‘To have a single patient identifier for us would be 
absolutely marvellous, because when you have a 
very common name it’s not unusual to have 
multiple files, even within our own database.’ 
Participant 4, organisation E
No solutions were forthcoming about how to 
improve the systems in the patients’ pathway to 
ensure that after one outpatient appointment all the 
necessary tests and procedures would be completed 
and reported before the patient’s follow up 
appointment. This is the challenge for improving 
systems reliability. 
Summary
The reasons that clinicians are faced with making 
clinical decisions in the absence of either the 
patient’s medical records or key clinical 
information are many and varied from the 
complexity of aligning a patient’s pathway to 
inadequate information in a GP letter to misfiling 
test results. It was apparent from the interviews that 
solutions introduced to solve one problem in one 
department had sometimes created new problems 
for others elsewhere. This could be as simple as 
introducing a new form for requesting a specific 
test in one department, meaning there were now 
multiple forms to be completed by doctors in 
outpatient clinics, or it could be the introduction of 
new computer systems in each department – 
pathology, radiology etc – meaning that staff in 
clinics have to log in to each different system to find 
results. 
All those interviewed described problems that they 
dealt with regularly in trying to assemble the 
relevant information for doctors in outpatient 
clinics. There is clearly a wealth of knowledge in 
each organisation about how each part of the 
system operates and the associated difficulties. 
In conclusion, our findings suggest there is no one 
magic bullet that will solve the problem of missing 
clinical information in the outpatient setting. What 
is needed is a process for gathering and considering 
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the knowledge of key staff, making sense of this for 
the system as a whole in each organisation and 
from this designing and implementing plans for an 
over-arching safer clinical system.
4.6 Discussion  
Summary of results 
In our study 1.5% of outpatients had their whole 
medical record missing, despite an enormous effort 
every day by medical records staff to find missing 
medical records. Organisation A with only 0.2% 
missing demonstrates that it is possible to have 
robust systems for tracking and finding medical 
records. However we found that across the three 
organisations, 10 times as many patients had some 
type of relevant clinical information missing (15% 
of all patients). The type of information missing 
varied, with one organisation having written 
information missing more often, and another 
having more test and investigation results missing. 
Of those patients with missing clinical information, 
32% experienced a delay or disruption to their care, 
20% had a risk of harm and in over half of these 
patients the doctor relied on the patient for the 
information. Doctors made a clinical decision 
anyway in 20% of cases with missing clinical 
information.
The causes of missing clinical information were 
many and varied, from simple misfiling of test 
results to the complexity of making sure a patient 
had all tests and investigations completed and 
reported before they returned for their follow up 
appointment. We found over 60 causes for clinical 
information being missing when needed in 
outpatients, covering all aspects of the accident 
causation model from work and environment 
factors to those relating to individual patient 
factors. There were no clear cut solutions but rather 
the need for each organisation to examine the 
systems failures at each point and with the 
knowledge and support of all those involved, 
design and implement an overarching solution to 
the system-wide issues.
Comparison with the literature
In studying primary care clinicians reports of 
missing information in the US Smith et al (1996) 
found that in one in seven visits (14%), some 
important piece of data including laboratory 
results, a radiology report, or a hospital history, was 
not available. In 60% of these visits clinicians 
reported that the lack of data was likely to result in 
either a delay in care or a duplicative medical 
service (32% in our study) and in 44% physicians 
believed the patient’s well-being was likely to be 
affected (20% in our study).
Dovey et al (2002) in examining 344 reports of 
medical errors from family physicians, also in the 
USA, found that 7.8% were due to the unavailability 
of information that should have been in the 
patient’s medical records. In this study the majority 
of error reports were administrative, with 44% of all 
error reports perceived by the physician to be 
associated with adverse consequences for the 
patient or family. 
Elder and Hickner (2005) reporting on missing 
clinical information noted that ‘an important part 
of primary care involves obtaining and explaining 
clinical information and assisting patient decision 
making. When information is missing, the ability 
to communicate with patients about their care is 
hampered’. Surgeons in our study repeated this, 
with one describing the feeling of the patients 
losing trust in their surgeon when information 
wasn’t available.
The frequency and impact of missing imaging data 
in a Neurology Department of an Australian 
hospital was studied by Lederman et al (2002). In 
24% of cases (10 of 42) they found that some or all 
of the required information was missing. 
The health issues of repeating radiation exposure 
are noted in the paper and the fact that where it is 
not possible to delay decision making, there is a 
possibility of a higher margin for error on decisions 
taken. 
In our study we found that for those patients with 
missing information, the doctor made a clinical 
decision in 20% of cases. 
In a review of errors and unintended consequences 
of information technology, Ash et al (2004) note 
that ‘some systems in use in medical work practices 
today have interfaces that are outdated, with no 
windows, no intuitive graphic navigation aids, and 
endless lines of identical-looking text. In such 
cases, even when the information is there, it could 
be exceedingly hard to find.’ Ash also notes the 
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difficulty clinicians face in acquiring, maintaining 
and refining a mental overview of a patient’s 
condition when having to switch between 
computer screens to gather information whilst also 
talking to the patient, some also having to read 
paper records at the same time.
Examples of types of record and filing system errors 
reported in the ‘Threats to Australian Patient 
Safety’ study (Makeham et al., 2008) included:
 – Having some parts of a paper based patient 
record missing (eg. notes falling out of a record 
in the filing process).
 – Having parts of a patient’s records stored on 
both a computer and a paper file, leading to 
some clinical information missing in the history 
if only one or the other is used.
 – Filing results or correspondence into the file of a 
different patient with a similar name.
 – Spelling errors (particularly surnames) in 
patient electronic records causing difficulty in 
importing electronic investigation results into 
the patient file.
 – Losing paper-based patient records in the 
general practitioners’ practice filing system .
 – Having multiple records for the same person 
with different details listed in each, such as two 
separate medication and allergy lists.
 – We found all these factors and more as causes of 
missing clinical information in our study.
Interpretation
In 2008-09, there were 3.84 million attendances at 
surgical outpatients in England (The NHS 
Information Centre), 0.38 million in Scotland (ISD 
Scotland) and 0.19 million in Wales (2007/08 
figures Stats Wales). This gives an approximate total 
annually of 4.4 million general surgical outpatient 
appointments in England, Scotland and Wales out 
of an overall total of 66 million outpatient 
appointments. Despite the limitations of this study, 
it is of interest to see how the findings may translate 
into the wider NHS and Table 13 has been 
produced on this basis for general interest:.
Strengths and limitations 
As far as we are aware, this is the first study to 
present figures on missing clinical information in 
outpatient clinics in the UK and the first to look at 
how clinicians respond, including the associated 
impact on patient care.
Our data relied on collection by busy doctors in 
outpatient clinics and may therefore be subject to 
under-reporting. There were different computer 
and written record systems in each organisation 
which we recognise may mean that the forms were 
not completed in exactly the same way in each 
organisation. 
Table 13: Implications of research findings if applied to outpatients across the NHS
Percentages found in this study
Estimated annual numbers of patients if study findings are applied to:
General surgery outpatients  
(n=4.4 million)
All outpatient attendances  
(n=66 million)
1.5% missing medical records 66,300 991,300
15% missing clinical 
information
663,000 9,913,000
4.7% impact on patient care 207,700 3,106,000
1.7% new appointment booked 75,150 1,124,000
3.2% decision without 
information
141,500 2,115,000
3% risk of harm 132,600 1,983,000
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We relied on doctors to assess their perceptions of 
risk to patients and the impact of missing 
information on the patient’s care using a simple 
scoring system and did not give detailed 
definitions. This type of perception scoring is useful 
in gaining an assessment of the issue in question 
but perceptions of similar risks are likely to vary 
between clinicians and the results should be seen in 
this light.
Where doctors relied on patients for information, 
we did not explore the types of missing information 
concerned. We recognise that patients are more 
likely to know some information than others, for 
example they may be more knowledgeable about 
their allergies than their test results.
The organisations selected were all large teaching 
hospitals and more research is needed to confirm 
whether the size of the hospital affects the 
availability of clinical information in outpatient 
clinics.
4.7 Recommendations
Whilst the percentage of missing medical records 
was relatively low in the organisations we studied, 
we found 10 times more patients being seen in 
outpatient clinics with one or more pieces of 
important clinical information being missing. The 
NHS currently monitors the percentage of missing 
medical records but to date has not collected 
information about what is missing from these 
records. 
Each time important clinical information is 
missing our findings suggest that there is 
opportunity for the patient’s care to be delayed, for 
disruption to them and their families and also for 
patient harm. This is clearly an important issue 
both for patient satisfaction and for patient safety 
that to date has not been measured across the NHS. 
We therefore recommend that a method for 
auditing the prevalence of missing clinical 
information is developed across the NHS and is 
measured systematically and regularly to monitor 
improvements over time alongside that for missing 
medical records.
It might be argued that measuring the percentage of 
missing medical records has confined the problem 
to the medical records department. However we 
found that the causes of missing clinical 
information were many and varied and were 
systems wide and different in each organisation, 
depending on their systems and their 
organisational history. We therefore recommend 
that the causes of missing clinical information are 
investigated by NHS organisations and systems 
wide solutions are designed and implemented. 
Finally we would emphasise that the problem of 
missing information may not be quite as intractable 
as it sometimes seems and that current systems and 
processes could probably be dramatically improved 
even in the absence of electronic systems. The most 
striking finding from our study was that while all 
three organisations had problems, they were not 
the same problems. 
In each hospital, some systems worked well and 
others poorly. This suggests that it is possible for all 
the existing systems to run more effectively if 
missing information was given higher priority and 
if sufficient effort was given to applying the 
standard armament of process improvement tools 
to the problem. We recommend that those with 
systems wide management responsibilities receive 
training in systems theory and practice. This 
recommendation also arises from the findings in 
the interviews that local solutions in one 
department often cause new problems in other 
departments.
 If these latent conditions are to be prevented in 
future then those with systems wide responsibilities 
need to be knowledgeable in systems theory. 
Improving the reliability of clinical records systems 
would make care safer for patients, less frustrating 
for clinicians, reduce delay and duplication and 
save a great deal of money by avoiding extra 
appointments.
Our recommendations can be summarised as 
follows: 
 – The causes of missing clinical information are 
investigated in every NHS organisation with 
systems wide solutions designed.
 – A common method of auditing the prevalence 
of missing clinical information in outpatient 
clinics is developed for the NHS.
 – The prevalence of missing clinical information 
in outpatient clinics is measured systematically 
in every NHS organisation and repeated at 
regular intervals in order to track progress of 
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improvement.
 – All members of the extended multidisciplinary 
team, including administrative staff, should be 
involved in planning and implementing changes 
to the process of delivering information at the 
point of clinical decision making, such as 
changes to the forms for ordering tests or a new 
IT system.
 – Managers and others with systems wide 
responsibilities are trained in systems theory in 
order to consider the wider implications of local 
solutions, preventing the build up of latent 
conditions elsewhere in the organisation.
4.8 Conclusion
Clinicians in our study were faced with making 
clinical decisions without key clinical information 
in 15% of cases in outpatient clinics. The type of 
information missing varied, with one organisation 
having written information missing more often and 
another having more test and investigation results 
missing. Of those patients with missing clinical 
information, 32% experienced a delay or disruption 
to their care, 20% had a risk of harm and in over 
half of these cases, the doctor relied on the patient 
for the information. Doctors made a clinical 
decision despite the information being missing in 
20% of patients.
On the basis of our findings we have made 
recommendations for the prevalence of missing 
clinical information to be measured investigated 
across the NHS and for systems wide solutions to 
be implemented. Finally we have recommended 
that all those with systems wide responsibilities be 
trained in systems theory in order to prevent the 
build up of latent conditions with the introduction 
of local solutions to the problems identified.
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Chapter 5
Reliability of prescribing for 
hospital inpatients
by Bryony Dean Franklin
5.1 Introduction
Prescribing errors are common and have potential 
for serious patient harm. Errors have been reported 
in 1.5-9.2% of medication orders written for 
hospital inpatients in the UK (Vincent et al, 2009); 
this wide range of figures is mainly due to 
differences in setting, definitions and data 
collection methods used. A median error rate of 7% 
was reported in a recent international systematic 
review of prescribing errors in hand-written 
medication orders for hospital inpatients (Lewis et 
al, 2009). 
About 1-2% of UK hospital inpatients are harmed 
due to medication errors, the majority of which are 
errors in prescribing (Barber et al, 1998; Neale et al, 
2001). This equates to 80,000-160,000 patients per 
year. Even prescribing errors that do not result in 
harm create additional work for staff and can 
adversely affect patients’ confidence in their care. 
The wide variation in methods and definitions used 
means that it is virtually impossible to compare 
results obtained between different studies (Franklin 
et al, 2005; Franklin et al, 2009a; Franklin et al, 
2009b; Ferner, 2009). Although a large multi-centre 
study of inpatient prescribing errors was recently 
published in the UK (Dornan et al, 2009), this does 
not present comparative results between 
organisations. 
The only comparative UK study across more than 
one organisation was conducted in a paediatric 
setting (Ghaleb et al, 2009). We therefore have little 
insight as to whether prescribing error rates are 
relatively consistent, or whether there are 
differences between organisations as a result of 
differences in local systems. Identifying differences 
between organisations would help us understand 
best practice and make recommendations for error 
prevention. 
Prescribing errors in hospital inpatients was the 
topic selected by organisation B for investigation as 
part of the SCS project with an initial aim of 
improving the reliability of prescribing, later 
amended to an aim of creating a demonstrably safe 
medication system. 
We therefore wanted to collect data at organisation 
B plus two additional NHS organisations, using 
standard methods and definitions, to explore the 
differences and similarities between them.
5.2 Objectives 
 – To measure the incidence of prescribing errors 
identified by ward pharmacists, for newly 
written inpatient and discharge medication, in 
at least two wards in each of three NHS 
organisations.
 – To describe the types of prescribing errors 
identified and their potential clinical 
importance.
 – To identify any variation in the prescribing 
errors identified between wards, specialties and 
organisations.
 – To explore the causes of errors and the systems 
factors involved.
 – To make recommendations for improving the 
reliability of prescribing in hospital inpatients.
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5.3 Methods
Methodological considerations
There are several methodological issues that are 
important in quantitative studies of prescribing 
errors (Lewis et al, 2009; Franklin et al, 2005; 
Franklin et al, 2009a; Franklin et al, 2009b; Ferner, 
2009). These include whether to focus on process 
(number of errors) or outcome (patient harm), the 
definition of error to use, the method of data 
collection, which types of prescriptions/medication 
orders to study, and the denominator used to 
calculate the error rate. We also needed to choose 
the wards on which to base our study. Each of these 
considerations will be briefly addressed before we 
describe the specific methods used for data 
collection in this study. 
Process versus outcome
We chose to focus on the number of prescribing 
errors (defined later), rather than patient harm. 
Whilst patient harm is the more important 
outcome, it is relatively rare and with the short 
timescale available it was not considered practical 
for the present study. Furthermore, harm is difficult 
to measure objectively. This means that studies 
based on harm can be prohibitively expensive. 
Collecting data on all prescribing errors, regardless 
of their outcome, also provides many more 
opportunities for learning. However we did explore 
potential for harm by documenting the number of 
doses given before errors were corrected, and by 
assessing the potential clinical importance of a 
sample of the errors identified.
Definitions 
The research literature on prescribing errors uses a 
wide range of definitions. We used a comprehensive 
practitioner-led definition previously developed 
using consensus methods (Dean et al, 2000), which 
has been used extensively by other researchers 
(Lewis et al, 2009; Ross et al, 2009) and by the 
Department of Health (2004). It is important to 
note that prescribing errors are not synonymous 
with pharmacists’ interventions (Donyai et al, 
2007). However, we also recorded the proportion of 
errors that resulted in pharmacists’ interventions, 
and thus had workload implications for pharmacy 
staff. 
Data collection
There are several ways in which quantitative data 
can be obtained on prescribing errors. These 
include retrospective review of the medical notes, 
review of incident reports, and prospective 
collection of data by ward pharmacists. 
Retrospective review of the medical notes was 
considered too time-consuming for the present 
study. Incident report data has the theoretical 
advantage of being readily available without any 
additional data collection, but the level of under-
reporting means that these data are not useful for 
quantitative analyses (Franklin et al 2005, Franklin 
et al 2007a). Prospective data collection by ward 
pharmacists is well established, is not overly time 
consuming when done for short periods, and so 
was adopted for this study. 
Types of medication order studied
The study focused on prescribing errors in newly 
written ‘regular’ and ‘when required’ inpatient and 
discharge medication. Medication prescribed to be 
given ‘once only’, and continuous intravenous 
infusions, were excluded in order to simplify and 
standardise data collection. 
Denominators 
The primary denominator for calculating the 
prescribing error rate was the number of new 
medication orders screened by the ward 
pharmacists; however we also collected data on 
patient days, so that error rates per 100 patient days 
could be estimated as a secondary denominator. 
Previous studies that used medication orders as the 
denominator have not corrected this denominator 
to take into account any errors involving the 
omission of medication. However, for correctness 
and to facilitate statistical analysis, we added the 
number of omitted medications (medication that 
should have been prescribed, but was not) to the 
denominator (Allan and Barker, 1990). 
Wards 
We chose to study one or more medical admissions 
units and one or more surgical wards at each 
organisation in order to include different kinds of 
patient and associated prescribing practices. While 
one UK study suggested no evidence of variation in 
prescribing error rates between most medical 
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specialities, wards with a higher patient turnover, 
such as medical admissions units, had higher error 
rates due to the volume of prescribing being done 
immediately following admission, when omission 
of patients’ previous medication is common 
(Franklin et al, 2007b). It is not known whether 
error rates on surgical wards are higher or lower 
than on other wards. 
Selection of organisations and wards
As well as organisation B, we also collected data at 
organisations A and C. We first contacted the chief 
pharmacist and medical director at each of the 
three organisations to request their approval and to 
identify a senior member of pharmacy staff at each 
organisation who would be responsible for co-
ordinating local quantitative data collection by the 
ward pharmacists. Suitable wards were then 
identified for study.
At organisation A, we studied a 28-bed surgical 
ward plus four medical admissions wards across 
two hospital organisations, comprising a total of 69 
medical admissions beds. The surgical ward 
admitted both elective and emergency patients, 
under a range of surgical specialties with an 
emphasis on vascular surgery. Patients typically 
had a range of medical comorbidities.
At organisation B, we studied two surgical wards 
and a 24 bed medical admissions ward. The two 
surgical wards were both single sex and general 
surgical with an emphasis on urological and 
gastrointestinal surgery; they had 15 and 18 beds 
respectively. Each admitted a mixture of acute and 
elective patients. Although this topic was being 
studied at organisation B as part of the SCS 
programme, no SCS-related changes had been 
made at the time of data collection. 
At organisation C, a surgical ward and the 33 bed 
medical assessment unit were studied. The surgical 
ward had 26 beds and had a focus on orthopaedic 
trauma surgery, in particular fractured neck of 
femur. 
All used paper-based prescribing for inpatients, as 
is the case in most UK hospitals. Discharge 
prescribing was mainly electronic at organisation 
A, and part electronic and part paper at 
organisations B and C, again reflecting typical 
practice in the UK. 
Process mapping
A process map was drafted based on the prescribing 
processes at organisation B, and then sent to 
pharmacy staff at organisations A and C for 
comment and to identify any additional features or 
differences that needed to be included.
Definitions
We used the following working definition of a 
prescribing error (Dean et al, 2000): 
‘A prescribing error occurs when, as a result of a 
prescribing decision or prescription-writing 
process, there is an unintentional, significant 
reduction in the probability of treatment being 
timely and effective, or increase in the risk of harm 
when compared to generally accepted practice.’
This definition is accompanied by lists of situations 
that should be included and excluded as prescribing 
errors (Dean et al, 2000). 
Pharmacists’ interventions were defined as any 
situation where the pharmacist was required to 
speak with another non-pharmacy member of the 
healthcare team or write in the patient’s medical 
notes. 
The primary denominator used to calculate error 
rates was the number of newly written regular and 
‘when required’ inpatient and discharge medication 
orders screened by ward pharmacists, plus any 
medication orders that should have been written 
for the patient but were omitted. A medication 
order is one drug prescribed for a patient; there are 
usually multiple medication orders on each 
patient’s inpatient drug chart and on each discharge 
prescription. 
Sampling and sample size
We estimated that about 250 new regular, ‘when 
required’ and discharge medication orders are 
written each week on a typical ward, and based our 
sample size calculations on a 7% rate of erroneous 
medication orders. Collecting data for two weeks 
on each ward would therefore allow an erroneous 
order rate of 7% to be identified with 95% 
confidence interval of 4.8 to 9.2% for that ward. We 
therefore collected data for about two weeks at each
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organisation with the aim of achieving a sample of 
500 medication orders on each ward. 
Data collection 
Data were collected by ward pharmacists in spring / 
summer 2009, using established methods (Franklin 
et al, 2007b). The ward pharmacists were given a 
verbal briefing, either by the pharmacist member of 
the WISeR team or by a local pharmacy co-
ordinator, supplemented with written guidelines on 
data collection (appendix 7). 
Ward pharmacists were asked to complete a data 
collection form (appendix 8) with details of the 
number of newly written regular, ‘when required’ 
and discharge items screened each weekday during 
the study period, together with information on 
whether or not they had checked each patient’s 
medication history on that particular day. This 
included any newly written and newly rewritten 
inpatient charts, but excluded drugs prescribed on 
anaesthetic charts, once only (‘stat’) prescriptions, 
and any drugs or intravenous fluids prescribed on 
the back of the drug chart or on additional sheets. 
In addition, the ward pharmacists were asked to 
record any prescribing errors identified in the 
medication orders screened. The ward pharmacist 
was asked to document the details of the 
prescribing error, the number of doses given (or 
omitted) before the error was corrected, whether or 
not the pharmacist made an intervention to correct 
the error, and the number of occupied beds on the 
ward on that day. 
One medication order could be associated with 
more than one error. Each individual prescribing 
error was classified into one of the following 
categories, which were designed to be exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive:
 – medication omitted when clinically indicated 
(including unintended omission of patients’ 
usual long-term medication on admission to 
hospital)
 – no indication (prescribing a drug that is not 
required) / contra-indication for the drug 
 – duplicate therapy (unintended prescription of 
the same drug twice, or of two drugs in the same 
therapeutic class)
 – incomplete prescription (includes, for example, 
missing dose, route, signature or start date)
 – prescribing a drug to which the patient has a 
documented allergy 
 – incorrect drug (drug A intended, but drug B 
prescribed) 
 – incorrect dose 
 – incorrect frequency or duration (but correct 
total daily dose) 
 – incorrect route
 – incorrect formulation 
 –  inappropriate abbreviation 
 –  illegible 
 – missing or incorrect instructions for 
administration. 
The research team checked all completed data 
collection forms to verify that errors met the study’s 
definition, and that they were classified correctly. If 
there was any doubt as to which category an 
individual error fell into, the category highest up 
the list was selected.
Analysis
We calculated the incidence of erroneous orders for 
each ward and organisation, defining these as 
medication orders associated with one or more 
prescribing errors, and classified the errors 
identified as set out above, together with 
accompanying 95% confidence intervals. Where 
appropriate, we calculated confidence intervals for 
the difference between two percentage error rates; 
where the confidence interval for the difference 
does not span zero, this represents a statistically 
significant result. We also estimated the error rate 
per 100 patient days, using the pharmacists’ records 
of the number of patients on each ward each day to 
estimate the number of patient days. We assumed 
that prescribing error data collected on a Monday 
related to three patient days for each patient, since 
most of the wards studied did not have clinical 
pharmacy services at weekends. 
To explore variation between organisations, 
specialties, wards, and whether or not the patient’s 
medication history was taken on the day of data 
collection, we first performed separate analyses for 
each of these variables. We then conducted 
multilevel binary logistic regression, aimed at 
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predicting whether or not each medication order 
was erroneous. 
We used SPPS for analysis. The multilevel models 
took into account whether or not a medication 
history was taken for that patient on that day, 
specialty, and ward (nested within organisation). 
All were categorical variables and were coded 
before entry into the model. The output was the 
odds ratio: the change in odds of a medication 
order being erroneous resulting from a unit change 
in a predictor variable. 
We assessed the clinical importance of a random 
sample of  one in five sample of the errors identified 
on each ward, using established validated methods 
(Dean and Barber, 1999; Kollo and Dean, 2000). 
Briefly, five health care professionals (three 
pharmacists, a doctor and a nurse) assessed each 
error on a scale of zero to 10, where zero represents 
an error with no potential effects on the patient, 
and 10 an error that would result in death. We then 
calculated the mean score across all five judges for 
each error, which was used as an index of clinical 
importance. 
Exploring the systems failures involved
For each of the three organisations, we then 
selected some typical prescribing errors identified 
on each ward, and explored their likely causes using 
a series of interviews with prescribers, pharmacists 
and nurses from that ward, using methods similar 
to those used previously (Dean et al, 2002; 
Sanghera et al, 2007). 
We aimed to interview between one and three 
nurses, pharmacists and prescribers of different 
grades from each organisation. We asked the local 
collaborator for each organisation to suggest health 
care professionals from the study wards and invite 
them to participate. The interview schedule is 
shown in appendix 9. An initial coding frame was 
constructed by one researcher based on Figure 2 
(page 14) and then revised by a second researcher. 
Any differences in coding were discussed and 
agreed between the two researchers.
5.4 Results
Process maps
We developed separate process maps for the 
prescribing of inpatient and discharge medication, 
based on the processes in place at organisation B. 
Pharmacy staff at organisations A and C confirmed 
that their processes were the same. The process 
maps for inpatient and discharge medication are 
shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 respectively. 
Inpatient drug charts were very similar at each 
organisation, with the exception of pre-printed 
units (g/mg/micrograms) in the ‘dose’ sections in 
organisation C and no box for the maximum dose 
for drugs given ‘when required’ in organisation B. 
While the processes for prescribing were the same, 
there were some differences in the pharmacy 
services provided across the three organisations. 
These will be described first for the surgical wards, 
and then for the medical admissions wards.
The surgical wards at each organisation received a 
visit from a clinical pharmacist each weekday. 
However, at organisation A, the types of visits 
varied across days of the week. On Mondays, 
Wednesdays and Fridays, the pharmacist 
conducted ‘chart focused’ visits during which they 
screened all drug charts, resolved any urgent 
problems, and recorded a prioritised list of less 
urgent issues for follow-up the following weekday. 
On Tuesdays and Thursdays, the ward pharmacists 
conducted a ‘patient focused’ visit during which 
any newly admitted or pharmaceutically complex 
patients were seen, and the outstanding issues 
followed up and resolved. This typically included 
confirming patients’ medication histories, and 
counselling patients about their medication. These 
weekday visits were about 120 minutes in duration; 
the ward also received a short visit on a Saturday 
from one of the weekend team during which any 
medications required were ordered. 
At organisation B, the two surgical wards received 
daily visits on weekdays from a pharmacy 
medicines management technician as well as a 
pharmacist. The technician examined all drug 
charts and brought any newly prescribed items to 
the pharmacist for a clinical check. The pharmacist 
focused on new patients and discharges. The 
pharmacist and technician were present on each 
ward for approximately one hour each weekday. 
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At organisation C, the surgical ward received a visit 
from a pharmacist each weekday. The pharmacist 
screened every drug chart and completed drug 
histories for all new admissions. At the time of the 
study, the pharmacist spent about 90 minutes on 
the ward each day. At organisations B and C, there 
was no clinical pharmacy service at weekends.
The medical admissions wards at organisation A 
had a pharmacist present for most of the day. On 
each of the two hospital sites, a pharmacist was 
available on the wards from 8am to 7pm on 
weekdays and from 8am until 1:30pm at weekends. 
The pharmacists attended the multi-disciplinary 
post-take ward rounds on most days, including at 
weekends. During the remainder of the day, the 
pharmacist completed medication histories and 
clinical reviews, screened and dispensed discharge 
medication and counselled patents regarding their 
medication. 
At organisation B, the admissions ward had a 
pharmacist present from 8.00am to 11.00am each 
weekday. For the first 1.5 hours, the pharmacist 
accompanied the doctors on the post-take ward 
round, and used the remainder of the time to follow 
up medication histories, facilitate discharge, and 
resolve any outstanding pharmaceutical issues. At 
the time of the data collection, pharmacist 
attendance on the post-take ward round was a new 
service which had only recently been introduced. 
There was no weekend clinical service. 
At organisation C, the medical assessment unit 
received a visit from a ward pharmacist each 
weekday, who clinically screened every drug chart 
and completed drug histories for all new 
admissions. The ward pharmacist spent on average 
120 minutes on the ward each weekday; there was 
no clinical pharmacy service at weekends.
The incidence of prescribing errors 
A total of 6,237 newly written medication orders 
were included in the study across 10 wards in the 
three organisations. A total of 368 omissions were 
also identified, and these were added to the 6,237 
newly written orders to give a denominator of 6,605 
which used to calculate the incidence of erroneous 
orders. 
These data relate to 1,289 drug chart screenings 
(where the same patient’s drug chart may be 
screened more than once on successive days) and 
an estimated 1,771 patient days. In 493 (38.2%) of 
1,289 drug chart screenings, the pharmacist also 
checked the patient’s medication history on the day 
of data collection. 
Overall, 1,025 prescribing errors were identified in 
974 of the 6,605 medication orders (14.7%; 95% 
confidence interval 13.8 to 15.6%). This represents 
a reliability of 85.3%. In terms of errors per patient 
day, our data correspond to an estimated 58 
prescribing errors per 100 patient days. 
Types of error are summarised in Figure 13. The 
three most common error types were omission of 
medication that was clinically indicated for the 
patient, incorrect dose, and incomplete 
prescription. 
Pharmacists recorded the number of doses given 
before the error was corrected for 904 of 1,025 
errors (88.2%). For these 904 errors, a mean of 0.9 
doses were given (or omitted) before the error was 
corrected (range 0-11). Overall, 69.4% of all errors 
resulted in an intervention being made by the 
pharmacist.
In the sample there were three types of medication 
order: regular (n=4,700), ‘when required’ 
(n=1,237) and discharge medication (n=668). 
When expressed by medication order type, the 
error rate associated with discharge medication was 
lower than for the other types. Overall, 15.3% of the 
4,700 regular medication orders were associated 
with one or more errors (95% confidence interval: 
14.3 to 16.3%), 15.2% of 1237 ‘when required’ 
medication orders (95% confidence interval: 13.2 
to 17.3%), and 9.0% of 668 discharge medication 
orders (95% confidence interval: 6.8 to 11.2%). The 
proportions of regular, ‘when required’ and 
discharge medication orders were similar across 
the three organisations. 
For those 4035 medication orders that were 
screened by the pharmacist at the same time as 
checking the patient’s medication history, the error 
rate was 17.3%; for the 2564 medication orders that 
were not screened at the same time as checking the 
patient’s medication history, the error rate was 
12.1% (95% confidence interval for the difference 
between the two error rates: 3.5 to 6.9%). 
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Figure 11: Process map for prescribing inpatient medication at all three organisations
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Figure 12: Process map for discharge medication at all three organisations
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Variability between and within 
organisations 
The error rate for the surgical wards was 
significantly lower than that identified on the 
admissions wards (Table 14). However, this may be 
at least partly accounted for by the dramatic 
difference between the admissions and surgical 
wards in the percentage of drug chart screenings 
for which the patient’s medication history was 
checked on the day of data collection. 
For the admissions wards, the pharmacist checked 
the patient’s medication history on the day of data 
collection in 65.5% of 634 drug chart screenings. 
On the surgical wards this figure was 11.9% of 655. 
Analyses of error rates by organisation are shown in 
Table 15. The incidence of erroneous orders was 
significantly higher at organisation C than at 
organisations A and B. At organisation A, the 
pharmacist checked the patient’s medication 
history on the day of data collection in 43.2% of 532 
drug chart screenings. Corresponding figures for 
organisations B and C were 31.4% of 389, and 
37.9% of 388, respectively. Differences in the 
prevalence of medication history taking therefore 
do not explain the variation between organisations.
Table 16 and Table 17 summarise the results 
relating to pharmacists’ interventions and doses 
given before prescribing errors were corrected, by 
organisation and by specialty respectively. Errors 
were generally identified earlier on the admissions 
wards than on the surgical wards, and were more 
likely to result in a pharmacist’s intervention. 
There were smaller differences between 
organisations than between clinical specialties, 
although prescribing errors at organisation C were 
less likely to result in pharmacists’ interventions, 
and more doses were given before they were 
corrected.
A more detailed breakdown by ward is shown in 
Table 18. There was considerable variation among 
the 10 wards. Among the surgical wards, the 
incidence of erroneous orders was significantly 
lower at organisation A than at organisations B 
(surgical ward 1) and C. 
Figure 13: Types of prescribing error identified, for all three organisations combined
% of all medication order errors by type
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Table 14: Incidence of erroneous orders by clinical specialty
Specialty
Number of medication 
orders screened
Incidence of erroneous 
medication orders (95% 
confidence interval)
Errors identified per 100 
patient days
Admissions 4059 16.3% (15.2 to 17.4%) 80
Surgical 2546 12.2% (10.9 to 13.5%) 37
Total 6605 14.7% (13.8 to 15.6%) 58
Table 15: Incidence of erroneous orders by organisation
Organisation
Number of medication 
orders screened
Incidence of erroneous 
medication orders (95% 
confidence interval)
Errors identified per 100 
patient days
A 2689 13.6% (12.3 to 14.9%) 53
B 1812 12.2% (10.7 to 13.7%) 47
C 2104 18.4% (16.7 to 20.1%) 74
Total 6605 14.7% (13.8 to 15.6%) 58
Table 16: Action taken to remedy errors, presented by organisation 
Organisation
Percentage of errors 
that resulted in an 
intervention
Number of errors for 
which the number of 
doses given was recorded
Mean number of doses 
given or omitted before 
error corrected
A 70.1% 333 (86.7%) 0.6
B 74.5% 207 (89.6%) 0.8
C 66.0% 364 (88.8%) 1.1
Total 69.4% 904 (88.2%) 0.9
Table 17: Action taken to remedy errors, presented by clinical specialty
Specialty
Percentage of errors 
that resulted in an 
intervention
Number of errors for 
which the number of 
doses given was recorded
Mean number of doses 
given or omitted before 
error corrected
Admissions 76.4% 601 (87.0%) 0.5
Surgical 54.9% 303 (90.7%) 1.6
Total 69.4% 904 (88.2%) 0.9
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Among the admissions wards, organisation C had a 
higher rate of erroneous orders than those at 
organisation B and one of the admissions wards at 
organisation A. 
When expressed as errors per 100 patient days, 
there was a more than five-fold variation between 
the highest (admissions ward, organisation C) and 
the lowest (surgical ward, organisation A).
Table 18: Incidence of erroneous orders on each of the study wards
Organisation – 
ward
Medication 
histories checked*
Number of 
medication 
orders screened
Incidence of erroneous 
medication orders (95% 
confidence interval)
Errors identified 
per 100 patient 
days
A - surgical 13.7% 639 7.0% (5.0 to 9.0%) 19
A - admissions 1 62.7% 963 16.2% (13.5 to 18.9%) 77
A - admissions 2 18.7% 219 12.8% (8.4 to 17.2%) 28
A - admissions 3 84.0% 568 15.8% (12.8 to 18.8%) 94
A - admissions 4 70.7% 300 15.3% (11.2 to 19.4%) 96
B - surgical 1 15.1% 603 12.1% (9.5 to 14.7%) 34
B - surgical 2 8.8% 304 9.9% (6.5 to 13.3%) 37
B – admissions 65.1% 905 13.0% (10.8 to 15.2%) 72
C – surgical 9.1% 1000 16.3% (14.0 to 18.6%) 54
C – admissions 80.8% 1104 20.4% (18.0 to 22.8%) 102
Total 38.2% 6605 14.7% (13.8 to 15.6%) 58
✳Percentage of drug chart screenings for which the patient’s medication history was checked on the day of data collection
Types of error
The most common types of prescribing error in all 
three organisations were omission of medication 
that was indicated for the patient concerned, and 
incorrect dose (Figure 14). 
There was a lower incidence of omission errors and 
a higher incidence of dose errors at organisation B 
in comparison to the other two organisations. There 
was no clear evidence of any impact of the pre-
printing of units on the drug chart at organisation 
C; there were three errors in organisation A that 
may have been prevented by such pre-printed units, 
and one error in organisation C that was likely to 
have been caused by the pre-printed units. 
However, the lack of a box for the maximum dose or 
frequency in the ‘when required’ section of 
organisation B’s drug chart appears to have affected 
the incidence of errors involving failure to specify 
the maximum dose or frequency for ‘when required’ 
medication; there was one error of this type at 
organisation A (2.6% of all ‘when required’ orders), 
35 at organisation B (45.5%) and 10 at organisation 
C (14.9%). The difference between organisations is 
statistically significant (p < 0.001; chi square test). 
When presented by clinical specialty, there was a 
much higher incidence of omission errors identified 
on the admissions wards (Figure 15). The incidence 
of other error types was very similar.
A multilevel logistic analysis showed that, after 
taking into account the impact of whether or not a 
medication history had been taken for the patient at 
the time of pharmacist screening, there was no 
significant effect for specialty (p = 0.1). 
We then assessed the relative effects of the 
remaining two factors. We found that as well as 
whether or not a medication history had been taken 
for the patient at the time of pharmacist screening 
(p < 0.001), there was also a significant source of 
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Figure 14: Incidence of different categories of prescribing error on each study organisation
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variation between wards (nested within 
organisation; p < 0.001). 
Table 19 shows the odds ratios for each individual 
parameter category. This shows that medication 
orders that were screened by the ward pharmacist at 
the time of medication history taking were 
significantly more likely to be erroneous. 
All three wards at organisation B and the surgical 
ward at organisation A were less likely to be 
associated with erroneous orders than the reference 
ward, the surgical ward at organisation C.
Our panel of judges assessed the clinical importance 
of a random one in five sample of the prescribing 
errors indentified on each ward. A total of 183 
prescribing errors were assessed in total. The mean 
clinical importance score was 5.3 on the zero to 10 
scale. There was little variation between 
organisations (mean scores: organisation A 5.2; 
organisation B 5.5; organisation C 5.4), specialties 
(admissions 5.4; surgical 5.4) or wards (appendix 
10), and statistical analysis thus deemed 
inappropriate. 
A total of 34 (19%) errors in the sample had mean 
scores of more than 7.0, and were thus classed as 
serious. These are listed in full in appendix 11; 
examples are given in Table 20. 
Results from system failures analysis
A total of fifteen interviews were conducted. 
Participants comprised three nurses, five doctors 
and seven pharmacists. At organisation A, 
participants were three pharmacists, a nurse and a 
locum doctor. At organisation B, they were two 
pharmacists, a consultant and a junior doctor, and 
at organisation C they were two nurses, two junior 
doctors and two pharmacists. Some of the 
pharmacists interviewed had also assisted with the 
collection of the quantitative data on prescribing 
errors.
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Figure 15: Incidence of different categories of prescribing error by clinical specialty
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Table 19: Odds ratios for each parameter, following multivariate logistic regression
Parameter Reference category
Odds ratio (95% 
confidence interval)
Medication orders screened by pharmacist 
at time of medication history taking for 
that patient
Medication orders not screened as 
time of medication history taking 
1.41 (1.17 to 1.70)*
Surgical ward (Organisation A) Surgical (Organisation C) 0.37 (0.26 to 0.52)*
Admissions 1 (Organisation A) 0.82 (0.63 to 1.06)
Admissions 2  (Organisation A) 0.69 (0.45 to 1.07)
Admissions 3  (Organisation A) 0.76 (0.56 to 1.04)
Admissions 4  (Organisation A) 0.75 (0.51 to 1.09)
Surgical 1  (Organisation B) 0.68 (0.50 to 0.92)*
Surgical 2  (Organisation B) 0.57 (0.38 to 0.87)*
Admissions  (Organisation B) 0.63 (0.48 to 0.84)*
Admissions  (Organisation C) 1.02 (0.79 to 1.33)
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Table 20: Examples of prescribing errors classed as ‘serious’ 
Type of error Organisation Ward Description Mean score
Omission B Admissions Tinzaparin 3,500 units not 
prescribed although clinically 
indicated.
9.4
Omission A Admissions 1 Patient uses Insulin Levemir but it 
was not prescribed in hospital.
8.5
No indication C Surgical Morphine 10-30mg every 6 hours 
prescribed at discharge. Confused 
patient and does not require this 
drug.
8.8
No indication A Admissions 1 Patient prescribed amitriptyline 
10mg once daily but has possible 
acute coronary syndrome and 
myocardial infarction, therefore 
amitriptyline is contra-indicated.
7.0
Allergic C Admissions Flucloxacillin 1g four times daily 
prescribed to a patient allergic to 
penicillin.
9.6
Inappropriate dose C Admissions Prednisolone 1mg once in the 
morning prescribed but patient’s 
usual dose is 3mg in the morning.
7.5
Inappropriate dose C Surgical Morphine15-20mg orally when 
required prescribed but no 
maximum dose or minimum 
interval stated.
7.4
Inappropriate dose A Surgical Oxycodone (as ‘Oxynorm’) 
prescribed twice on ‘when required’ 
section of drug chart: 35mg and 
40mg, both prescribed for every 4 
hours. Correct dose should have 
been 40mg every 4 hours when 
required.
8.4
Inappropriate 
frequency or dosing 
schedule
A Admissions 2 Gliclazide 80mg prescribed at 6am, 
2pm and 8pm. Should be at 8am, 
12pm and 6pm i.e. with meals.
7.3
Incorrect formulation B Admissions Isosorbide mononitrate 120mg 
once daily prescribed. Should be the 
modified-release form.
7.6
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Perceptions about reliability
The first part of each interview explored 
participants’ views about the reliability of 
prescribing for hospital inpatients. Some doctors 
and nurses felt that prescribing was reliable: 
‘I’d like to think reasonably reliable.’ Doctor 3, 
organisation C
In fact, two doctors completely denied the 
occurrence of errors:
‘Prescribing errors, not in this hospital.’ Doctor 5, 
organisation A
‘I’m not sure I’ve actually seen one [prescribing 
error] as yet.’ Doctor 4, organisation B
Others felt that prescribing was reliable, but noted 
that this was partly due to pharmacists’ 
interventions in correcting erroneous prescriptions:
‘Generally it’s very safe, because in our area we have 
our own pharmacists, and they come, they go 
through, every day… I think it’s pretty safe.’ Nurse 2, 
organisation C
In contrast, pharmacists generally had more 
negative or conditional perceptions, perhaps 
because of the number of errors they identify and 
rectify when screening drug charts:
‘Not very reliable. That would probably be the first 
thing that comes to mind.’ Pharmacist 3, 
organisation A
The majority of interviewees described prescribing 
as a process that was conditional, depending on a 
number of factors, in particular the doctors’ level of 
experience: 
‘That depends on the experience of the person, 
whether they’re used to prescribing that medication 
and how junior or senior they are. So the more 
junior you are the less reliable it’s going to be, and 
the more familiar you are and the more senior you 
are with the drugs, the more reliable it’s going to be. ’ 
Doctor 3, organisation B
In the next sections we report in more detail the 
factors that contribute to prescribing errors, 
presented according to Vincent’s factors that affect 
clinical practice (Institutional context
The main theme identified here was in relation to 
medical education policies. 
Medical education
Many pharmacist interviewees perceived that one of 
the main factors affecting prescribing was a lack of 
specific training about prescribing at medical 
school: 
‘They don’t pay attention to these things in medical 
school so I think this goes very deep where 
awareness and attitude from medical school has to 
change.’ Pharmacist 3, organisation A
‘We’ve learnt it [prescribing] as a subject and they 
haven’t, they’ve done it as part of what they do and 
they’re not the specialists.’ Pharmacist 1, 
organisation A 
In contrast, one doctor reported that he did receive 
training on prescribing in medical school:
‘At medical school within my fifth year I had quite a 
bit on therapeutics prescribing and within that we 
addressed prescribing errors and certain areas of 
prescribing, for example, anticoagulants and 
antiepileptic medication, some of the slightly more 
difficult areas which aren’t, don’t come so 
straightforward’ Doctor 4, organisation C
Organisational and management factors
Themes within this category were organisational 
priorities within the hospital setting, lack of a 
common information system between primary and 
secondary care, and insufficient hospital-based 
training on prescribing. 
Organisational priorities
In relation to organisational priorities, some 
interviewees felt that prescribing was not one of the 
doctors’ priorities in comparison to diagnosing and 
stabilising patients, as well as bed pressures and the 
priority to discharge patients as quickly as possible.
‘In terms of the GP and stuff it means a lot of extra 
work and the thing with doctors is the priorities are 
different from ours. Their priorities are making sure 
the patient’s stable, making sure the patient’s well 
enough, whereas our priority, as pharmacists, is 
drugs.’ Pharmacist 3, organisation A
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‘There’s also quite a bit of pressure on us with things 
like discharge summaries, to try and get those done 
and done quickly.’ Doctor 4, organisation C
Lack of common information systems between 
primary and secondary care
A number of participants highlighted how errors 
occur due to the lack of a common information 
system between primary and secondary care:
‘It’s Chinese whispers, isn’t it? I get given a list of 
drugs from the GP or from the ambulance man 
who’s copied it down from the daughter, he gives it 
to me and then I copy it down. And then the nurses 
give it [the medication] and then we change it and I 
write it down, then I write a letter to the GP and 
then that letter gets back to the GP …’ Doctor 3, 
organisation C
‘Obviously if they’re at a loss as to whether 
somebody takes thyroxine every day, or takes iron 
tablets …. It might be that hopefully we might be 
lucky and a patient might come in with their 
relatives and we can quiz them.’ Nurse 4, 
organisation A
Insufficient hospital-based training
Many participants also felt that hospital-based 
training on prescribing was lacking or inadequate:
‘Typically the junior doctors’ training is quite 
didactic so they sit in a lecture room with consultant 
lecturers. And, but to get them to move into a more 
of a workshop scenario where they can, and maybe 
you can, if you have the pharmacist lead you could 
talk about some of the prescribing problems that 
you’ve encountered and actually get them to talk 
about and think about what was going on, what 
were the problems and I think that might be, if you 
did that regularly through the year that might be a 
much better way of changing.’ Pharmacist 1, 
organisation B
Work environment
The work environment was the most commonly 
cited factor in relation to causes of prescribing error. 
Themes identified included team composition, 
workload, shift patterns, and distractions while 
prescribing. 
Team composition
Factors related to team composition included 
insufficient staff, as well as a specific lack of junior 
medical staff:
‘There’s always going to be not enough staff.’ 
Pharmacist 2, organisation A
‘If we’re short staffed, or we’re very busy and there’s 
an emergency, I think that’s when things, sometimes 
people make errors.’ Nurse 4, organisation A 
‘We don’t have F1s, house officers, we only have F2s, 
and at that point they’re very focused on wanting to 
get theatre time for their surgical training, which is 
not unreasonable’. Pharmacist 5, organisation C
Conversely, interviewees also perceived that 
inexperienced doctors were more likely to make 
errors:
‘If there was responsibility with one doctor who had 
a good amount of experience, then it [errors] would 
be less likely to occur.’ Pharmacist 2, organisation B
‘It just depends on their [doctors’] experience and 
maybe where they’ve worked before.’ Nurse 4, 
organisation A
Workload and time pressures
Related factors are workload and time pressures, 
which were the most frequently reported factors 
affecting prescribing. Interviewees described how 
having to see as many patients as possible was a 
major contributing factor: 
‘I think on ward rounds a lot they’re very rushed, 
sometimes just generally on the ward when they’re 
just very busy, if I ask them to add something they’ll 
just do it quickly and they’ll do it wrong, even if 
you’ve given them a list to copy it off it will just be 
wrong because they’re just in a rush, they’ve just got 
lots of other things, people asking them to do other 
things at the same time.’ Pharmacist 1, organisation 
A 
‘I was in a rush, because I was with a consultant, he 
was already with the next patient and I was trying to 
catch him up.’ Doctor 3, organisation C
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‘Just pressure of time is the main one that just makes 
you potentially make mistakes. Not having time to, 
if a patient’s got polypharmacy and you’ve been 
asked, for example, to treat heart failure so 
potentially you’re starting three or four drugs, 
diuretics, ACE inhibitor, didge [digoxin], a rate 
control agent, for each of those drugs there are 
meant to be certain criteria, maybe I haven’t always 
checked the renal function before I start an ACE 
inhibitor for example, because I’m in a rush.’ Doctor 
3, organisation C
Shift patterns
In addition to workload, doctors described how 
during overnight shifts, they were required to 
prescribe for patients they were not familiar with. 
‘Sometimes you just don’t have enough time or you 
don’t really know the patient, if you’re on nights or 
late and you’re covering the whole hospital and you 
don’t know the patient and you don’t know that 
much about them and you’re suddenly asked to, can 
you prescribe this?’ Doctor 4, organisation B
Another issue was having ‘outlier’ patients on 
distant wards, thus adding stress and time pressures:
‘The other thing ... that contributes is having 
outlying patients, and that happens in all the 
specialities… If they’ve got a patient on another 
ward the other end of the hospital then those 
patients that are outlying, it puts added stress on the 
junior doctors to go down there and be back up on 
the other ward.’ Pharmacist 5, organisation C
Distractions
Interviewees often reported distractions that occur 
while prescribing, leading to errors:
‘There’s a lot around the fact that they get 
interrupted when they’re working so and they get 
distracted because they get called to see other 
patients or a nurse comes about a different patient 
so I think that doesn’t probably help their 
concentration ... if you looked on any of our wards 
they can have two or three teams of doctors there at 
a time, plus physios, plus specialist nurses so you’ve 
got perhaps ten people milling round the nurses’ 
station...’ Pharmacist 1, organisation B
‘I was probably talking to lots of people at the same 
time, and running the ward round, talking to the 
patient, talking to the nurse and to the junior 
doctor, and prescribing at the same time so it’s easy 
to see how you can make a mistake.’ Doctor 3, 
organisation B
Team factors
Themes relating to team factors included 
incomplete supervision, written communication, 
perceived professional hierarchy, over-reliance on 
pharmacists and nurses to identify errors, and lack 
of feedback to prescribers who make errors.
Incomplete supervision
Often reported was a situation in which junior 
doctors were under the supervision of their 
consultants, but consultants would give a 
prescribing order orally to their juniors without 
giving any details, assuming the junior doctors 
would prescribe correctly:
‘I think it’s certainly true that sometimes the 
clinicians, the lead clinicians can say, start such and 
such and they don’t give any details about the dose 
and how long for so if there’s quite a lot of detail, 
start on antibiotic but they don’t say which 
antibiotic, for how long at what dose.’ Pharmacist 1, 
organisation B
‘Well, they [consultants] come on the ward rounds, 
and they do give them [junior doctors] a general, 
they’ll say, stop the tablet or whatever, and change it 
to this, or we’ll give them bisoprolol instead of 
whatever ... but then once they’ve gone, they’ve 
finished their ward round and they’re gone, 
generally the doc, the junior doctors are left on their 
own to muddle through.’ Nurse 2, organisation C
Some interviewees reported that as a result, junior 
doctors sometimes had to seek the help of others, 
usually pharmacists: 
‘They [doctors] would check with the pharmacist as 
well. Quite often with the junior doctors they do rely 
quite heavily on the qualified nurses. And they’d say, 
oh, what’s the normal frequency of this, or the 
dose?’ Nurse 2, organisation C
‘The consultant will say, prescribe this, and then 
they’ll come to us and they, what’s that, what do I 
need to do?’ Pharmacist 6, organisation C
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Communication
Communication between different members of the 
team, and between primary and secondary care, was 
perceived to be a major problem contributing to 
prescribing errors:
‘Communication is a big problem in this hospital, I 
think, and in this department, because it’s such a 
rapid turnover.’ Nurse 2, organisation C
Lack of written documentation and poor 
handwriting were commonly cited as problems by 
both nurses and pharmacists: 
‘One of the problems is handwriting, which is 
always a bugbear, when we find a drug that we can’t 
possibly read across the, because it is manually 
done. So simply writing... every doctor thinks their 
handwriting is legible, which often it isn’t’. Difficult 
to do.’ Nurse 1, organisation C
‘My issue with prescribing communication is that in 
hospital settings it’s not clearly documented in the 
medical notes … It doesn’t get written in the notes, 
the patient gets transferred, nobody knows, the 
patient continues on the medicine even if it’s not 
working, ultimately it gives them side effects and 
makes them fall.’ Pharmacist 3, organisation A
‘They might have doses from another, an old drug 
chart, for example, or a drug name from an old drug 
chart where they, someone’s written it and because 
they’re not familiar with the drug they’ll write what 
they think they can see so, and it’s not correct, so 
they write something that looks incorrect or might 
look like something else or looks like no drug.’ 
Pharmacist 1, organisation A
Perceived professional hierarchy
This relates to reluctance on the part of junior staff 
to question their seniors, perhaps due to lack of 
confidence or not wanting to show a lack of 
knowledge – interestingly, these perceptions were 
on the part of pharmacists rather than the doctors 
themselves:
‘Sometimes the junior doctor thinks, I think this is 
right, and actually maybe they’re right but their 
consultant says something different so they’re too 
scared to ask, to argue against the consultant.’ 
Pharmacist 3, organisation A
‘I think sometimes junior doctors don’t like to 
question what the consultant says, so if the 
consultant says, prescribe this drug, or, prescribe 
this dose, the junior doctor thinks that doesn’t 
sound right but they do it anyway.’ Pharmacist 5, 
organisation C
‘At that point they won’t ask the consultant, oh how 
do I spell that drug or what’s that drug or what dose 
is that, because I don’t, they probably think that they 
should know it so they won’t ask the consultants.’ 
Pharmacist 1, organisation A
Over-reliance on others to correct errors
There seemed to be evidence of over-reliance on 
pharmacists and nurses to identify and correct 
prescribing errors:
‘We’ve got two safety nets, the nurses are the first 
one and the pharmacists are the second one. And 
nothing gets prescribed from the pharmacy unless 
everything is fine with the drug chart. If we send the 
drug chart down to pharmacy and it’s wrong, they’ll 
just send it back, but they check it.’ Doctor 3, 
organisation C
‘It’s been known where they just leave the dose blank 
intentionally because they know a pharmacist will 
come along and check it or question them or write 
something in or sort it out, which they probably 
shouldn’t be doing.’ Pharmacist 1, organisation A
Lack of feedback to prescribers 
This was often highlighted. This was partly because 
if one doctor makes an error and a pharmacist 
identifies it, another doctor will often rectify it, and 
partly because pharmacists often correct minor or 
very obvious errors on the drug chart without 
informing the prescriber:
‘And there’s another key issue here as well especially 
if you’re in an area where there’s a lot of doctors 
rotating, sometimes that phenytoin prescription is 
written by Doctor X, Doctor X has gone home so I 
have to go to Doctor Y and get them to change it and 
that’s fine, they learn something new, but Doctor X 
who wrote the prescription doesn’t know anything 
about it.’ Pharmacist 3, organisation A 
‘Also for something like aspirin, I know most 
pharmacists would just add that on to the drug chart 
and PNC [prescriber not contacted], so not contact 
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the prescriber because it’s so small you wouldn’t 
contact the doctor just to say, oh it should be enteric 
coated or, oh it should be dispersible and you didn’t 
write that on … A lot of the time we’ll change, we’ll 
add modified release and, without probably telling 
the doctor.’ Pharmacist 1, organisation A
This may at least partly account for some doctors 
stating that they had never seen a prescribing error.
Individual (staff) factors
Within this category, lack of knowledge was the 
most commonly cited factor affecting the process of 
prescribing, in particular in relation to 
inexperienced junior doctors:
Lack of knowledge
‘The other thing is the actual knowledge, some 
people are aware but they don’t know what to do. 
They don’t know how to calculate a creatinine 
clearance so even if they want to do something 
about it, they don’t have the knowledge to do 
something about it.’ Pharmacist 3, organisation A
‘You start picking up drug interactions yourself so if 
you’d asked me this question when I started I 
probably wouldn’t be able to give you a list of 
enzyme inducers and enzyme inhibitors whereas I 
can now and because I’ve been doing the job for a 
while now I just know which antibiotics might 
interact or affect other drugs and I know the side 
effects of more of the drugs so I can spot 
interactions quicker.’ Doctor 3, organisation C
‘Something more important like carbamazepine 
that should be modified release or not modified 
release, they tend not to write the enteric coated or 
the modified release, which is obviously really 
important because I think once they’ve got the drug 
I don’t think they always see the importance of the 
other information that’s with it.’ Pharmacist 1, 
organisation A
Task Factors
Task factors are those that affect the actual task of 
prescribing, such as prescribing guidelines, 
availability of clinical information, drug chart 
design issues, lack of standardisation in certain 
prescribing tasks, and lack of familiarity with 
certain drugs or tasks. 
Prescribing guidelines
When participants were asked about the availability 
and usefulness of guidelines and protocols, they all 
answered positively. However, there were some 
problems where guidelines weren’t always 
accessible.
‘Yeah the card, a laminated card, it is in there 
somewhere. So that’s made it really easy for us 
because that’s the one that we prescribe the most I 
would say, especially on admission to be doing a 
post treatment drug and you can look it up quite 
quickly and do it at the time, which is really helpful.’ 
Doctor 4, organisation B
 ‘I think they have trouble getting access to 
[resources] on the ward sometimes. Like even a 
BNF, in theory the wards have got BNFs on the 
ward, but they might not be able to lay their hands 
on it when they... the formulary, it’s mostly online 
and they haven’t always got access to a computer 
and they don’t, it’s a hassle to go and look. So I think 
sometimes the sources are there but they might not 
refer to them, or they might not be able to lay their 
hands on them just when they need them.’ 
Pharmacist 5, organisation C
Availability of clinical information
Another factor was a lack of information about the 
patient, particularly out of hours:
‘They don’t have that patient’s renal function, the 
weight’s not always on the drug charts so they just 
won’t do it.’ Pharmacist 1, organisation A
‘The overnight environment is quite difficult 
because we don’t have all the information that we 
would like to prescribe.’ Doctor 4, organisation C
Drug chart design
Drug chart design issues were raised several times, 
including the complexity of the different sections of 
the drug chart and, in line with our quantitative 
findings, lack of a box to specify the maximum dose 
for drugs to be given ‘when required’ in one of the 
organisations:
‘Why we don’t put maximum doses? It’s going to 
sound silly,  because there’s not a box for it. And if 
you’re writing something like paracetamol or maybe 
tramadol that you write a lot, you just know it [the 
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dose] and it’s more the routine, but if there’s a little 
box saying maximum dose, because you normally 
just put ... PRN, this amount and then ... you sign it.’ 
Doctor 4, organisation B
Lack of standardisation
In prescribing certain drugs, lack of standardisation 
was often a problem. For example this was an issue 
in indicating drugs that were given less often that 
once weekly, or those that were to be stopped at a 
specified future date. 
‘Everyone’s got different ways of writing, give for 
three days and stop, and some people just write 
three days and assume that the nurse won’t give it on 
the fourth day, and some people will colour in the 
days they want it to give and then make crosses and 
it’s obvious that it stops’ Doctor 3, organisation C
‘The other thing I tend to find is that sometimes 
when doctors prescribe things and then decide to 
discontinue, instead of putting, they always put a 
start date, but instead of putting an actual end date 
in the box, they tend to just put lines through 
things.’ Nurse 4, organisation A 
‘I was thinking more that they don’t cross off on the 
boxes when they should that it’s once weekly … to 
write, so they write, in the frequency box they’ll 
write once a week but you know where you have to 
circle the days, they’ll make it look to the nursing 
staff that it should be every day.’ Pharmacist 1, 
organisation A 
Lack of familiarity with specific drugs or tasks
Other task factors related to drugs or tasks that were 
unfamiliar to the prescriber:
‘It’s certainly true that some of the mistakes are just 
because doctors aren’t familiar with the drugs and 
so it’s a drug they’ve not seen before. It’s not one 
they’re familiar with, they’re not used to the dosage, 
they don’t know or they might put one for one tablet 
and not know that it comes in three different tablet 
strengths.’ Pharmacist 1 organisation B
‘When you’re doing calculations, especially when 
you’re not that familiar, that can take a while.’ 
Doctor 4, organisation B
‘We’re very comfortable with a certain number of 
drugs, the drugs that frequently get used in primary 
care and secondary care ...the drugs that we are less 
familiar with, it’s all the sub speciality drugs, which 
end up on the acute medical unit, we’re less familiar 
with those and as such, not necessarily errors, but 
omissions may occur because we’re not familiar 
with the drugs and how they should be prescribed.’ 
Doctor 4, organisation C
Patient characteristics
Patients themselves can also play an important role 
in preventing errors. Relevant factors include 
patients’ knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of their 
medication, their communication skills, and how ill 
they are. There was an assumption that patients 
were the primary source of information about their 
medication:
‘People have incomplete lists of medication, they’re 
unaware of which medications they’re currently on 
and as such, probably we don’t get 100% of 
prescribing right on the first attempt, so drugs will 
get missed or we won’t know doses, so they will be 
omitted temporarily until we know what those 
doses and frequency of prescribing is.’ Doctor 4, 
organisation C 
‘Sometimes this may happen because the patient, on 
arriving, may be quite unwell or might be not in a 
position to say what medication he’s on and he 
might be getting discharged the right, second day, 
even without us knowing the proper medication 
what he might have been on.’ Doctor 5, organisation 
A
Defences and solutions 
The interviewees suggested a number of defences 
that were already available and in use, as well as 
other potential solutions. 
Pharmacists and nurses
The main current defence identified by most of the 
interviewees was the presence of a pharmacist on 
the ward, particularly when pharmacists were also 
available on ward rounds: 
‘I know [pharmacist 1] and [pharmacist 2] and I’ve 
gone to see them ... they’re normally on the ward the 
same time each day and it’s common place to take 
both the pharmacists with us  quite often. I know 
them quite well to ask them ... “do we normally give 
this much or?” So that’s really helpful, we do ask 
them.’ Doctor 4, organisation B
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‘When a pharmacist is on the ward round and 
things we’re quite often able to catch things early on 
when the doctors were there, so there and then you 
can get things written up and change appropriately.’ 
Pharmacist 6, organisation C
‘As a medical doctor prescribing drugs is the corner 
stone of what we do for patients, isn’t it? So it 
shouldn’t need a pharmacist but every day I’m ... the 
pharmacist comes to me and says, by the way ... I’m 
sure it’s the same with other doctors as well.’ Doctor 
3, organisation C
Nurses were also referred to as a defence. However, 
one participant mentioned the effect of recruiting 
nurses from different countries to work within the 
NHS, creating a diverse workforce where staff may 
not challenge their colleagues due to their own 
cultural values:
‘And I think the other problem is that over the years 
we have recruited lots of nurses from different 
countries, and I think it’s also difficult for those 
nurses to challenge things as well.’ Nurse 4, 
organisation A
Electronic prescribing
All three participating organisations had electronic 
prescribing systems available for discharge 
prescriptions, and these were viewed very 
positively:
‘They’re [computer programmes] useful and I think 
they, it’s like every computer program once you 
know how to use it, it’s really great.’ Pharmacist 1, 
Organisation B
‘We’ve now moved to an electronic discharge 
system, whereby there can’t be any ambiguity with 
the wording...’ Doctor 4, organisation C
There was an assumption that inpatient electronic 
prescribing and an electronic national care record 
would also reduce prescribing errors:
‘But then some of the wards have got obviously 
electronic systems where the prescribing’s probably 
a lot better.’ Pharmacist 2, organisation A 
‘Well I guess that ultimately you’d have complete 
electronic systems wouldn’t you? The GP, and a 
national system that you could tap into at any time 
of day. And anything, any medication that was 
changed would be entered onto that, but at present I 
think that’s a bit of a dream rather than a reality.’ 
Pharmacist 6, organisation C
Interviewees were also aware of the limitations of 
such electronic systems:
‘The things that the computers wouldn’t help with 
would be things like missing things off drug 
histories and the computer’s not going to know if 
you’ve not even attempted to put it in there.’ 
Pharmacist 2, organisation A
‘It’s not the only solution because you can still make 
mistakes. You just make a different sort of mistake.’ 
Pharmacist 1, organisation B
‘If you’ve got three or four teams of doctors on the 
ward and you’ve got two computers and the ward 
receptionist needs to use one of them they’re not all 
going to be able to prescribe electronically at the 
same time with our current infrastructure. So I 
think that’s a solution which is quite a long way off.’ 
Pharmacist 1, organisation B
Better feedback to prescribers about their errors 
This was also recommended:
‘I don’t know whether there’s any sort of mentorship 
programmes because a lot of the prescribing errors 
are made by more junior doctors and if there’s any 
mentorship because they have their mentor 
consultants, if there’s any way where people who 
pick up prescribing errors can feed back through 
their mentor because then it’s coming from doctor 
to doctor, they might be taking it better than some 
pharmacist.’ Pharmacist 3, organisation A
Guidelines presented as summaries or checklists
Other recommendations by the interviewees were 
to improve the guidelines available: 
‘It should be simplified maybe on some sort of 
flowchart, bullet points, maybe even emailed to 
everybody in a really easy to read format because 
they are useful. As pharmacists we obviously, being 
the drug experts, we’ve read them, most pharmacists 
have read them, they’re very useful, who else is 
going to sit and read 25 pages? Doctors don’t have 
the time to do that.’ Pharmacist 3, organisation A
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‘I think guidelines need to be made more user 
friendly I think, in my opinion. Like our example is 
our antibiotic guidelines, they’re a nice card that the 
doctors carry around, very easy to refer to and 
actually I don’t see that many errors in anti infective 
prescribing comparatively.’ Pharmacist 3, 
organisation A
Educational interventions
Education and training, with a focus on practicing 
prescribing skills, was suggested by several of the 
pharmacists: 
‘Small group training would be better probably than 
a lecture, where people probably switch off, that’s 
actually on the ward, physical showing them, this is 
the drug chart, this is what you write and where and 
when, would probably improve.’ Pharmacist 2, 
organisation A
Increasing non-medical prescribing
Several interviewees advocated further expanding 
the numbers of non-medical prescribers: 
‘So yes that [pharmacist prescribers] can relieve the 
pressure on the junior doctors and also has the 
advantage if they’re doing those things over and 
over and over again, they’re very familiar with them 
and they’ll probably be the simpler drugs. And the 
advantage to the patient is that if they need some 
paracetamol or some lactulose they can get it 
straightaway without having to wait for the junior 
doctor.’ Doctor 3, organisation B
‘I think the other alternative which is something 
that is becoming a little bit more trendy now- is to 
have alternative prescribers who can actually reduce 
the doctors’ workload. There’s probably more nurse 
prescribers than there are pharmacists but it’s 
coming.’ Pharmacist 2, organisation B
A quiet environment for prescribing
Finally, it was suggested that having a designated 
quiet area for prescribing would help in relation to 
reducing interruptions and distractions: 
‘It would be nice if there was a quiet area where you 
couldn’t be disturbed.’ Nurse 2, organisation C 
5.5 Discussion 
Summary of results
We identified prescribing errors in 14.7% of all 
newly written medication orders screened by 
hospital pharmacists on the study wards, 
corresponding to a reliability of 85.3%. Error rates 
were significantly higher on admissions units than 
on surgical wards, but this was accounted for by the 
high proportion of prescribing on these wards being 
immediately following admission, when omission 
of patients’ usual medication was common. 
There were also variations in the incidence and 
types of prescribing error among wards and 
organisations. A mean of 0.9 doses (range 0-11) 
were given (or omitted) before errors were rectified.
Contributing systems factors included lack of 
information from primary care about patients’ 
medication, time pressures, lack of feedback to 
doctors about their prescribing errors, lack of 
standardisation in how certain drugs are prescribed, 
poor documentation of prescribing decisions, a 
focus on the choice of drug at the time of 
prescribing, with little attention given to other 
details, lack of practical training on prescribing, and 
junior doctors not feeling confident to ask 
consultants, or challenge them, about prescribing. 
Comparison with the literature
Our overall erroneous order rate of 14.7% is higher 
than in most published studies (Lewis et al, 2009). 
However, there are many subtle methodological 
differences between studies of prescribing errors 
(Franklin et al, 2009b). Studies using comparable 
methodology report a median error rate of 9.9% 
(range 7.7 to 14.6%) (Franklin et al, 2009b) and a 
study presenting error rates according to different 
clinical specialties (Franklin et al, 2007b) presents 
rates comparable to those in the present study for 
two specialities with high patient turnover, 
comparable to the admissions units included in our 
study. 
When presented according to errors per patient day, 
we identified an estimated 58 prescribing errors per 
100 patient days. This is also higher than those 
reported in the literature. A recent systematic 
review identified eleven studies which provided an 
incidence of errors per patient days, the median of 
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which was 2.4 errors per 100 patient days. However 
the range was wide (0.01 to 414 errors per 100 
patient days), again reflecting wide variation in the 
methods, denominators, and settings used (Lewis et 
al, 2009). 
Many of these 11 studies collected data over much 
longer time periods and are more likely to be subject 
to reporting fatigue, or analysed incident report 
data, which are known to be subject to significant 
under-reporting. Our study focused on newly 
written medication orders that were seen by ward 
pharmacists in a defined period over about two 
weeks, rather than all medication orders, and the 
higher error rate is therefore likely to be at least 
partly a reflection of the methodology used. 
The most common types of error identified in our 
study were omission, wrong dose, and incomplete 
prescription. This is in line with the existing 
literature (Lewis et al, 2009). We also found that 
76.4% of errors on the admissions units, and 54.9% 
on the surgical wards, resulted in an intervention 
being made by the ward pharmacist. 
A previous UK study (Donyai et al, 2007), also on a 
surgical ward, reported a figure of 40%, suggesting 
that pharmacists’ practice may differ in different 
clinical specialties, probably due to differences in 
the availability of medical staff and their working 
relationships. 
The only other UK study of prescribing errors which 
presents comparative results for more than one 
organisation was conducted in paediatric wards; 
this highlighted substantial differences between 
wards, but wards were not matched across 
organisations and it is therefore not possible to 
compare organisations (Ghaleb et al, 2010). Our 
findings are in line with a previous UK study (Tully 
and Buchan, 2009) which found that errors were 
more likely to be identified at admission than at 
other times, independent of ward type, seniority of 
pharmacist, and workload. 
In relation to the causes of errors, our findings are 
broadly similar to those identified in previous UK 
studies of the causes of prescribing error (Dean et al, 
2002; Sanghera et al 2007, Tully et al 2009, Dornan 
et al 2009). Common themes are lack of error 
awareness, over-reliance on pharmacists and nurses 
to correct errors, deficiencies in education 
particularly in relation to linking theory with 
practice, reluctance to question senior colleagues, 
poor documentation, and no feedback on 
performance. 
Interpretation
This study has confirmed that there is a high 
incidence of prescribing error in hospital inpatients. 
We have also shown this to be the case across three 
organisations and two clinical specialties. However, 
there were significant differences between the two 
specialties, notably a higher incidence of error on 
the admissions wards. This was accounted for by a 
higher incidence of omission errors, likely to be due 
to a higher proportion of the prescribing on these 
wards being the prescribing of patients’ usual 
medication on their admission to hospital.
It is well known that this is the stage of patient stay 
most likely to be associated with error (Dornan et al, 
2009), resulting in the national recommendation 
that pharmacists are involved in medication 
reconciliation as soon as possible after patient 
admission (NICE/NPSA, 2007). It may also be that 
admissions pharmacists attending the post take 
ward rounds are more likely to identify other 
medication that is clinically indicated for the patient 
but not yet prescribed. 
The lower error rates for discharge medication may 
be because they are generally transcribed directly 
from the inpatient medication chart, where most 
errors will already have been identified and 
rectified. The errors that do occur are likely to be 
transcription errors between the two documents. 
Some aspects of drug chart design also appear to be 
important - the lack of a box for maximum dose or 
frequency for ‘when required’ medication in one of 
the organisations appears to have contributed to the 
increased number of errors involving failures to 
specify this information at that organisation.
Our study shows that many, but not all, prescribing 
errors result in pharmacists’ clinical interventions. 
A higher incidence of prescribing errors resulted in 
interventions on the admissions wards; this may 
reflect the increased availability of medical staff on 
the admissions wards in comparison to surgical 
wards, resulting in pharmacists contacting medical 
staff to resolve prescribing errors rather than 
amending directly on the drug chart. 
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The errors for which no interventions were made 
were typically those relating to illegible medication 
orders, missing information about the strength, 
formulation or maximum dose, incorrect times of 
administration, and transcription errors between 
old and new drug charts, Ward pharmacists would 
typically amend these types of errors on the drug 
chart without consulting a member of medical staff. 
While prescribing errors were common, our study 
shows that ‘defences’, usually the ward pharmacists, 
were generally working – on average, only about 
one dose was given (or omitted) before the error was 
rectified. However there were also differences 
between organisations and specialties in this 
respect, most likely due to differences in the 
pharmacy services provided. 
The organisation with the lowest mean number of 
doses given (or omitted), organisation A, had the 
most comprehensive pharmacy service, with higher 
levels of pharmacy presence on the admissions 
wards and at weekends. Our findings therefore 
suggest that such services do result in erroneous 
medication orders being identified and rectified 
more quickly.
We identified some common themes in relation to 
the causes of prescribing error, the implications of 
which are addressed later as recommendations.
Strengths and limitations 
A key strength of this study is that we used robust 
methods and definitions, based on our established 
experience in researching this area. We used these 
same methods and definitions to study prescribing 
errors on comparable wards in three NHS 
organisations. This is therefore the first UK study to 
present comparable data on error rates across 
organisations in an adult setting. We used a 
practitioner-led definition, ensuring that our 
findings are grounded in practice rather than 
academic ideals. 
As far as we are aware, this is also the first study to 
present figures on the number of doses 
administered before errors were corrected. This may 
be a useful indicator for how good the system’s 
defences are, and we recommend that future studies 
consider including this as an outcome measure. 
Future studies could also consider how many days 
of incorrect medication were received (or omitted) 
before errors were rectified. 
In common with most literature in this area, our 
data rely on data collection by ward pharmacists. 
Ward pharmacists’ data collection is likely to be 
subject to under-reporting and possibly some 
under-identification of errors (Franklin et al, 2009a; 
Tully and Buchan, 2009). This may be particularly 
the case when identifying errors that require more 
in-depth knowledge of the patient’s medical history, 
such as omissions and contra-indications. 
However since errors were identified in the context 
of pharmacists’ routine clinical practice, and 
medical staff contacted to correct errors where 
necessary, our approach includes an additional 
validation step in comparison to data collected 
solely for research purposes. Any medication orders 
screened and errors identified by dispensary 
pharmacists were not included; however this is 
unlikely to affect the error rate calculated. 
The binomial proportion confidence interval is 
appropriate if individual observations are unrelated 
and the opportunity for success/failure is constant 
across observations. There may be a number of 
reasons why this assumption is violated, for example 
due to variation in error rates between doctors. 
However, this is not easy to measure or control for 
and could not be taken into account in the present 
study.
Recommendations
Our recommendations can be considered as those 
to reduce errors at the point of prescribing, and 
those to facilitate defences to stop errors that do 
occur from causing patient harm.
Reducing errors at the point of prescribing
 – Facilitating the development of common 
electronic information systems between primary 
and secondary care. 
 – Allocation of quiet areas for prescribing.
 – Increased judicious use of electronic prescribing, 
for both inpatients and at discharge.
 – Provision of better feedback to hospital doctors 
about their prescribing errors.
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 – Provision of key prescribing guidelines as pocket 
guides or other accessible formats.
 – Training in practical prescribing skills, both at 
medical school and in the hospital setting, 
including better communication of prescribing-
related information among the multi-
disciplinary team.
 – Drug charts in some trusts may benefit from 
minor changes to design out certain types of 
error.
 – Some clarification of roles and responsibilities 
may be needed for medication history taking 
following patient admission. Currently 
pharmacists provided a key role in this area, 
potentially leading to medical staff omitting to 
perform this task.
 – More research is needed into the effect on 
prescribing errors of using non-medical 
independent prescribers. We need to understand 
both whether these practitioners make more, 
less, or different errors to those of medical 
prescribers, and also whether there is any 
subsequent knock-on effect on errors made by 
medical practitioners.
Defences to stop errors from causing patient 
harm
 – Developing pharmacy services to facilitate more 
proactive use of clinical pharmacists, such as on 
ward rounds, to provide advice at the point of 
prescribing rather than retrospectively.
 – Further consideration is needed of the roles that 
patients can play in identifying and challenging 
medication errors.
One of the NHS’s targets in the report ‘An 
Organisation with a Memory’ was to reduce serious 
errors in the use of prescribed medicines by 40% 
(Department of Health, 2000), but there is no 
evidence that any progress has been made (Vincent 
et al, 2008). While numerous studies have described 
the extent of the problem, to date there have been 
few UK studies of the impact of interventions to 
reduce prescribing errors. 
Two UK studies of inpatient electronic prescribing 
demonstrated a modest reduction in errors 
(Franklin et al 2007a; Shulman et al, 2005), but this 
is by no means the definitive solution as substantial 
rates of error still occur. 
There is limited evidence that educational 
interventions can improve prescribing, but studies 
are mainly in the undergraduate setting (Ross and 
Loke, 2009). For all of the above recommendations, 
work is therefore needed to formally evaluate their 
benefits, as well as their costs.
Conclusion
This is the first UK study to have compared 
prescribing errors for hospitalised adults across 
more than one organisation. We identified 
prescribing errors in 14.7% of all newly written 
medication orders screened by hospital pharmacists 
on the study wards, corresponding to a reliability of 
85.3%. There were variations in the prevalence and 
types of prescribing error among the three 
organisations, but similar contributing factors 
identified.
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Chapter 6
Reliability of the clinical handover 
process
by Mark-Alexander Sujan
6.1 Introduction
Communication, coordination and handover of 
information have been recognised as an important 
topic in enhancing the quality of care (Institute of 
Medicine, 2001). Handover has been defined as ‘the 
transfer of professional responsibility and 
accountability for some or all aspects of care for a 
patient, or group of patients, to another person or 
professional group on a temporary or permanent 
basis’ (British Medical Association, 2004). However, 
a recent systematic literature review conducted on 
behalf of the Australian Commission on Safety & 
Quality in Healthcare (ACSQHC) (Wong et al, 
2008) suggests that this definition is not universally 
recognised and that there is still widespread 
confusion and a lack of common understanding of 
the term ‘clinical handover’. In addition, other terms 
such as hand-off, shift report and patient transfer 
are frequently used. There are also many different 
ways of performing handovers in practice 
(Roughton & Severs, 1996). Current handover 
processes are often not standardised and are highly 
variable (ACSQHC, 2009). A questionnaire survey 
of Australian doctors in one general metropolitan 
hospital in New South Wales revealed that 95% of 
the 74 respondents did not identify a formal or set 
procedure for handover for on-call junior medical 
staff (Bomba & Prakash, 2005). 
The Australian literature review concludes that 
‘clinical handover is a high-risk scenario for patient 
safety with dangers of discontinuity of care, adverse 
events and legal claims of malpractice’ (Wong et al, 
2004). This is based on various sources of evidence. 
For example, respondents to a questionnaire survey 
in two teaching hospitals in the US believed that 
around 15% of adverse events, errors and near-
misses involved handover (Jagsi et al, 2005). 
Handover is also among the most common causes 
of malpractice claims in the USA, accounting for 
around 20% of cases that involved trainees (Singh et 
al., 2007). The literature review also found that 
handovers between ambulance services and 
emergency care, and handovers within emergency 
care, were particularly problematic. 
There is little evidence as to the actual reliability of 
clinical handovers. This is exacerbated by the fact 
that no universally agreed definitions or methods of 
studying handover exist. A survey in three large 
metropolitan emergency care departments in 
Australia (Ye et al., 2007) employed post-handover 
questionnaires and found that information was 
perceived to be lacking in 15.4% of handovers. This 
often concerned details of management (5% of all 
handovers), investigations (4.7%) and where 
patients were to be transferred (4.7%). 
There is now guidance available on standardising 
and supporting clinical handovers (British Medical 
Association, 2004; ACSQHC, 2009). However, there 
is little empirical evidence as to their effectiveness. 
A simulation study comparing the reliability of 
different handover methods (Bhabra et al, 2007) 
found that information handed over verbally only 
was retained very poorly (2.5% of information 
retained after 5 handover cycles), whereas verbal 
handover with written notes performed more 
robustly (85.5%). Handover supported by printed 
electronic documentation suffered almost no 
information loss (99%). However, many of the 
influencing factors present in actual practice could 
not be taken into account in such an experimental 
setup. 
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The topic of clinical handover from doctor to doctor 
was selected for investigation as part of the SCS 
project by organisation C with the aim of improving 
the reliability of handover for patients on the stroke 
pathway. We also explored doctor to doctor 
handovers at two other NHS organisations, within 
emergency care, using common definitions and 
methods. 
6.2 Objectives 
 – To measure the level of standardisation of 
clinical handovers within a selected medical 
specialty in each of the three organisations. 
 – To describe which information is handed over 
poorly and which is handed over well.
 – To identify any variation in the level of 
standardisation between organisations.
 – To explore the systems factors which contribute 
to poor quality handovers.
 – To make recommendations for improving the 
level of standardisation and quality of the 
handover process.
6.3 Methods
Methodological considerations
The assessment of reliability requires clearly 
specified processes and is linked to the notion of 
failure. However, most clinical handovers are not 
standardised and take place in informal ways with 
significant variation in the way they are conducted, 
their duration and their location, as well as the 
information that is communicated. In addition, 
there is no straightforward way of identifying 
handover failures other than through retrospective 
reviews of adverse events, an approach that was too 
resource-intensive for consideration here. 
It was therefore decided to assess the level of 
standardisation of the handover, which can be 
achieved through observation. We identified an 
ideal or minimal dataset of clinical information that 
needs to be communicated at the handovers 
concerned. This is in accordance with findings that 
suggest that the presence and use of such a core data 
set may improve the reliability of clinical handovers 
(ACSQHC, 2009). The core data set represents 
information that one would expect to be handed 
over and was derived through practitioner 
consensus. 
We therefore collected data using observation of 
actual handovers and described the level of 
standardisation seen. The level of standardisation 
reflects the extent to which individual information 
items, groups of information items or the entire core 
data set were handed over. This method assesses 
whether or not information about an item has been 
provided, but not whether the information 
communicated was actually correct, or was received 
correctly by the recipient. 
Selection of organisations, departments 
and handovers
As well as organisation C, we studied this topic in 
organisations D and F. We established contact 
through a senior clinician at each organisation with 
the approval of the medical director or the head of 
clinical governance. The handovers were selected 
based on ease of access as well as findings from the 
literature that suggest that handovers to and within 
the emergency department are particularly 
problematic (Wong et al, 2004). A weekly handover 
from one neurological consultant to another was 
studied in organisation C, and shift handovers 
within the emergency care department were studied 
in organisations D and F. All handovers were from 
doctor to doctor, however, they were carried out in 
different ways: telephone handover (organisation 
C), verbal face-to-face handover (organisation D) 
and a team-based handover including nursing staff 
(organisation F). Organisation C had not made any 
SCS-related changes to the handover process at the 
time of data collection. 
Process mapping
A process map for each of the three handovers was 
produced to show the location of the handover 
within the overall care pathway. In addition, more 
detailed maps were produced to represent the steps 
involved in each of the handovers. 
Core data set
A core data set of information was identified 
through consensus, to reflect information that 
clinicians would expect to hand over. The core data 
set was proposed by the lead clinician involved in 
organisation C, where it was commented upon and 
revised by further senior clinicians. It was then 
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validated and agreed by the lead clinicians involved 
at the other two organisations. 
The resulting core data set was as follows: 
 – patient identification (name, date of birth, 
location, and hospital number)
 – assessments (presenting condition, diagnosis)
 – investigations (tests with results, tests ordered 
but results not received, tests still needing to be 
done)
 – care plan and management (acute medication, 
ongoing medication, complications, onward 
care). 
The core data set thus comprised 13 different data 
items from four broad categories. 
Data collection 
Quantitative data were collected during summer / 
autumn 2009 through observations using a data 
collection sheet (appendix 12). Data were collected 
by the research team in two of the organisations (D 
and F) and by the local SCS team at the third 
(organisation C), following training and mentoring 
by the SCS support team. We aimed to conduct five 
observations of handover sessions at each 
organisation, based on what was practical within 
the time available. For each patient and for each of 
the 13 information items of the core data set, we 
recorded whether or not the information item was 
explicitly referred to. 
Analysis
As a measure of the level of standardisation, we 
calculated the percentage of patients for whom each 
item of the core data set was communicated. We 
also calculated for each of the four broad categories 
of information (patient identification, assessments, 
investigations, care plan) the percentage of patients 
for whom the respective category was 
communicated. A category was classified as having 
been communicated if at least one element 
belonging to the category had been handed over. 
Exploring the systems failures involved
We aimed to conduct three interviews in each of the 
participating organisations. Interviews were all 
conducted by the same researcher, using the 
interview schedule in appendix 13. The interviewees 
were asked about problems with clinical handovers 
with which they were familiar themselves. They 
were asked to comment on their likely causes, based 
on their own experiences, and the consequences for 
patient care. The interviews were then analysed 
qualitatively using the framework on page 14, and 
common themes identified. 
6.4 Results
Process maps
We developed separate process maps for the clinical 
handovers at each of the three organisations, to 
show where the handovers occurred within the 
process. We also developed more detailed 
representations for the handovers within the two 
emergency care departments. The process maps are 
shown in Figure 16, Figure 17 and Figure 18. Each 
study setting will next be described. 
Organisation C
The neurology department studied offered a 24-
hour on call and inpatient service. The department 
worked closely with the regional neurosurgical, 
neuroradiology and neuro-oncology departments 
and offered a full range of consultant-led inpatient 
and outpatient general neurology and subspecialty 
investigations and treatments. The neurology 
department operated an ‘attending consultant’ 
system. This meant that all patients in the 
department at any one time were under the care of 
the same consultant. The attending consultant 
changed each week, requiring a weekly medical 
handover. The attending system contrasts to the 
more traditional system of different patients being 
under a single medical ‘firm’ for the duration of 
their stay. 
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Figure 16: Process map for handover, organisation C
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Figure 17: Process map for handover, organisation D
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Figure 18: Process map for handover, organisation F
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Organisation D
At organisation D we studied the shift handovers on 
the clinical decision unit (CDU). The CDU was 
designed to provide rapid investigation and 
management of specific conditions presenting to 
the emergency department with an expectation that 
the majority would be discharged within 12 hours. 
This included those who needed to follow a specific 
investigation pathway (e.g. renal stones, chest pain), 
those who needed a short period of recovery (e.g. 
minor head injury, resolving anaphylaxis, asthma) 
and those needing rapid social care arrangements 
(e.g. frail elderly). The unit was adjacent to the 
emergency department and had 8 beds and 4 chair 
spaces. The average turnover was 1.5 patients per 
bed per day. The patients were managed by the 
emergency department staff with a senior doctor 
being responsible for their care. The care of the 
patients was handed over when these senior doctors 
changed their shifts in the morning, afternoon and 
evening. The handover aimed to ensure the accurate 
transfer of information to ensure timely, safe and 
specific care. 
Organisation F
At organisation F we studied the shift handover on 
the emergency medical assessment unit (EMAU). 
EMAU provided a facility for assessing and treating 
emergency medical patients who attended either 
following a GP referral or who were referred from 
the emergency department. The unit had an average 
of 24 admissions per day. 
All patients were seen by a member of each of the 
nursing and medical teams, and underwent a range 
of treatments and investigations. Each patient was 
then reviewed on one of the two daily consultant 
ward rounds and a plan of care agreed. From the 
EMAU, patients were discharged home, transferred 
to another ward or kept on the unit for short stay 
treatment. 
We observed the evening handovers on EMAU. This 
handover was in a phase of transition at the time of 
the study; a shift from a doctor-only handover 
towards a team-based handover was in progress. 
The handover therefore involved members from the 
incoming and outgoing medical teams as well as, on 
occasion, a member of the nursing team. 
In addition, this handover incorporated the 
‘hospital at night’ handover, so that not only patients 
on EMAU, but also those elsewhere in the hospital 
were potentially being handed over. 
Handovers lasted for around 15 to 30 minutes and 
were scheduled for 9pm. None of the organisations 
had formal protocols for the handovers studied.
Communication of elements of the core 
data set
In total, data were collected for 246 patient 
handovers during 19 handover sessions. These 
comprised 171 patients during eight handover 
sessions at organisation C, 43 patients during seven 
handover sessions at organisation D, and 32 patients 
during four handover sessions at organisation F. 
Figure 19 shows for each information item of the 
core data set the percentage of patients for whom 
the information item was communicated. 
The information items most commonly 
communicated were name (77% of patients, 95% 
confidence interval: 72 to 82%), presenting 
condition (77%, 95% CI 72 to 82%) and diagnosis 
(75%, 95% CI 70% to 80%).
 The information items least frequently 
communicated were investigations that had not yet 
been done (17%, 95% CI 12 to 22%), investigations 
for which results had not come back (18%, 95% CI 
13 to 23%), ongoing treatments (17%, 95% CI 12 
to22%]) and complications (17%, 95% CI 12% to 
22%). 
Each of the higher-level categories was then 
assessed in terms of whether at least one element 
from that category had been discussed. For the 
category ‘patient identification’ we also specifically 
looked at whether or not at least two patient 
identifiers were used. 
This reflects the fact that failures in patient 
identification have been recognised as particular 
sources of risk (for example, NPSA, 2004), and it is 
usually recommended that more than one patient 
identifier is used. Figure 20 presents the percentage 
of patients for which each of the categories was 
communicated. 
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Figure 19: Percentage of patients for whom each information item of the core data set was 
communicated at handover
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Figure 20: Percentage of patients for whom each broad category of information was 
communicated at handover
Extent of variability between 
organisations 
Figure 21 and Figure 22 illustrate the percentage of 
patients for whom individual information elements 
of the core data set were communicated and the 
percentage of patients for whom different categories 
of information were communicated. The greatest 
variation was for patient identification. Both the 
date of birth and the hospital number were used in 
the telephone handover of stroke patients at 
organisation C. 
Staff at the other two organisations, where handover 
was face to face, relied on either the patient’s name, 
or their location, or both. There was also 
considerable variation in the number of identifiers 
that were used. 
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Figure 21: Comparison between organisations in terms of the percentage of patients for 
whom each item of the core data set was communicated at handover
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Figure 22: Comparison of organisations in terms of the percentage of patients for whom 
each broad category of information was communicated at handover
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At least two distinct patient identifiers were used in 
97% of cases at organisation C (95% CI 94 to 100%), 
but only 7% at organisation D (95% CI 0 to 15%). 
Organisation F, with a team based handover, scored 
consistently higher on the percentage of patients for 
which the categories of assessments, investigations 
and care plan were communicated. 
Results from system failures analysis
A total of eight interviews were conducted; these 
were six consultants and two registrars. At 
organisation C, we interviewed two consultants. At 
organisation D, we interviewed three consultants 
and a registrar, and at organisation F we interviewed 
one consultant and one registrar. Some of the 
interviewees had also contributed to the 
development of the core data set; none had assisted 
with quantitative data collection.
Perceptions about reliability 
During the interviews the perceptions of 
participants about the degree of standardisation and 
the reliability of the handover were first explored. 
Most participants felt that the handover was not 
standardised or reliable, although they varied in 
their concrete assessment: 
‘It’s, it’s... not standardised at all.’ Doctor 3, 
organisation D
‘The baseline when we studied it was about 30%’. 
Doctor 1, organisation C
‘I think it’s not particularly reliable though, because 
I think we still miss patients, and we don’t hear 
about all the patients that have been admitted under 
us, and that’s quite a failing.’ Doctor 2, organisation 
C
‘I think with again moderate reliability.’ Doctor 2, 
organisation F
One interviewee felt that although handovers were 
still not very standardised, they were more 
standardised than they had been:
‘I think it’s become more standardised because the 
junior docs use a handover sheet now where they 
tend to document things, and before they had that it 
wasn’t so standardised, but there’s still a fair amount 
of variability depending on who’s doing it, I think, 
and the other things going on in the department at 
the same time’. Doctor 4, organisation D 
In addition to these explicit responses, the lack of 
standardisation also became clear from different 
descriptions about how a handover takes place and 
the role of the documentation: 
‘So if I’m looking for,... if I’m being handed over 
individual patients, then I usually do look through 
the notes at the same time as hearing it.’ Doctor 4, 
organisation D 
‘No, it’s just a verbal handover...I haven’t seen a 
handover sheet.’ Doctor 2, organisation D
In terms of harm, participants agreed that it 
depends very much on the criticality and the 
situation of the patient and can therefore range from 
negligible to serious: 
‘It could be catastrophic, it could be not, but I can’t 
quantify average number... because if the patient’s 
really ill and we don’t know about them that can be 
catastrophic, if you don’t know about them but 
they’re all right it’s just inconvenience to the system 
and the patient and the organisation.’ Doctor 2, 
organisation C
One interviewee felt quite strongly that: 
‘Oh it’s incredible harm. I think it’s one of the biggest 
areas of potential harm for any patient entering our 
door. It’s,... I think the importance and prioritisation 
we should have on handover is nothing compared to 
what it should be. Not just within my hospital, 
within every single hospital I’ve ever worked in.’ 
Doctor 1, organisation F 
In the next sections we report in more detail the 
factors that affect the quality of handover, presented 
according to Vincent’s factors that affect clinical 
practice.
Institutional context
Most doctors felt that there was no specific training 
provided for handover during the medical 
curriculum: 
‘No I don’t think people have (received training in 
handover), I think people have a lot of experience in 
handovers and it might be..., depending on which 
unit you’re working with and which consultants 
     79 HOW SAFE ARE CLINICAL SYSTEMS? 
you’re working with, they might all have a different 
perspective on it.’ Doctor 2, organisation D
‘I think medics are very bad at handover because it’s 
not part of their education, part of their upbringing, 
part of their culture.’ Doctor 3, organisation D
‘We don’t formally give training in handover but the 
middle grade doctors will have worked in this area 
for some time and so will have been doing 
handovers for some time and then they [junior 
doctors] may, they’ll just observe how it’s done 
here.’ Doctor 4, organisation D
‘The second thing would be training sessions in 
handover. Which we haven’t got at the moment but 
I want to set up.’ Doctor 1, organisation F
One doctor also emphasised that training in non-
technical skills such as handover is not provided 
and not recognised as a priority: 
‘Yeah, they’ve got virtually no non technical 
training at all... It’s certainly not a priority so they 
wouldn’t be (receptive to training)’. Doctor 1, 
organisation C
Organisational and management factors 
One doctor felt that there is not an effective 
management structure: 
‘A functioning operational management structure 
or a clinical management structure that is able to 
effect change.’ Doctor 1, organisation C
Some doctors commented on incompatible shift 
schedules and the problems this creates for a 
team-based handover: 
‘There isn’t always a registrar going home at four 
that’s the other thing, their shifts don’t really match 
up.’ Doctor 3, organisation D
‘I think everyone hands over individually because 
all the shifts finish at different times.’ Doctor 4, 
organisation D
‘Now the junior doctors’ contracts are from nine till 
five, and the MAU doctors’ contract are from eight 
till four, and noone’s found the management time to 
marry those two together.’ Doctor 1, organisation C
Work environment 
In terms of the work environment, the main issue 
related to high levels of workload:
‘One of the difficulties that we have is because of the 
workload. You really need to have a good half an 
hour before the handover to almost prepare for it, 
and you can tie up loose ends and you can get 
sorted in your own mind and on paper, wherever, 
what needs chasing for overnight. Now, the 
problem is... when you’re on 200% capacity, that 
time does not exist a lot of the time and you are, ...
you try or I try or other people do, to give yourself 
five, ten minutes but that is just not sufficient. You 
need sufficient preparation.’ Doctor 2, organisation 
F
‘I think people are probably quite hard pressed 
sometimes and busy and perhaps that bit 
(documentation) is not done as precipitously as it 
should be.’ Doctor 2, organisation D 
‘There should be one (handover) at four but not 
sure it’s always happening because that’s one of our 
busiest times.’ Doctor 3, organisation D
‘Well usually the department is quieter in the 
morning... Later on in the day, the department is 
usually much busier and the people...have other 
responsibilities though there isn’t necessarily a 
fixed time when it (the handover) happens and 
you’re more likely to be interrupted or have 
conflicting demands on your time.’ Doctor 4, 
organisation D
Team factors
Team factors related predominantly to 
communication. One doctor felt that junior doctors 
were not encouraged to challenge or speak up: 
‘...there’s never a huge amount of discussion... 
unless they are a confident junior they probably 
wouldn’t pipe up.’ Doctor 2, organisation F
On the other hand, other doctors felt that among 
senior doctors communication during handover 
was essentially a two-way process: 
‘...from my point of view we usually have an active 
discussion about people and if I’m not happy about 
what they’re saying then it’s questioned and we talk 
about the management, so it is a two way 
conversation.’ Doctor 2, organisation F
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‘It should always be a two-way communication.’ 
Doctor 1, organisation F
‘If there’s a sense that the patient’s ill or something 
needs to be done then it’s likely that that will get 
interrogated and you get much more of a two way 
dialogue.’ Doctor 2, organisation C
 This latter issue of the handover being dependent 
on the perceived criticality of the patient was 
echoed by other doctors. One doctor expressed 
quite succinctly the importance of dialogue: 
‘Sometimes the purpose of the verbal handover is 
to actually articulate things which may be difficult 
to write clearly so it may be, you know, when you’ve 
written everything down about a patient, it may 
look very black and white but actually you might 
think, I’m still not quite sure about this patient or 
I’ve still got a bit of a worry and I can’t pinpoint 
what it is. Often it’s that kind of thing which you get 
in a verbal handover which you wouldn’t get from 
reading the notes... What you get from a verbal 
handover is the subtleties, I think, sometimes as 
well.’ Doctor 4, organisation D
The importance of experience and the 
responsibility on part of the receiving doctor was 
also highlighted: 
‘And you’ve got to know what those tests are, and 
you’ve got to know why they’re being done, and if 
that information is not offered, you’ve got to go 
digging for it.’ Doctor 1, organisation D
‘You know, to not ask that information is negligent. 
That’s why it’s there, we do those tests because they 
will have a bearing on the outcome, so to not ask for 
those pertinent pieces of information, is negligent.’ 
Doctor 1, organisation D
Another communication factor that was 
highlighted, was the process of communication 
that depended on individual initiative and was 
shaped by individual differences: 
‘It relies on the individual person taking initiative 
to do the handover, so I think it, I think it relies on 
the person who finishes the shift to hand over to the 
person who’s on the next shift and if, you know,... 
and if that initiative doesn’t take place then, then 
very often the...handover doesn’t take place.’ Doctor 
3, organisation D 
Individual (staff) factors
Interviewees pointed out that the quality of a 
handover is dependent on individual skills and is 
influenced by different personal styles: 
‘Then it’s really about the quality of the people 
doing the handover... it’s about the where that 
person is coming from and how wedded they are to 
the entire process.’ Doctor 2, organisation C
‘It’s often the people. But there will be things 
documented but some people are much more 
thorough in their documentation than others.’ 
Doctor 4, organisation D
‘Number one, the person handing over. Number 
two, the, how particular the person receiving the 
information is, i.e. how accurate they want to have 
exactly where things are on the plan... Well I can be 
pretty pedantic so it gets fairly, if I’m the one 
receiving, I can be pretty pedantic so... it gets fairly 
reliable, I want to know exactly where we’ve got, I’m 
a bit of a veteran T crosser and I dotter.’ Doctor 1, 
organisation D
Task factors
Factors relating to the task included procedures, the 
time available and other concurrent tasks, and the 
information that was available. 
Procedures
Most participants felt that there was no formal 
protocol or procedure in place to do handovers: 
‘No. Well there are guidelines that’s being outlayed, 
aren’t there, by The Royal College, but they’re not 
formally followed as far as I’m aware in a hospital 
level...not that I’ve been made aware of (a formal 
procedure).’ Doctor 2, organisation F
‘The handover in this area is very informal.’ Doctor 
2, organisation D
‘It’s not standardised at all and I don’t think it’s very 
reliable... I don’t think there is a procedure (for 
handover)... No it’s (collation of information) not a 
formalised process currently.’ Doctor 3, 
organisation D
‘There isn’t a formal procedure, no. It’s an evolved 
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thing and I suspect there’s a bit of variability... I 
don’t think there’s any real structure during the 
evening.’ Doctor 4, organisation D
On the other hand, at organisation D all 
interviewees agreed that certain parts of the 
relevant patient care are very standardised, which 
facilitates the handover: 
‘So there are various pathways to go along, and after 
a while, particularly as a middle grade, doing it 
week in, week out, month in, month out, year in, 
year out, it becomes second nature, it’s just the same 
as writing your own name.’ Doctor 1, organisation 
D
‘...the pathways that the patients are actually on, is 
very standardised and very reliable...They’re all on 
an objective pathway so there isn’t any point, if I’m 
handing over to another, if a doctor’s handing over 
to me, then going into any further detail on those 
patients at that stage.’ Doctor 2, organisation D
However, one doctor at organisation D also pointed 
out that there was still benefit in standardising the 
handover even if the patient pathways themselves 
were already standardised: 
‘I think there will still be benefits in standardising 
because we want, we want to come to a point where 
we do this all the time with everybody in the 
department.’ Doctor 3, organisation D
An exception to the general belief that there are no 
formal protocols for handover was held by one 
doctor at organisation F: 
‘We do (have a formal protocol). We have a policy 
that defines who should be present. The fact that it’s 
a registered and attended meeting compulsory, the 
fact that it is sterile and bleep free. And the content.’ 
Doctor 1, organisation F
This particular individual was leading and 
promoting a lot of improvement work in the area of 
handover at this organisation, which may explain 
their different perception. 
Time available and concurrent tasks
Interviewees frequently remarked that there was 
insufficient time to do the handover and that there 
were other tasks that required their attention: 
‘On paper if you looked at it in isolation then we 
have got a time and a place, but actually it conflicts 
with other things.’ Doctor 2, rganisation C
‘...for some people it maybe that there’s a clash of 
activities that haven’t been properly thought about.’ 
Doctor 1, organisation C
Information availability
Problems were reported in relation to availability of 
information for patients coming in during out-of-
hours periods and in relation to availability of 
real-time information: 
‘Yeah, but the patient who has come overnight 
virtually none of the information.’ Doctor 1, 
organisation C
‘Well the data isn’t updated, so the patient will have 
moved wards, you won’t know the ward and they 
may have changed.’ Doctor 1, organisation C
‘It’s a real, the problem is, it’s... a real time dynamic 
list, that is unfortunately chronological in the sense 
that it’s probably updated twice a day. When 
actually it should be more dynamic.’ Doctor 1, 
organisation F
‘Not particularly, the written information is not 
particularly accurate... I think it gives you a 
reasonable sense of what’s going on...but people 
generally know and work round it.’ Doctor 2, 
organisation C
One doctor explicitly linked the availability of 
information to other contributory factors such as 
individual differences and familiarity with the 
process: 
‘It all falls down when, overnight for instance ... 
when you haven’t got a person leading it in there, 
doing it from their end. So, some nights you can 
have a very good nurse who’s familiar with the 
processes and knows all about this area, who will 
update the screen, and update the lists and make 
sure that all the notes are updated and everything 
and then it’s very easy to get a good picture in the 
morning. But sometimes you come in and 
somebody who doesn’t really own the process and 
everything, they might be a bank nurse who never 
worked there before, so they won’t physically know 
how to update a computer and how to update the 
lists.’ Doctor 3, organisation D
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Patient characteristics
In terms of patient characteristics, interviewees 
agreed that the level of detail and the amount of 
discussion around a patient was determined to a 
large extent by the patient’s condition, i.e. the sicker 
a patient, the more thorough the handover would 
need to be: 
‘So I mean, my ideal for the handover has always 
been that it’s the patient. It’s not for every single 
patient, because we have hundreds of patients, we 
don’t have time. The people who are either very 
unwell or people who have interventions that need 
to be modified based on results that are not 
available for the first team that asses the patient.’ 
Doctor 1, organisation F
‘If the patient who the people are handing over 
don’t think there’s anything particularly going on 
with them, and they’re about to go home and 
everything has been done, then that will be a very 
passive handover, and the person listening will just 
receive that information without interrogating it 
particularly. If there’s a sense that the patient’s ill or 
something needs to be done then it’s likely that that 
will get interrogated and you get much more of a 
two way dialogue.’ Doctor 2, organisation C
Defences and solutions 
The interviewees identified a number of 
recommendations for improving the quality of 
handover. 
Standardisation 
Standardisation of the handover in terms of 
participants, time and place, and to a certain extent 
content was the most frequently discussed 
recommendation for improvement: 
‘I would have more structured handover.’ Doctor 2, 
organisation F
‘Training sessions in handover ... that when you 
come into the trust, you immediately get 
standardised training on what is required of you in 
handover, what is the trust’s standard in handover, 
what is national standard in handover really.’ 
Doctor 1, organisation F
‘I also think somehow, I don’t know quite how, 
greater agreement between the consultant body 
about how the handover is done would be useful... 
If there was a standardising when they start on 
being a bit more rigid about when people start, 
people tend to drift in and out, and you know what 
it’s like, consultants are all slightly disparate animals 
and have their own strong views, a lot of them have 
strong views about the rights and wrongs... but I 
think you can standardise the place and the time 
and the process.’ Doctor 2, organisation C
‘Well I suspect that the,... now having got 
agreement of what the handover should be and 
having now got an analysis, a standardisation 
around where it should be, who should be there, 
what should be included with the list, I suspect with 
some targeted energy we’ll be able to show a big 
step change, and once you’ve got that step change 
and you can start talking about it, I suspect other 
teams will want to try.’ Doctor 1, organisation C
‘I would impose a departmental handover twice a 
day and I would make it standardised.’ Doctor 3, 
Organisation D
‘It would be good if we could get end of the day or 
middle, you know, interim during the day 
handovers as clear as they are earlier in the day.’ 
Doctor 4, organisation D
While there was broad agreement about the need 
for standardisation, there were also cautious 
remarks about standardising sensibly and 
appropriately: 
‘I personally am not a fan of extensive handovers, I 
think what’s important is the sick patients are 
identified.’ Doctor 2, organisation F
‘...if someone comes in with a migraine and they’re 
completely fine they can go home, then given that 
we all have a background of doing our jobs for a 
number of years, if someone says that to me and 
says, this patient with migraine there’s no problems 
they came in they were a bit anxious but everything 
is fine they can go, I wouldn’t need to know what 
the discharge arrangements are because I would 
trust my colleague having made the referral, having 
sorted it out, and I think you can only run a system 
based on trust. Because there are flip sides, you 
assume that everyone is incompetent unless you 
can demonstrate they’ve filled in these fields, and 
actually the purpose of the handover is to 
communicate the data effectively, not to generate a 
paper trail that can be audited to demonstrate that 
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it’s been done properly, and I think if you had a 
situation where you had 40 patients and each 
patient you have to say every single line of data 
whether or not it was actually clinically needed, 
when it came to an ill patient you’d have, everyone 
would be bored and you, people wouldn’t prick up 
their ears, and actually that’s the important thing.’ 
Doctor 2, organisation C. 
Electronic support / prioritisation scheme 
Interviewees, particularly those from organisation 
F, encouraged the adoption of an electronic tool 
and/or a scheme to indicate the criticality status of 
patients in order to help doctors prioritise patients: 
‘I’ve developed it (electronic handover tool) with 
some of the people in IT to produce a real time 
dynamic list of every single patient in the hospital... 
So it has several sections, presenting complaint, 
obviously the demographics of the patient, the 
management plan and the diagnosis, and the 
awaited tests and how that will influence the 
outcome. And then finally, a level of intervention, 
to determine whether patients would be 
resuscitated should they have a cardiac arrest, or 
would they be suitable for intensive care. And then 
free text after that to decide whether the person 
reviewing the patient during the out of hours time 
period, have a message for people the next morning 
who come on to take over the care of the patient. So 
we have a loop now that’s about to start in February 
that I’m hoping will add the visual and the hard 
copy and real time dynamic sort of list that I think 
will improve safety by a lot.’ Doctor 1, organisation 
F
‘I would have, I’d probably have a, some kind of 
recorded database really of the patients that are 
critically ill, so that everybody is aware at nursing, 
junior and senior level. So the important things are 
dealt with overnight. So I would, I think I would 
have some kind of formalised structured database 
which has the sick people on it, and what their 
problem is, so the working diagnosis and the 
problems that need to be addressed overnight and 
any outstanding investigations which need 
chasing...The second thing is outstanding jobs that 
need doing, so less urgent, so they would be graded, 
so there’d be a grading system.’ Doctor 2, 
organisation F
‘I think there should be a field saying how ill the 
person is, simply because that’s how I believe a lot of 
medicine works, if someone, if you get phoned up 
about a patient often the first question is, are they 
ill? Because if they’re not you can relax, and if they 
are you have to think about it, and do something 
quickly.’ Doctor 2, organisation C
Team-based, multidisciplinary handovers
The adoption of team-based and multi-disciplinary 
handovers was frequently recommended in order 
to improve overall situational awareness: 
‘It’s a formal 30 minutes sterile complete handover 
that involves the incoming and the outgoing 
medical team who congregate for a 30 minute bleep 
free period.’ Doctor 1, organisation F (reporting on 
a practice that is being championed in this 
organisation)
‘Handover is not just about one or two people it’s 
about the team, so the team should be there.’ 
Doctor 2, organisation C
‘Yeah, but you have to extract it (knowledge about 
patients), and it won’t be known to everybody, but if 
you have a whole team in the room it will come 
out... so it’s clear that actually at the consultant to 
consultant handover you do need junior doctors 
involved to get it accurate.’ Doctor 1, organisation C
‘They have a sit down handover twice a day about 
the whole department and so they talk through 
every cubicle and every...patient and everybody 
right, and very quickly, but, it only takes about 20 
minutes, half an hour but nobody’s allowed to 
actually go on the shop floor unless somebody’s 
dying, until that is done.’ Doctor 3, organisation D 
Training and Simulation
The absence of training was identified as an issue 
and the provision of training in handover pointed 
out as a way forward towards standardisation (see 
above Standardisation). In addition, the use of 
simulation and the provision of training in non-
technical skills were recommended: 
‘...so my idea would be to actually video people 
doing a simulated handover and then you could use 
it to go to teaching points and training points and 
learning points so that people improve their 
practice and then obviously pick them up on things 
that could be improved.’ Doctor 1, Organisation F
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‘I think the operational management journey is 
very embryonic, and I think that the, obviously the 
medical, senior medical journey in terms of non 
technical skills is very embryonic, but if we’re 
serious about this taking off, two things have got to 
come together. So I think that the best way for this 
to be done is, it’s going to be so many managers and 
clinicians off together to get the training, and I did a 
course at the Royal College of Physicians where I 
thought that worked really well.’ Doctor 1, 
organisation C 
Culture
Several references were made to the need to 
develop a more open, proactive and pathway-
driven culture: 
‘It’s all about getting the right person to do the right 
job and not having your highly trained doctor 
doing stuff that another person could be doing 
when people are waiting. So the purpose of 
handover is to streamline those out of hours jobs 
that we have to do into entirely appropriate ones 
that maximise the time the doctors have to deal 
with patients who are deteriorating acutely.’ Doctor 
1, organisation F
‘Culture changes from jointly working on the work, 
we can’t change it, it’s when you get people work 
together looking at the system end to end, that that 
shared understanding emerges which then that 
blips the culture.’ Doctor 1, organisation C
‘I can only look at my own practice and know that I 
don’t do it perfectly and it’s a question of having the 
right culture within the environment to allow the 
inquisition of a senior person by someone of the 
same grade or someone more junior. And you can 
only really achieve that if the culture of your 
working environment supports anyone having a 
free voice.’ Doctor 1, organisation F 
‘I tend to make it quite clear at the beginning at all 
the inductions and everything, that one of the 
things we need to do is be able to challenge each 
other.’ Doctor 3, organisation D
Organisational Issues
The final set of recommendations related to 
organisational changes in order to ensure that 
people were actually able to participate in whatever 
standardised handover format was proposed: 
‘I mean this applies not only to what you’re looking 
at but to the entire health service is the,... one of the 
great inefficiencies is that doctors are expected to be 
the secretaries, and what, if there was more 
investment and time on, you know vital people to 
chase results for tests, organise, then our efficiency 
would go up massively. That is a deficiency all over 
the health service. And that does again come to 
down to you know what you’re looking at as well, 
the handovers.’ Doctor 2, organisation F 
‘Oh, you can overcome that (incompatible shifts) 
because in the morning I think it’s only half an hour 
difference so, would then be a case of letting the, the 
nursing shift start later or the doctor shift starting 
earlier or meeting halfway in the middle but I think 
you do need to reserve that half hour where 
everybody comes together, either have a walk 
round as a team or have a sit down as a team.’ 
Doctor 3, organisation D
6.5 Discussion 
Summary of results
While there were some differences between 
organisations in relation to patient identification, 
there was a clear trend across all three organisations 
that diagnostic items (presenting condition 77% of 
patients, diagnosis 75%) were communicated more 
frequently than items relating to the management 
of care (outstanding tests 17% of patients, ongoing 
treatment 17%, complications 18%). This suggests 
that the focus during handover is on immediate 
aspects of care rather than on the end-to-end 
patient pathway. 
Systems factors affecting the quality of handover 
identified during the interviews included:
 – Absence of a standard protocol for handover. 
 – Concurrent activities and competing demands 
preventing a structured and formal handover.
 – Information not being updated in real-time and 
information flow out of hours being poor.
 – The organisational culture being reactive - 
handover is not seen to be a priority and there is 
no culture of questioning and challenging.
 – Doctors not receiving training in handover or 
other non-technical skills.
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Comparison with the literature
A direct comparison with published studies is 
difficult due to the differing methods and 
approaches used across different studies as well as 
due to the fact that clinical handovers are poorly 
standardised. To date, there is little systematic 
evidence as to the actual reliability and potential of 
harm associated with clinical handovers, and what 
does exist frequently originates from studies 
conducted outside the UK. The present study 
confirms that assessments (presenting condition 
and diagnosis) were communicated more often 
during handover than investigations and 
management, or care plans. This was the case for all 
three organisations and reflects findings from a 
study in an Australian emergency care department 
(Ye at al, 2007). A recent unpublished UK study also 
found that doctor to doctor handovers were 
inadequate in acute medicine, general surgery and 
obstetric-gynaecology wards in a district general 
hospital (Pezzolesi et al 2009). In Pezzolesi’s study, 
verbal handovers achieved the lowest scores for the 
patient management plan; scores were higher for 
current diagnosis and list of current problems.
Other studies (Bomba & Prakash, 2005; Ye et al, 
2007; Jagsi et al, 2005) used post-handover 
feedback to assess whether ‘clinically relevant 
information’ was missing, hence it is likely that 
these studies particularly identified those situations 
where people felt that they should have been 
informed about certain issues but were not.
A study conducted in a US hospital employed 
discourse analysis to assess the type of information 
discussed during handover between the Emergency 
Department physician and receiving hospital 
physician. The study found that the communication 
was focused primarily on information giving rather 
than a critical exchange including questions and 
answers (Apker et al, 2009). This finding was 
confirmed in part during the qualitative part of our 
study. However, our interviews also revealed that 
there was a strong appreciation among doctors of 
the fact that handover should be a two-way 
communication with responsibility also on the 
receiving party to ensure that they get all the 
information they need. 
Recommendations proposed in the literature to 
improve the reliability and quality of clinical 
handover frequently include the adoption of a 
standard protocol (Alvarado et al., 2006; McCann 
et al., 2007). This is intuitive as many studies 
(including the present study) provide evidence that 
there is little standardisation of clinical handover. 
However, a recent editorial in the Annals of 
Emergency Medicine also warns of the dangers and 
frustrations of adopting simple solutions, such as 
the popular SBAR (Situation-Background-
Assessment-Recommendation) method, without 
having understood and addressed the wider system 
factors (Patterson & Wears, 2009). The qualitative 
part of the present study provides some insights 
into these system factors. 
Interpretation
Even though the three handovers that we studied 
were very different in terms of specialty, number of 
patients handed over and the specific form in which 
they were conducted, a number of common threads 
emerged across all three organisations. 
The quantitative analysis of the handovers 
confirmed prior findings that certain information 
such as diagnostic information was communicated 
significantly more frequently than information that 
was concerned with the management of care. The 
qualitative analysis suggests that this could be due 
to the fact that doctors are concerned more with the 
immediate aspects rather than end-to-end patient 
care; another explanation is one of practicality, as 
doctors would like to focus in the limited time 
available on the most critical patients and their 
immediate care needs. 
The quantitative analysis also established that none 
of the handovers were standardised and that the 
way handover was conducted depended on a 
number of factors, such as the particular 
individuals involved, the time of day and the 
demand levels in the department. The qualitative 
analysis shed some light on the complexity of 
systems factors that potential solutions need to 
address. These range from the lack of training in 
handover and the absence of any training in non-
technical skills, to incompatible shift patterns, 
conflicting concurrent activities and demands, and 
an overall low organisational priority given to 
handover. The study suggests that successful 
interventions will need to address these issues 
holistically. 
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It was noted that organisations C and F had one or 
more clinicians who led and promoted work on 
handover. At the time of the study, this work was at 
an early phase and no concrete results were visible. 
However, the observations and the interviews 
conducted at the three organisations support a 
potential hypothesis that at the organisations with a 
clinical champion in handover there was a greater 
awareness among staff that handover was an 
important patient safety issue within their 
organisation. 
Strengths and limitations 
The research studied doctors’ handover in three 
very different environments. One environment had 
few patients to hand over, another environment 
had moved towards a team-based handover, and 
the third environment conducted a weekly 
handover of a large number of patients. The 
different characteristics of the environment and the 
patients within the environment make a direct 
quantitative comparison between the organisations 
virtually impossible. On the other hand, striking 
similarities that emerge across such diverse 
environments reinforce the results of the study with 
respect to generic deficiencies in the process of 
handover that are not confined to a single 
environment or specialty. One could argue that 
deficient handover is a chronic disease within the 
NHS. 
The design of the quantitative study using a 
consensus-based core data set allowed a baseline 
assessment of the percentage of patients for which 
information items were handed over. This can be a 
useful tool for a continuing audit of the handover 
by each of the organisations. 
The focus of the quantitative study was on 
standardisation rather than accuracy as such. 
During the quantitative study, we only recorded 
whether or not a particular information item was 
discussed, not whether this information was 
correct nor whether it was received and acted upon 
correctly. Establishing the accuracy of information 
through an observational study is not possible and 
requires additional methods, such as post-
handover interviews and document review. We also 
did not consider items that were not in the core data 
set, but might have been important for individual 
patients.
The qualitative analysis provided interesting and 
useful insights into both the systems factors that 
affect the quality of handover, and ideas for 
potential improvements. While there was broad 
agreement among the interviewees around many of 
the identified issues, the sample of eight 
participants is too small to provide anything other 
than an initial set of findings that should be 
followed up in more detail. 
6.6 Recommendations
As pointed out above, a number of systems factors 
that impact the quality of clinical handover were 
identified. The recommendations identified by 
participants to improve handover should therefore 
be seen as complementary, as it is unlikely that any 
single intervention will lead to sustainable 
improvement without addressing the range of 
factors that were identified (Patterson & Wears, 
2009). For example, the introduction of a standard 
handover protocol may only achieve its full 
potential when accompanied by appropriate 
institutional, organisational and specific work place 
interventions, such as training in non-technical 
skills, ensuring that there are no competing 
demands on people’s time during handover and the 
provision of a dedicated location for performing 
the handover. 
Recommendations for improving the quality of 
clinical handover included:
 –  Standardisation: agree a standardised handover 
format including an agreed time and place.
 –  Organisation: ensure that this standardised 
format can be enacted in practice. Often 
departments are busier during the afternoon 
and handover takes place in an abbreviated or 
ad-hoc fashion. Interventions, such as 
streamlining shift patterns for different staff 
groups, the replacement of multiple specialty-
based handovers with a single team-based 
handover and the introduction of a protected 
bleep-free time during handover may support 
staff in following the standard handover 
protocol. 
 – Communication: develop team-based 
handovers; provide an environment for active 
discussion and (professional) challenge.
 – Technology: provide real-time electronic 
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support systems for handover including a 
prioritisation scheme for patients (e.g. Red/
Amber/Green). 
 – Training: provide training in handover and 
non-technical skills, such as through the use of 
simulation. This could be in medical school or 
in the hospital setting, or both. 
 – Culture: progress towards a proactive, pathway-
driven culture.
6.7 Conclusion
This study assessed the frequency with which 
certain information items are communicated 
during handover and the systems factors that lead 
to poor handover. Information handed over was 
concerned more with immediate aspects of patient 
care and less with end-to-end management of the 
patient pathway. Clinical handovers in the study 
organisations were not standardised. There is 
consensus that standardisation is a first step 
towards enhancing the reliability of processes 
(Wong et al, 2008; Australian Commission on 
Safety & Quality in Healthcare, 2009). However, 
organisations also need to address other systems 
factors including training, communication, 
organisational structures and priorities, and 
cultural aspects. 
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Chapter 7
Reliability of equipment 
availability in the operating theatre
by Amit Vats, Vashist Deelchand and Krishna Moorthy
7.1 Introduction
According to Vincent et al (2001), one in 10 
patients admitted to acute care hospitals suffer 
adverse events, with 40-50% of these related to 
surgery (Brennan et al., 1991). Analysis of surgical 
adverse events reveals that 54% are preventable 
(Gawande et al., 1999). Considering that over 8 
million operations are performed each year in the 
UK alone, large numbers of patients are coming to 
preventable harm from surgery. For a few years 
now, the patient safety agenda has been shifting and 
risks are now considered to be a product of the 
underlying factors hidden within the broader 
socio-organisational context of care delivery 
(MacReady, 2000, Reason, 2003). 
Surgical technology has gone through a rapid and 
dramatic transformation in the past century and 
continues to do so. While research into better 
diagnosis and treatment has been expanding, the 
need for delivering consistent and reliable surgical 
care has been largely overlooked. 
Under the pressure of a high patient turnover, 
providing treatment for patients with increasingly 
complex co-morbidities involves sophisticated 
technology and is dependent on many individuals 
from various specialties. Such a system demands a 
greater degree of inter-professional teamwork and 
communication. The risks to patient safety 
associated with high turnover surgery were referred 
to in many studies e.g. the Harvard and Colorado-
Utah studies (Thomas et al., 2000, Brennan et al., 
1991). 
Half of adverse events in hospitalised patients are 
related to surgery and almost one third of these 
occur in the intra-operative period (Gawande et al., 
2003, Gawande et al., 1999). 
Equipment related problems
Equipment problems are common in operating 
theatres and not only cause theatre disruption but 
also, in some cases, inter-professional 
confrontation and patient harm. Missing and 
malfunctioning equipment required for a surgical 
procedure is common in most operating theatres. 
Christian et al (2006), in their observation of 10 
surgical procedures, found that there were close to 
15 additional resources (such as extra surgical 
equipment) added per procedure after the 
commencement of an operation. Equipment 
problems are likely to cause disruptions of 
workflow, delay case progression and lead to 
deterioration in the dynamics between team 
members, as well as compromising patient safety 
(Christian et al., 2006). 
In a survey of UK operating theatre team members, 
respondents believed that nearly 10% of errors in 
the operating theatre were related to equipment 
problems (Flin et al., 2006). The American College 
of Surgeons’ Closed Claims study revealed that in 
5% of claims, the errors were equipment-related 
(Griffen et al., 2007). Equipment failures are also a 
common cause of stress in the operating theatre 
(Arora et al., 2010). 
Another reason for equipment-related issues to be a 
potential cause for concern is that surgeons often 
have to adjust their technique to adapt the 
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procedure in order to ‘work around’ equipment 
problems (Christian et al., 2006). Although this has 
not been studied in great detail, there is a potential 
that such an adaptation can result in technical 
errors. Therefore, in the present study we wanted to 
explore the reliability of equipment availability in 
the operating theatres, together with implications 
for patient safety.
7.2 Objectives
 – To create a process map describing how 
equipment is ordered and supplied to operating 
theatres.
 – To measure the prevalence of surgical 
equipment failures and non-availability in each 
of three organisations.
 – To identify any variation between organisations. 
 – To explore the systems factors involved.
 – To make recommendations for improving the 
reliability of ordering and delivery of surgical 
equipment to theatres.
7.3 Methods
Selection of organisations and theatres
The study was conducted in three hospital 
organisations across the UK: organisations A, D 
and F. Theatres were recruited from each 
organisation to include different specialties: 
trauma, orthopaedics, general surgery and 
paediatric surgery. The study was conducted in 
three theatres at organisation A, and five in each of 
organisations D and F. The theatre managers at 
each organisation were initially approached 
regarding access and initial management approval, 
together with a discussion of data collection 
strategies.
Process mapping
The researcher conducted visits to the operating 
departments at each organisation and engaged 
operating theatre staff in informal conversations. 
The information received was used to design a 
process map showing how surgical equipment was 
made available for an operation at each 
organisation. 
Definitions
An item of surgical equipment was defined as any 
resource which is used to perform a surgical 
procedure. This included the instruments needed 
for the procedure, any anaesthetic-related 
equipment, any type of machinery (e.g. suction or 
diathermy machines), and any other resources 
needed for the progression of surgery such as 
sutures, surgical drains or irrigation fluids. It did 
not include drugs administered systemically to the 
patient. 
An equipment failure was defined as any situation 
where equipment was not available, was not 
working, or staff did not know how to use it.
A patient adverse event was defined as an undesired 
patient outcome that may or may not be the result 
of errors (Vincent, 2001). 
Data collection and analysis
Data were collected over a period of four weeks, 
including weekends, in the operating theatres 
selected. 
To measure the prevalence of equipment failures in 
operating theatres, data collection forms were 
designed for theatre staff to complete after each 
procedure. In organisation A, the researcher 
briefed the theatre manager and theatre sisters on 
how they should be completed. In organisations D 
and F, the relevant matron and theatre co-ordinator 
were briefed respectively. These staff were asked to 
provide onwards briefings to other theatre staff. The 
forms (appendix 14) were distributed to all the 
participating theatres; scrub nurses and surgeons 
were asked to discuss equipment problems and 
complete a form after each procedure, regardless of 
whether or not any equipment failures were 
identified. 
In addition, to assess the validity of theatre staff self 
reporting, we recruited and trained a member of 
local theatre staff to act as an observer in 
organisation F for a convenience sample of surgical 
procedures. We then compared the self-reported 
data with the observational data, to assess the 
extent of any under-reporting. Although the 
observer was normally employed to work in the 
theatres in organisation F, they did not participate 
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in the surgical procedure whilst performing the 
observation.
The form comprised the following sections: 
Equipment problem
Under this section, the theatre team was asked to 
document which item of equipment the problem 
related to and which surgical procedure was being 
observed. 
Type of equipment problem
There were four categories: not available, faulty 
equipment, wrong use of equipment (ie when the 
equipment was not used for its intended purpose), 
and lack of knowledge on how to use the 
equipment. 
How was the problem dealt with
This section was included to understand how 
equipment problems are dealt with in operating 
theatres. There were three options: equipment 
added (for example, when an item of equipment 
was missing), equipment replaced/ fixed (for 
example, when an item of equipment was faulty or 
broken), and work around the problem. 
Did the problem impact on flow of surgery
The impact on the flow of surgery was measured in 
terms of the time delay the equipment problem had 
on the procedure. There were five options: no 
impact, minor (less than five minutes’ delay), 
moderate (delay of five to 30 minutes), severe 
impact (more than 30 minutes’ delay), and surgery 
cancelled.
Did the problem threaten patient safety
In this section the theatre team discussed and 
recorded the perceived severity of each failure 
using a five-point Likert scale in increasing threat 
to patient safety: no threat, minor threat, moderate 
threat, potential adverse event, and potential severe 
adverse event. 
Analysis
The denominator was the total number of 
operations for which forms were completed. We 
used the Kruskal Wallis test to compare the 
prevalence of equipment problems between 
organisations.
Exploring the systems failures
Exploring the systems failures involved semi-
structured interviews conducted using a topic 
guide. The study sample consisted of surgeons, 
anaesthetists and theatre nurses. 
The interviews aimed to explore the factors 
underlying equipment problems. Healthcare 
professionals were given a participant information 
sheet and invited to sign a consent form if they were 
willing to participate in a 20-30 minute interview. 
These interviews explored the typical causes of 
surgical equipment failures in theatres, either 
face-to-face or by telephone, depending on their 
availability and which method they preferred. 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted at a venue 
of the participant’s choice. Interviews were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
The interviewees were asked about any problem 
with surgical equipment with which they were 
aware themselves, and were also presented with 
descriptions of a sample of surgical equipment 
problems identified in theatres in the quantitative 
part of the study. They were asked to comment on 
their likely causes, based on their own experiences. 
The interview schedule is shown in Appendix 15. 
The interviews were then analysed qualitatively, 
using Vincent’s framework as previously described. 
Thirteen interviews were conducted across the 
three participating organisations. Coding of a 
sample of five interviews (39%) was checked by a 
second researcher to ensure conformity. 
Furthermore, quotes used for further analysis were 
agreed upon by the two researchers before they 
were included in the final report. 
7.5 Results
Process map
The process map relating to all three organisations 
is shown in Figure 23. All theatres had similar 
processes for the ordering of surgical equipment. 
Some equipment was ‘owned’ by the surgical 
department and some was acquired on loan when 
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needed. Some equipment was obtained directly 
from the manufacturers (for example, prostheses). 
All organisations had an onsite store room where 
equipment was stored and readily available. 
Multiple use equipment had to be sterilised before 
it could be used again. The sterilisation unit at 
organisation F was in-house while in organisations 
A and D the sterilisation process was outsourced to 
off-site commercial sterilisation companies. 
The prevalence of equipment problems
A total of 490 operations were included in the 
study, including 258 at organisation A, 67 at 
organisation D and 165 at organisation F. The 
different types of operation studied in each 
organisation were trauma, orthopaedics, general 
and paediatric surgery. 
A total of 103 cases of equipment failure were 
reported with 19% (n=94) of operations affected 
with a minimum of one problem and a maximum 
of two (average problem rate 1.1, SD±0.3). 
Types of equipment failure, and how they were 
dealt with, are summarised in Figure 24 and Figure 
25 respectively.
Figure 26 shows that in about 51% of affected cases, 
the flow of surgery was affected by the equipment 
problem, resulting in varying amounts of delay. 
Most delays were short (less than five minutes). No 
operation was cancelled due to equipment 
problems during the course of the study. Figure 27 
shows that in 21% of cases where there were 
equipment problems, the staff involved perceived 
there to be a potential threat to patient safety of 
varying degrees. 
Table 21 illustrates some of the examples of surgical 
equipment problems faced by participants.
Variability between organisations 
Table 22 shows the extent of variation between the 
three organisations in terms of the prevalence of 
equipment failures. 
Organisation D had the highest incidence of 
problems, with 37% of operations having one or 
more equipment problems, followed by 
organisation A and organisation F with equipment 
problems in 19% and 12% of operations 
respectively. Figure 28 shows the types of 
equipment failure at each organisation. The Kruskal 
Wallis test was used to confirm that the differences 
were statistically significant (p<0.001). A post-hoc 
analysis showed that there were statistically 
significant differences between organisations A and 
D, and between D and F (p < 0.05; Mann-Whitney 
test). However there was no difference between 
organisations A and F (p = 0.097).
Figure 29 shows that at organisations A and D, staff 
were most likely to cope with the equipment 
problem by working around the problem. At 
organisation F, the most common response was to 
replace the equipment or fix the item. Figure 30 
shows that at organisations A and F, the majority of 
equipment problems did not cause any delay to the 
flow of the surgery. However, at organisation D, the 
most common response was that the equipment 
problem caused a minor delay (less than 5 
minutes). Site D also had more procedures subject 
to severe delays (more than 30 minutes). 
According to Figure 31, in all organisations staff 
perceived that the equipment problems did not 
often cause potential threats to patient safety, 
although threats to patient safety were more likely 
to be reported at organisation D than at the other 
organisations.
Comparison of self-report data with 
observational data
In organisation F, 43 (26%) of 165 operations were 
observed and data were collected simultaneously 
by the observer and the surgical team. Based on the 
data collected from those 43 operations, only one of 
the observed operations experienced an equipment 
problem. The same equipment problem was 
reported by the observer and the self reporter 
(100% of 43 operations) suggesting that self 
reporting was comparable to the observer’s 
reporting. However, for the case in which staff 
experienced a problem with the equipment, the 
surgeon reported that the equipment was replaced/
fixed and the team had to work around the 
problem, while the observer reported that an extra 
item of equipment was added during the operation 
in order to deal with the problem. Both the 
observer and the surgeon teams rated the impact 
on the flow of surgery and patient safety the same.
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Figure 23: Flowchart of process for obtaining surgical equipment in all three organisations
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Figure 24: Flowchart of process for obtaining surgical equipment in all three organisations
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Figure 25: How the equipment problems were dealt with, across all three organisations
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Figure 26: Equipment failures’ effect on delays during the procedure, for all organisations combined
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Figure 27: Potential threats to patient safety, for all three organisations combined
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Table 21: Examples of the problems identified
Case Reference 
Description of 
equipment problem Consequence Impact on Patient Safety
445 D During an Orthopaedic 
knee ligament repair 
procedure, the special 
instrument used to 
harvest tendon for the 
repair was faulty.
Surgeon had to work 
without the equipment.
Surgery became 
technically difficult 
leading to increased 
duration of procedure 
and also the tendon 
harvested was 
inappropriate which 
could impact on patient’s 
quality of life and even 
failure of repair.
450 D During a urological 
procedure (flexible 
cystoscopy) the 
cystoscopy machine was 
found to be faulty.
The surgeon had to work 
around the problem as 
despite several attempts 
the fault could not be 
corrected. 
The procedure had to 
be performed under 
suboptimal vision 
through the cystoscope 
It posed a moderate 
threat to patient safety. 
Moreover it led to severe 
delay in case progression.
452 D For an elective list 
case, the laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy set was 
missing.
The surgery was 
severely delayed due to 
unavailability of the set. 
The surgeon had to wait 
for the set to be made 
available.
The situation posed a 
minor threat to safety 
due to prolonged 
anaesthetic time.
Table 22: Comparison between the three organisations
Organisation
Total operations 
studied
Number of 
operations with 
equipment 
problems
Number of 
equipment 
problems
Percentage 
operations with 
one or more 
equipment 
problems
A 258 50 56 19%
D 67 25 28 37%
F 165 19 19 12%
96    THE HEALTH FOUNDATION
Figure 28: Types of equipment problem at each organisation
Site A n=56
Site A n=28
Site A n=19
76% 20% 4% 0%
33% 63% 0% 4%
31% 53% 16% 0%
Not available Faulty Wrong use of 
equipment
Lack of knowledge 
on how to use
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Figure 29: How the problem was dealt with at each organisation
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Site A n=19
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Figure 30: Effect on the flow of surgery, at each organisation
Site A n=56
Site A n=28
Site A n=19
58% 24% 4% 0%
30% 41% 19% 0%
53% 32% 0%
15%
11%
16% 0%
0
20
40
60
80
100
%
Did the problem impact on the ow of surgery? n=total number of problems at each site
10
30
50
70
90
No impact Minor – 
less than 5 
minutes
Moderate – 5-30 
minutes
Severe – 
greater than 
30 minutes
Cancelled
Figure 31: Threats to patient safety, on each organisation
Site A n=56
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Site A n=19
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7.6 Results from system failures 
analysis
Thirteen staff members were interviewed in all 
from the three organisations. Nine staff members 
were interviewed from organisation A (four 
surgeons, three anaesthetists and two nurses), two 
staff members from organisation D (both nurses) 
and two staff members from organisation F (both 
nurses). All had also participated in collecting the 
quantitative data. Coding of the data was based on 
the pre-established categories adapted from the 
London protocol for the WISeR study as shown on 
page 14.
Institutional context
We did not identify any issues relating to the 
institutional context.
Organisational and management 
factors 
Financial resources and constraints may affect the 
availability of certain equipment. Interviewees 
reported that due to financial restrictions, up to 
date and rarely used equipment could not always be 
procured. 
 ‘No, it’s very much up to us. We’re still working 
with some equipment that is very old, 20 years old. 
You have to keep up to date with the equipment, so 
that’s one thing.’ Nurse 1, organisation D
‘It could be old equipment, we don’t have the most 
up to date things that are available because of 
expenditure.’ Nurse 1, organisation F
‘Occasionally you will find that if you’ve got 
somebody who comes in with a trauma injury, and 
it will be unique stuff that we use maybe two or 
three times a year that we wouldn’t buy to have on 
the shelf, but that you would hire in. That would be 
the occasional time whenever you shouldn’t have 
something that’s, or you should, it, you’ll have 
something that’s not available.’ Nurse 2, 
organisation A
Some expensive equipment gets damaged easily 
and places more burden on the financial resources 
available.
‘Well we do but it’s the cost implication for it. They 
are expensive and they can get damaged easy.’ 
Nurse 1, organisation D
Organisation A and organisation D have 
outsourced their sterilisation unit. Although 
surgical instruments are ‘owned’ by the theatres, in 
organisations A and D they are sent off site for 
sterilisation. In organisation D, the responsibility 
for replacing equipment when it goes missing 
between the sterilisation unit and theatres was not 
always clear.
‘And then say to theatres, right we’ve had to replace 
them with a new pair of diathermys, then the 
financial situation, who pays? Where’s the money 
coming from?’ Nurse 1, organisation D
Due to recent mergers affecting the organisational 
structure, sites work slightly differently. 
‘Because the individual sites do tend to work 
slightly different, and one of our sites was a merger 
only two years ago, so they’re very used to working 
on that site, and almost make the expectation when 
they go to one of the other sites it’s going to be 
exactly the same, and we haven’t got that 
consistency across the board in all specialities yet.’ 
Nurse 2, organisation D
There was sometimes a mismatch between the 
goals of the outsourced sterilisation unit at 
organisations A and D; and the needs of the 
operating theatre. It seemed that the main objective 
of the sterilisation unit was considered to be to 
sterilise the equipment, and not necessarily to 
provide a fully functional and complete equipment 
tray to the operating theatre.
 ‘Say you open a tray and the diathermy lead’s there 
but with no forceps, you can’t use it.  You cannot use 
the diathermy without the forceps, they go together. 
But on the outside it’ll say diathermy forceps 
missing. What you want is a system in place that if 
the diathermy forceps are damaged or missing, 
replace them, set out, it’s simple to me.’ Nurse1, 
organisation D
Some problems are recurrent. Learning from 
mistakes was not always part of staff culture and 
priorities.
‘We always need a colposcope with that list and 
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time and time again it isn’t there or it’s broken or it 
isn’t back or nobody knows where it is ’ Surgeon 3, 
Organisation A
Work environment
Equipment items that are shared among several 
theatre suites may not be available for an operation 
in specific cases. 
‘You’ve got three theatres needing particular 
equipment. Shall we say you’ve got three theatres, 
you’ve got only two sets of total hip replacement 
kits, you know, I’m not saying that this was the 
problem, but I was saying that, for example, we have 
only two total hip replacement … for instruments. 
If you’ve got three theatres who needs that, what 
would happen with the third theatre if you got only 
two? So it has to, someone in charge has to check the 
list first, not only your own list but what’s going on 
to other theatres.’ Nurse 2, organisation F
Faulty equipment was sometimes not sent for repair 
or replaced and was therefore unusable or 
unavailable for use.
‘Maybe it’s, I would say it probably isn’t maybe 
checked or sent off to be repaired’ Nurse 3, 
organisation A
‘the osteotomes that we cut bone with….they’ve 
been around for at least 30 years and they’re so over 
sharpened that they’re totally unusable. But they 
still turn up.’ Surgeon 2, organisation A
‘Our problems have been the warming blankets, and 
then various sats [oxygen saturation] probes etc not 
working, so it’s just wear and tear on equipment.’ 
Anaesthetist 2, organisation A
Organisation A uses a system of scanning and 
automatic delivery for certain store items. However, 
this system is unreliable and used items are not 
replenished.
‘Some of the things are on top up, which means they 
automatically get scanned and should get delivered, 
but for some reason that isn’t always you don’t 
always get what you need.’ Nurse 3, organisation A
Staff are sometimes rushed between procedures and 
not enough time is allowed between procedures for 
pre operative equipment checks.
‘I think if people are very rushed for whatever lack 
of staff, maybe it’s not, people have been cleaning 
from the case before and they’ve quickly got to set 
up for the next case. That might be one reason why 
someone might not, not that it’s an excuse or a 
reason not to, but this might be why people might 
feel pressure, under pressure and may skip that step.’ 
Nurse 3, organisation A 
The sterilisation unit has a high turnover of staff. 
The work environment for these staff may be a 
reason for the high turnover of staff.
‘they had to then recruit a vast number of staff for 
night shifts and evening shifts. And people, I don’t 
think, have really enjoyed that work, and there’s 
been quite a big turnover of their staff.’ Nurse 1, 
organisation D
There is a lack of facilities for storing equipment on 
site.
 ‘The storage that we have on site isn’t really very big, 
and, so storing a lot of the equipment isn’t that easy, 
and it takes up a lot of space.’ Nurse 2, organisation 
A
‘It’s a nightmare. I shouldn’t say that but it’s not it’s 
suboptimal. Not very good, we don’t have enough 
space, but perhaps that’s always going to be a 
problem.’ Nurse 3, organisation A
‘No, none at all, none at all. You have it all in the 
corridors, as you can see out there, and everything 
goes on the shelf and instrument trays get ripped 
where they’ve been slapped on top of each other and 
there’s no other place to store them so.’ Nurse 1, 
organisation F
Team factors
Prior to the operation, before opening the sterilised 
equipment tray, theatre staff are not informed of any 
faulty or missing equipment inside the tray. 
 ‘We do know this is a problem so we had some spare 
telescopes and light leads here ready to use, if that 
happens. So we have done that, we’ve tried opening 
another telescope but then that wasn’t good as well. 
So you can’t really know what’s in there and how it 
works in the set.’ Nurse 3, organisation A 
‘There is an intrinsic problem in that you can’t 
actually check they’re working before you’ve opened 
the set. But there is a step missing there in checking 
sterile equipment before it’s used. Probably the only 
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way you can do it is to actually open the sets before 
the patient’s asleep and check the equipment’s 
working.’ Anaesthetist 1, organisation A
Inadequate labelling of the surgical trays from the 
sterilisation unit may be the source of some 
confusion when the tray reaches theatre.
 ‘What we struggle with from sterile supplies, is they 
don’t always label it perhaps quite rightly, and 
perhaps we need to be more explicit about what we 
ask them to label it as.’ Nurse 2, organisation D
 ‘When, we get the instruments [from the 
Sterilisation Unit] ... we will check against the 
checklist for the instruments. And there can be 
some discrepancy ... Sometimes you should only 
have six forceps and sometimes it’s a hundred 
forceps but it’s only five inside or it could be seven. 
So you get to be very vigilant, because that can lead 
to disaster or something can go wrong if you don’t 
count your instruments.’ Nurse 2, organisation F
Some information such as that from equipment 
company representatives on new equipment, 
delivered during audits or study days, is not passed 
on to all staff. 
 ‘So during the audits, like a rep comes from a 
company and does not speak to everybody but 
there, of course, that would come down, the results 
from that would come down to communication 
because not everybody will be at the audits…people 
who were there might get the information but 
whether or not they pass it on to the next person, 
that again comes down to word of mouth which is 
not very reliable.’ Nurse 3, organisation A
Communication from surgeons may be lacking. The 
mode of communication used by surgeons to 
inform nurses of the equipment they need for a 
specific procedure is not regularly updated.
 ‘To know what equipment is needed by surgeons, 
we have kardexes for each surgeon, that our nurses 
use.... but they need to be updated for new 
procedures and new surgeons.’ Nurse 2, 
organisation A.
Senior surgeons delegate jobs to junior surgeons 
who then may not properly communicate 
information to the team in theatre. In case the 
patient list changes, sometimes the information is 
not passed on to the person in charge of the theatre. 
Sometimes surgeons do not have control of their 
own list and changes may not be communicated to 
the surgeons or theatre teams.
 ‘They don’t take ownership of it, and they don’t take 
responsibility for it, and what you need is the 
surgeon to take responsibility and ownership, and 
then to be communicating out to different people. 
And one of the things that you have to be very 
careful about is if they give it, if they give a job to one 
of their juniors, something gets lost in the 
translation, and it’s like Chinese whispers. So I think 
it’s really important that he communicates, or she 
communicates with whoever’s in charge of that 
particular area, and then there’s a communication to 
the entire team in theatre, rather than you know.’ 
Nurse 2, organisation A
 ‘I don’t think the surgeons are particularly good at 
communicating, and I think a lot of it revolves 
around the fact that they’re not in control of their 
own lists, and they have somebody else deciding 
what’s going on their list.’ Nurse 2, organisation A
However, according to two surgeons, relying only 
on a theatre list to determine which equipment may 
be needed may not be sufficient. The system should 
allow for enough flexibility in order to provide the 
surgeon with the specific equipment he/she may 
require at the point of need. 
 ‘I didn’t know until I have seen the patient what 
procedure I’m exactly going to do, because I hadn’t 
seen the patient before and he was on the list for 
that, for an open procedure and then when I have 
seen the patient, I decided that it would be better to 
do it laparoscopically. I discussed it with the patient, 
the patient wanted to have it done laparoscopically 
and I told the team that I will do it laparoscopically. 
What I hadn’t told them is what camera I need, 
because I assumed they will know.’ Surgeon 1 
organisation A
 ‘I might need that today, I might [need] something 
else or something specific and that’s usually [not 
mentioned on the theatre list] if it’s outside the remit 
of what you normally do or the other thing is 
sometimes the theatre list may not exactly have on it 
what for the operation you’re doing so actually ... to 
come down and say, well actually I’m doing this 
today and I want this, this, this and this [specific 
equipment that was not on the theatre list].’ Surgeon 
3, oganisation A
According to two surgeons, information about 
     101 HOW SAFE ARE CLINICAL SYSTEMS? 
equipment that is likely to be needed but not 
available or is not working is not highlighted by the 
nurses prior to the start of the operation. 
‘It comes to doing the laparoscopy and we’re told 
they don’t have any laparoscopes, they haven’t come 
back from the sterilising unit yet,’ Surgeon 3, 
organisation A
Individual Factors
Induction training/ familiarisation with different 
sites within the same trust is not adequate. 
Familiarisation for locum staff can also be 
overlooked.
‘Just the way the work plans are, they’ve just 
changed things around, and it may be that they 
predominantly have done a list in one of the sites, 
and now through various changes, they’re doing the 
list somewhere else. But it’s not that frequent, and 
obviously they may not be as familiar with what 
they’ve got on that other site as their normal base 
site.’ Nurse 1, organisation D
‘But then this was in the day surgery unit, which is 
away from the main theatres and they have a, I 
didn’t know that until then, I learned it then 
actually, they have a reduced amount or a reduced 
stack of things available there, right there, and if 
they, if you need a special equipment, although I 
thought this is not such a special equipment, but for 
them it was special equipment, you have to 
announce it in advance, so they will prepare it for 
the next day or whatever.’ Surgeon 1, organisation A
‘They have to come in and adapt to our type of 
equipment which sometimes can be a problem in 
that because they’ve not been trained on it and they 
don’t know.’ Nurse 1, organisation F
Sterilisation unit staff were perceived to not 
understand the needs of the operating staff and the 
surgery. Sterilised trays which are incomplete are 
therefore sent back to the operating theatre.
‘They don’t offer a decent salary, and so you get 
people who are going into TSSU to do a job, where 
it’s absolutely key to get your instruments right. 
You’ve got people here working with sets that don’t 
know the first thing about the instruments, don’t 
understand the significance of what happens 
whenever those instruments aren’t available, don’t 
understand the significance of not packing the 
instrument correctly.’ Nurse 2, organisation A
‘I’m not saying it was perfect before but there have 
been lots of issues as in we do get equipment back 
that obviously the people who are wrapping them 
don’t really have the knowledge or don’t really know 
exactly what’s going in the tray.’ Nurse 3 , 
organisation A
‘They are there to do a certain job of making sure 
that it’s sterile for us and that tray is like it should be, 
but they have no interrelation of what the surgical 
need is.’ Nurse 1, organisation D 
Theatre nurses may not be trained for specific 
specialties and cannot find the equipment required.
‘Really gynaecology trained theatre nurses, I think 
that would be the biggest advantage because very 
often they can’t find the equipment we need so we 
have to compromise and use something which is 
probably not unsafe but maybe not as good.’ 
Surgeon 3, organisation A
‘Whether we make a list of things that we may need 
for every case, we may not need them but that they 
should be actually there and available rather than 
one, two, three people running out of theatre trying 
to find something and then coming back 20 
minutes later and saying they can’t find it.’ Surgeon 
3, organisation A
‘And what we’re bringing in is, well I’ve managed to 
secure funding, so that we have senior sisters for 
special, by speciality. So that they will be seen as the 
key person, and then they’ll have their deputies, 
rather than not being too sure who’s going to be in 
that day, or with you at any one time.’ Nurse 3, 
organisation A
Task Factors
It is difficult to check sterile equipment before 
starting an operation because in order to maintain a 
sterile field the set will only be opened during an 
operation.
‘Oh yes where it’s been rewrapped and said it’s fine 
when actually when you open it the tip is damaged 
and you cannot use it.’ Nurse 1, organisation D
‘There is an intrinsic problem in that you can’t 
actually check they’re working before you’ve 
opened the set. But there is a step missing there in 
checking sterile equipment before it’s used. 
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Probably the only way you can do it is to actually 
open the sets before the patient’s asleep and check 
the equipment’s working.’ Anaesthetist 1, 
organisation A
Some tasks are not performed, for instance, 
equipment is not tested or checked before the 
procedure.
‘Eventually it comes down to the surgeon, you’re 
responsible for the equipment but obviously there 
are situations, so you’re supposed to test everything 
before you start but no-one, including me, is doing 
that probably all the time, because these are routine 
things and you just assume that these things are set 
up properly by the team, but then not.’ Surgeon 1, 
organisation A
‘Noone ever checks the diathermy, to make sure it 
works, before they need it.’ Anaesthetist 1, 
organisation A
Patient characteristics
Prior to an operation, theatre nurses are not 
informed about the likelihood of the need of any 
particular instrument specific to the condition of 
the patient.
‘Just before you do the case, maybe saying to the 
nurse, well actually I might need this today, I might 
need that today.’  Surgeon 3, organisation A
‘I don’t think that the nursing staff have…the things 
that they the nursing staff tend not to have the best 
idea about tend to be the technical, surgical things, 
what, the positioning of the patient or how long the 
operation’s going to be or what type of specialist 
equipment you’re going to need and ask for.’ 
Surgeon 4 , organisation A
Proposed solutions
Possible solutions were suggested by the 
participants in areas of communication, training 
and task allocation.
In order to improve communication, better 
labelling of items was proposed for sterile supplies 
and faulty equipment. 
‘What we struggle with from sterile supplies, is they 
don’t always label it perhaps quite rightly, and 
perhaps we need to be more explicit about what we 
ask them to label it as.’ Nurse 2, organisation D. 
‘I have been working in hospitals where they were 
putting on a tape or something on to the faulty 
equipment and so when the operation was finished, 
they sorted it out and they took it to the 
manufacturer or wherever to fix it’ Surgeon 1, 
organisation A
Visual aids were proposed for sterilisation unit staff 
in order for them to better understand what is 
required by the theatre staff. 
‘One the improvements that I thought of was taking 
pictures of our sets and bar coding all the 
instruments,’ Nurse 2 , organisation A.
‘The companies that you tend to get loans from are 
very good, because they’ll send diagrammatic 
pictures as well, so it’s very clear when you’re 
checking things off, those are the things that you 
should have on your trays, and they’re all the 
graphic trays, so it’s quite easy to see if you’ve got a 
gap, what should have been there.’ Nurse2,, 
organisation D.
Better and more specific scanning system may help 
to counter equipment problem. 
‘Because you can get bar coders that you can just 
zap all the way down all the instruments.’ Nurse 2, 
organisation A. 
‘I think there’s probably something around 
scanning as well, because our trays are scanned to 
say they leave the site, and they’re scanned to say 
that they’re in sterile supplies, and then they’re 
scanned coming back out. But they’re not scanned 
to individual theatres or individual even sites, all we 
will know is that it’s left sterile supplies and it’s at 
Hospital A. Well, Hospital A’s got ten theatres, and 
there’s only five that are clustered together, the 
other five are quite separate. So that’s been quite 
difficult for people, to find out well, where in the ten 
theatres has it gone back to? And even it may not 
have gone back to a theatre, it may have gone to an 
outpatients facility. So I think, and we are currently 
doing that work around doing almost that 
secondary scanning so that we can be more precise 
about where things are.’ Nurse 2, organisation D
Better training and exposure for sterilisation unit 
staff was also proposed. 
‘But on the back of that people have come and 
visited from [the Surgical Equipment Sterilisation 
Unit] and that has helped. And it’s a two way 
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process, they’ve asked us to visit them as well. And 
I’m very much the, making sure that that happens.’ 
Nurse 1, organisation D 
While training in specific specialty for nursing staff 
was suggested.
‘The main thing that would be good is if we had 
really gynaecology trained theatre nurses.’ Surgeon 
3, organisation A 
Allocation of tasks to specific people was suggested 
as a way to maintain the store room.
‘In my opinion, a few people will share this, we 
don’t actually have one person allocated to do that, 
to actually sort out the storeroom, neaten it up, 
unpack boxes, do this kind of thing, organise it 
really. I think the expectation is that everyone kind 
of does it and that doesn’t work, doesn’t seem to 
work at the moment anyway. If we actually had, say, 
one person to do that then it would work. So there 
may not be lack of space if it was better organised.’ 
Nurse 3, organisation A
Although many of these suggestions would be 
relatively to implement, none had been 
implemented in practice, and there seemed to be an 
acceptance of poor reliability as the norm.
7.7 Discussion 
Summary of results
This study shows that equipment problems can 
affect one fifth of the operations and often surgeons 
have to work around these problems, which not 
only leads to delays, but also threatens patient 
safety. A range of contributing factors were 
identified.
Implications of the findings
In this study, many factors were identified that 
could lead to equipment problems. The causative 
factors behind equipment problems were a complex 
interplay of communication errors, lack of training 
and orientation as well as organisational factors 
such as staffing, space and store management. 
There is often a lack of communication between 
surgeons and nurses regarding equipment needs 
for the procedures on the list. The kardex used by 
nurses for ordering equipment to be used by a 
surgeon for a surgery may also be outdated. There is 
also an element of ambiguity where a surgeon 
might assume that the nurse would know his or her 
preferred choice of equipment. Nurses also 
reported that on a number of occasions, the 
instruments were missing from the sets. This was 
largely put down to incomplete sets being sent out 
from the surgical sterilisation units, suggesting that 
the staff in the units may not realise the 
implications of sending incomplete instrument 
sets. Locum and floating theatre staff members may 
not be adequately oriented to the specific theatre 
space and as a result they may not be able to locate 
the equipment required. This was often a problem 
when a surgeon needed an instrument during the 
middle of a procedure. 
Analysing the data acquired in this investigation 
produced a variety of interesting results, some as 
predicted and some unexpected. We suspected that 
equipment failure would be common (Flin et al., 
2006, Verdaasdonk et al., 2007). The data supported 
this: 103 of 490 (19%) procedures were associated 
with one or more equipment problem. The majority 
of equipment problems related to equipment not 
being available. This was unexpected as the team 
had previously suspected that faulty equipment 
would be the main type of equipment problem 
(Verdaasdonk et al., 2007). However, the picture 
was not the same at all organisations. Most 
equipment problems at organisation A were due to 
equipment not being available, while at 
organisations D and F, most equipment problems 
were due to faulty equipment. Unavailability of 
equipment may be the result of a bigger problem in 
theatres e.g. miscommunication between doctors 
and nurses, especially if scrub nurses were not 
aware of all the equipment required for the 
procedure. In order to maintain a sterile field, 
nurses can only open the equipment pack just 
before the start of the operation and therefore may 
not be able to predict if equipment is faulty.
Lack of knowledge on how to use equipment only 
caused 1% of the problems, allowing one to 
conclude that most staff were properly trained in 
using the relevant surgical equipment. Looking 
deeper into some of the cases, a faulty tourniquet 
strap used in a knee replacement had to be worked 
around when it came undone in the middle of 
surgery. In severe cases, this could have increased 
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the risk of bleeding and put the patient’s life into 
danger. Wrong sutures and needles were common 
types of equipment failure and these put patients at 
risk of having complications after surgery. Scissors 
and blades not cutting properly delay the flow of the 
procedure and add unnecessary stress for the staff 
involved.
Due to the inevitability of equipment failure, it is 
essential that staff are prepared for these situations. 
In most cases, staff had to work around the 
problem, possibly contributing more stress to an 
already stressful environment. 
In most cases, the flow of surgery was affected by 
less than five minutes and there was no potential 
threat to patient safety. However in some cases 
serious concerns were reported. In one such case, 
the staff perceived there was a potential for an 
adverse event to the safety of a patient because the 
stopper on the control knob of an anaesthetic 
device was not functioning. This equipment defect 
also caused a delay of more than thirty minutes to 
the procedure. 
It is not clear why one organisation seemed to have 
a higher incidence of equipment problems; further 
work would be needed to explore this in more 
detail. 
Comparison with the literature
There is limited knowledge of prevalence of 
equipment problems in the literature. Our study 
was novel in many ways in trying to understand 
these problems, and therefore difficult to compare 
with the existing literature. In a video observational 
study of 30 laparoscopic procedures, Verdaasdonk 
et al (2007), reported that 26 (87%) were associated 
with at least one incident involving equipment or 
instruments. They also reported a median time loss 
of 1.5 minutes per incident. Our study included all 
types of surgical procedures including open and 
laparoscopic surgeries and a larger sample size. In 
our study, 19% of the procedures had equipment 
problems. There is a marked difference between the 
two studies. Firstly, our study was dependent on 
theatre staff reporting equipment problems rather 
than a trained observer. The staff may have been 
more likely to report only the major problems that 
affected their work pattern and may have under 
reported incidents such as improper set up or 
connection of equipment. Our study further 
reports the impact of these problems on safety and 
contributory causes of these errors.
Strengths and limitations
This is the first study that describes equipment 
problems in operating theatres in such detail and 
assesses their impact on flow of surgery and patient 
safety. The study covered multiple centres across 
the UK, thereby supporting generalisability of the 
findings. The study encouraged healthcare staff to 
assess and report the problems that they considered 
important, and therefore represents data that are 
unadulterated with observer bias. 
There may potentially have been an under 
reporting by hospital staff, particularly for those 
operations where there were no incidents related to 
surgical equipment. We suspect that data was not 
completed for all procedures during the study 
period. Staff may have been more likely to fill in the 
data sheet when they encountered equipment 
problems (as they are used to filling in incident 
forms) and may have forgot to complete the data 
sheets when they did not encounter any problems. 
Conversely, it is possible that certain types of 
equipment problem, such as staff not knowing how 
to use the relevant equipment, might be less likely 
to be reported due to staff not wanting to admit that 
this was the case. 
We attempted to quantify any under reporting by 
observing a sample of procedures in one of the 
participating organisations. We found good 
agreement between the two, but this was based only 
on a sample of 43 procedures during which only 
one equipment problem was identified. There was 
also a much lower prevalence of problems in the 
observed procedures. It is not clear why this was the 
case; it could reflect under-reporting of problem-
free surgical procedures in non-observed cases. 
Further work is therefore needed to explore the 
validity of self-reporting in this setting and to assess 
the extent of any under-reporting.
 We initially set out to measure variations between 
suites of theatres, days of the week and shifts. 
Unfortunately because these data were not 
systematically recorded on the data collection sheet 
by participants, we were unable to analyse these 
variations.
In relation to the interviews, we were only able to 
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interview surgeons and anaesthetists at one 
organisation. Unfortunately at two of the 
organisations we were only able to interview 
nurses, and did not interview surgeons or 
anaesthetists. We were also unable to interview any 
staff from the sterilisation units. This was mainly 
due to the limited time frame allocated to complete 
all interviews at all organisations. Staff tend to be 
very busy and not available for interviews. 
7.8 Recommendations
To resolve the problem of missing equipment there 
is clearly a need to improve the communication 
between the surgeons and nurses prior to surgery. 
Verdaasdonk et al showed that a structured 
checklist could halve the incidence of laparoscopic 
equipment problems (Verdaasdonk et al., 2008). 
Recently the WHO surgical checklist has been 
mandated in the UK, which provides an 
opportunity for theatre teams to ensure that the 
required equipment is available before initiating the 
surgery (Vats et al., National_Patient_Safety_
Agency(UK), 2009). Online portals may be useful 
to surgeons in stating the equipment needed for 
their elective lists. This would not only remove 
assumptions but also be a learning and audit tool.
To ensure that the equipment sets are not missing 
any instruments, visual aids can be used to support 
sterilisation unit staff to better identify equipment 
that is required by the theatre staff. 
There is a need to redesign the procurement system 
to reduce human error by putting in place checks to 
ensure that the sets dispatched are complete. 
To ensure that the equipment available in the 
operating theatre suits is easily located and readily 
traceable, there is a need to redesign the storerooms 
where equipment is easily identified and located. 
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology can 
be considered for locating expensive equipment 
that is shared between different theatres. 
To reduce human error it is essential that 
responsibilities are clearly assigned and 
redundancy added to the system supported by a 
training and orientation structure that supports 
new members of staff. 
Where the equipment is found to be faulty, a system 
should be in place to report these errors and ensure 
that faulty equipment is replaced or repaired. 
Also, the staff should be managed more efficiently 
to ensure that in each theatre there should be senior 
members who are familiar with the equipment’s 
functioning.
7.9 Conclusion
Equipment problems are common in operating 
theatres and often surgeons have to work around 
these problems, which compromises patient safety 
and cause disruptions in operating theatres. 
Communications, equipment transit through the 
sterilisation unit and store management were major 
contributors to surgical equipment problems. Team 
training and communication tools such as 
checklists and team briefings can improve 
availability of correct equipment at the right time. 
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Chapter 8
Safe systems for insertion of 
intravenous lines
by Matthew Cooke
8.1 Introduction
Intravenous lines (also known as intravascular 
catheters) are frequently used in hospital, and 
include both short-term and long-term peripheral 
and central venous catheters, and arterial catheters. 
Peripheral venous cannulation is undertaken in a 
large proportion of patients admitted to hospital. 
This has the potential to introduce infection into 
the local tissues at the site of cannulation or directly 
into the blood stream. A quarter of a million central 
venous catheters (CVCs) are used annually in the 
UK, however, the number of peripheral catheters 
used is not known. In the USA around 300 million 
catheters are used each year, of which three million 
are CVCs and 200 million peripheral intravenous 
catheters (Maki, 2008). 
Catheter-related bloodstream infections are 
associated with significant morbidity, mortality and 
costs, and are one of the most common types of 
hospital-acquired infection (Eggimann et al., 2000, 
Department of Health, 2007a). In 1994, an 
Australian study (Collignon, 1994) showed a 
bacteraemia rate of 0.33 per 1,000 cannulae, and a 
study in 2003 (McClaws et al, 2003) demonstrated 
an infection rate of 0.2 per 1,000 intravenous 
cannula days. The organisms most commonly 
isolated from all types of intravenous cannulae are 
coagulase-negative staphylococci, usually skin 
organisms (35% of infections ), with 
Staphylococcus aureus the second most common 
(25%) (anon, 2004); these organisms are skin 
commensals, confirming that the intravenous line 
infections are most likely to have been caused by 
organisms introduced from the skin. According to 
a survey of the prevalence of bloodstream 
infections in England, 42.3% are central-line 
related (Department of Health, 2007a) while in the 
USA, 250,000 cases of CVC-related bloodstream 
infection occur annually in hospitals (Muto C, 
2006).
In order to reduce the incidence of harm to patients 
during intravenous cannulation, improvements in 
the process of delivery of care have been proposed. 
The American Center for Disease Control has 
produced extensive evidence-based guidelines for 
the prevention of infection associated with 
peripheral intravenous cannulae and central 
venous catheters (O’Grady et al, 2002). 
In England, the Department of Health has devised 
the ‘Saving Lives’ programme consisting of High 
Impact Interventions (care bundles) to guide 
specific elements in the process of delivery of care. 
A care bundle is defined as a protocol put in place to 
ensure that a set of actions is performed using the 
latest evidence-based techniques. For instance, 
High Impact Intervention No 1 relates to the 
implementation of a Central Venous Catheter care 
bundle, while High Impact Intervention No 2 
focuses on the implementation of a Peripheral 
Intravenous Cannula care bundle (Department of 
Health, 2007a, Department of Health, 2007b). 
A study published in 2004 found that, in order to 
comply with the existing guidelines for central line 
insertion, a physician had to go to eight different 
places to collect the equipment needed for the 
procedure and that this could be a barrier to 
following the established procedures (Berenholtz 
SM, 2004). Two studies looking at the effectiveness 
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of implementing a central line care bundle showed 
that provision of adequate equipment at the point 
of need was essential in supporting frontline staff in 
complying with evidence-based care bundle 
guidelines (Berenholtz SM, 2004, Galpern D et al., 
2008). Another study demonstrated the need for a 
standardised list of equipment for a catheter 
insertion kit that included all supplies required to 
adhere to recommended guidelines (Muto C, 
2006). 
In this study, the availability of equipment for the 
safe insertion of peripheral intravenous lines was 
assessed. The measure chosen was the availability of 
equipment needed to comply with the 
requirements for the delivery of the care elements 
from the Dept of Health High Impact Interventions 
Number 2. This topic was not studied by any of the 
organisations participating in SCS, but was chosen 
by the research group as an additional topic.
8.2 Objectives
 – To create a process map and description of how 
equipment is supplied and made available to the 
relevant clinical areas.
 – To measure the reliability of the correct 
equipment being available for insertion and care 
of peripheral IV lines. 
 – To explore the systems factors involved in 
providing the correct equipment required for 
safe insertion of IV lines. 
 – To make recommendations for improving the 
reliability of processes of ensuring availability of 
equipment for insertion of IV lines.
8.3 Methods
Methodological considerations
There are national guidelines relating to the 
insertion of peripheral intravenous cannulae in the 
form of care bundles, which describe the 
equipment required. Therefore it is possible to 
measure the reliability of the system to deliver these 
pieces of equipment to the clinician at the point of 
care. Failures can be defined as not having these 
individual pieces of equipment available. The 
potential for harm is more difficult to assess as the 
individual inserting the cannula may not detect the 
harm from any infection caused, as this could occur 
several days later and potentially in a different 
location. Therefore any assessment of the risk and 
harm has to be based on subjective views of those 
inserting the cannulae combined with the risks 
identified in the literature.
We chose to study this topic by asking staff how 
equipment supply chains work in their unit, asking 
staff to report on the availability of equipment for 
each peripheral cannula insertion and the potential 
impact of any non-availability, and by interviews to 
explore the causes of such problems. 
Selection of organisations and wards
The study was conducted in three hospital 
organisations: A, D and F. All three organisations 
were in England, as the Department of Health 
guidance applies only to England. 
At organisation A, the managers of the Accident 
and Emergency department of the hospital and 
High Dependency Unit were approached for 
permission to conduct the study involving their 
staff.
At organisation D, the matron and the consultant 
research lead of the Accident and Emergency 
Department were approached.
At organisation F, the sister in charge of the medical 
assistants was approached to request participation 
in the study.
The areas studied and the staff undertaking 
cannulation in each organisation were as follows:
 – Organisation A: Two accident and emergency 
departments and two acute admissions wards 
were studied. Cannulation was undertaken by 
nurses, doctors and medical assistants. At this 
organisation prepared packs were used which 
included a single cannula. Disposable 
tourniquets were used.
 – Organisation D: We studied the accident and 
emergency department, where cannulae were 
inserted by doctors or advanced clinical 
practitioners (who may be from a nursing or 
allied health professional background). In this 
organisation, cannulation packs were available 
but did not contain the cannula. These were 
situated in a trolley containing extra equipment. 
Disposable tourniquets were routinely used at 
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this organisation; local policy banned the use of 
reusable tourniquets.
 –  Organisation F: We studied medical wards. 
Intravenous peripheral lines on all wards were 
inserted by Medical Assistants. No prepacks 
were available and all equipment was provided 
separately. Disposable tourniquets were 
generally available but not mandatory.
None of the three organisations changed relevant 
procedures during the course of the study nor 
undertook any intervention for improving the 
process.
Process mapping
A researcher conducted visits at each organisation 
and engaged in informal conversations and 
interviews with staff to identify:
 – The process involved in acquiring the 
equipment identified for the safe insertion of 
peripheral lines.
 – How the equipment was stored.
 – Provision of any visual management systems ( 
systems that enable stock levels to be easily seen 
and monitored).
 – How restocking was initiated to detect systems 
of stock control and feedback.
The information received was used to design 
process maps showing how the equipment was 
made available to staff at the point of need. 
Definitions
The equipment needed for the safe insertion of a 
peripheral line was identified using the High 
Impact Intervention guidelines created by the 
Department of Health. According to these 
guidelines, the risk of infection is reduced when all 
elements within the care bundle are performed 
every time and for every patient. The availability of 
sharps disposal bins is also an issue for staff safety. 
In order to support the frontline staff while they 
performed intravenous line insertion, we wanted to 
measure whether the appropriate equipment 
required was fully available. We studied whether 
the equipment was available on each occasion it 
was required or whether staff had to hunt to find 
the right equipment.
The items in the insertion of a peripheral line care 
bundle are:
 – hand hygiene facilities (hand washing facilities 
or alcohol gel)
 – personal protection (usually gloves alone but 
when indicated may include apron, goggles etc)
 – skin preparation (e.g. 2% chlorhexidine but not 
restricted to this)
 – clean tourniquet (single use or reusable)
 – intravenous cannula of appropriate size
 – specific intravenous cannula dressing
 – sharps disposal bin.
An equipment failure was therefore defined as one 
of the above items not being present, or not being 
suitable for use.
Denominator 
The denominator was the total number of 
peripheral IV line insertion procedures that were 
studied over the data collection period. There could 
be more than one cannulation procedure per 
patient if more than one cannula was required, or if 
more than one cannulation attempt was required 
for the same cannula.
Quantitative data collection and 
analysis
Staff at organisation A helped to design a data 
collection form, which was then used to document 
details of equipment failures during peripheral IV 
line insertion. At organisation A and D, the 
infection control nurses and ward managers were 
given instructions on how to complete the data 
forms. 
The forms were distributed to all the participating 
wards, and staff performing peripheral IV line 
insertions were asked by ward managers or 
infection control nurses to complete the forms as 
soon as possible after each procedure. 
The infection control nurse or nurse in charge was 
asked to co-ordinate the data collection in each 
clinical area. On site F, a vascular nurse was in 
charge of all the medical assistants who were 
responsible for line insertion. The vascular nurse, 
together with two medical assistants, was taught 
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how to complete the data collection forms. Site D 
lost the data collection forms and restarted data 
collection with a locally modified form which did 
not include details of how the problem was dealt 
with.
The data collection form (appendix 16) required 
details of the following:
Equipment used
In this section, the participant had to document the 
items of equipment from the list that were used.
Type of equipment problem
This was included in order to classify the type of 
equipment problem involved. The participant had 
to decide between four options to denote whether 
each piece of required equipment was available, 
partially available (for example, staff had access to a 
sink but the soap dispenser was empty), faulty, or 
not available.
How was the problem dealt with
This section was included to understand how the 
participant coped when faced with any equipment 
problems: Replaced from another area, for 
example, was any equipment added during the 
procedure as a consequence of the equipment 
problem; work-around, for example, the 
participant found another way of completing the 
procedure with what he/she had available; 
postponed procedure, the procedure was not 
performed.
In your opinion what was the impact on patient 
safety
Impact of the failure of equipment availability on 
patient safety was assessed using a Likert scale 
which recorded the observer’s perceived 
consequences for each failure. The categories were:
 – no threat
 – minor threat
 – moderate threat
 – potential adverse event
 – potential severe adverse event (as defined by 
NPSA).
Exploring the systems failures involved
Potential participants were approached by the 
researchers through our local contacts in each 
organisation. Participants were first contacted by 
telephone or email. Our aim was to interview a 
sample of health care professionals with an 
understanding of the issues in supplying and 
inserting IV lines. At each site, we aimed to 
interview one or two:
 –  nurses
 – doctors
 – medical assistants
 – ward managers
 – service managers. 
Interviews were conducted face to face using a 
semi-structured interview schedule (appendix 17). 
An initial coding frame was constructed by one 
researcher based on (page 14) and then revised by a 
second researcher. Coding of 50% of the interviews 
was checked by a second researcher; after the initial 
coding was completed. Discrepancies were 
reviewed and recoded after discussion and 
agreement between the two.
8.4 Results
Process maps
We developed a generic process map of the 
procedure used for restocking those items regularly 
used for intravenous cannulation at the study 
organisations. Figure 32 shows the process for 
ordering cannulae; processes for other items of 
equipment were the same. 
This demonstrated that stock levels of most items 
were routinely maintained by a system of regular 
orders of identical amounts of equipment, followed 
by adjustment of future orders in the case of over-
stocking or shortage. There were no specific 
systems in place to allow ordering to be balanced 
against demand or utilisation, meaning that there 
was a potential for overstock or non-availability of 
items depending on the difference between actual 
and expected usage. 
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The level of stock required for each item was 
determined by previous experience rather than by 
formal analysis. The map below demonstrates the 
ordering system for cannulae used in all 
organisations; the ordering systems for other items 
was similar. All three organisations used 2% 
chlorhexidine / 70% isopropyl alcohol with a skin 
applicator (‘Chloraprep’) for skin preparation. 
Reliability of equipment availability
Across the study organisations a total of 350 
peripheral intravenous cannulae were studied 
during the four week period of observation. A total 
of 47 incidents of non-availability or non-
functional equipment occurred in 46 cannulation 
operations (one cannulation procedure was 
associated with 2 equipment problem), 
representing an incidence of 13.1% of cannulation 
procedures, hence cannulation without equipment 
problems had a reliability of 86.9%.
Variability between organisations
At organisation A, we identified 15 equipment 
problems in 15 (19.7%) of 76 cannula insertions 
(Table 23). Table 24 shows more detailed 
information on the type of problem encountered by 
staff and how it was dealt with. All incidents related 
to availability of cannulae, tourniquets and sharps 
bins. 
In the two incidents involving IV cannulae, an IV 
pack with the appropriate cannulae size was not 
available. In five cases, staff stated that the small 
sharp bins provided were unsafe to use. Disposable 
tourniquets were not available in eight cases and 
staff had to use rubber gloves as tourniquets 
instead. In thirteen cases the lack of equipment was 
perceived by staff to have no potential impact while 
they perceived potential for minor impact in two 
cases.
At organisation D (Table 25), 62 cannula insertions 
were studied with seven of these (11.3%) associated 
with equipment problems. At this organisation the 
problems were mainly related to availability of skin 
preparation and correct dressings. In all cases, the 
problem was resolved by replacing the missing 
equipment from another area of the department. In 
four cases the lack of equipment was judged to have 
had no impact and in three cases a minor impact. 
Since the data collection form was modified locally, 
no data were collected on how the equipment 
problems were dealt with at this organisation.
At organisation F (Table 26), 212 cannula insertions 
were studied; with 24 cannulation procedures 
(11.3%) experiencing 25 equipment problems (one 
cannulation procedure had two equipment 
problems). In this organisation more detailed 
information was recorded by participants on the 
type of problem and how it was dealt with. This 
organisation also experienced problems with 
availability of cannulae and sharps bins but also had 
difficulty with skin preparation and dressings. In 10 
of the 25 equipment problems staff replaced a piece 
of equipment with an alternative, and in 12 cases 
relating to sharps bins used a workaround using a 
bin in a distant location. In 19 cases the lack of 
equipment was perceived by staff to have no 
potential impact while they perceived the potential 
for a minor impact in four cases and the potential 
for moderate impact in two cases.
Types of equipment problem
A summary of the incidence of all non-availability 
incidents is given in Table 27 below. It can be seen 
that non-availability of an empty sharps bin 
accounts for a high proportion (51%) of all 
incidents.
At all organisations the participants also gave their 
opinion of the possible impact on patient safety of 
the non-availability or non-functioning incident 
(Figure 33). Most perceived there to be either no 
impact or minimal impact on patient safety.
Results from systems failures analysis
A total of eight semi-structured interviews across 
three organisations were conducted. The 
participants’ professions at each organisation are 
listed in Table 28. In organisation A, the nurse and 
ward manager had also been involved in 
quantitative data collection. In organisation D, the 
advanced clinical practitioner had been involved in 
data collection, as had the medical assistant 
interviewed in organisation F. 
112    THE HEALTH FOUNDATION
Figure 32: Process map for ordering of IV cannulae across the study organisations
Is IV 
cannular used 
regularly or rarely
Rarely Frequently 
Start
cannulae available to sta to use
IV cannulae which 
are rarely used are 
ordered when 
required
IV cannulae which 
are frequently used 
are ordered and 
supplied regularly
Need to order 
triggered by stock 
level or demand
Order will be done 
either when 
demand is high or 
the stock level low
Cannulae available 
to sta to use
The same amount 
of equipment is 
supplied regularly 
e.g. every week
Process
Decision
Staff were asked similar questions, accepting that 
some may only know some components of the supply 
chain and process of cannulation. 
The issues identified will next be presented according 
to each stage of the model of factors that affect clinical 
practice.
Institutional context 
No relevant issues were identified in this category.
Organisation and management factors
The only issue identified here related to purchasing 
policy. Some organisations use disposable tourniquets 
but one interviewee commented that: 
‘They were great but apparently they’re really 
expensive and the trust wouldn’t buy them’, 
Participant 1, site F
This meant that reusable tourniquets were used, 
which have the potential to be less clean.
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Table 23: Type of equipment failure and the staff group inserting the cannula at 
Organisation A
 
Organisation A: Type of Equipment failure Staff category
Department
Total 
lines 
inserted
No of 
equip. 
failures
IV 
cannula
Hand 
hygiene PPE
Skin 
preparation Dressing
Sharps 
bin Tourniquet Nurse Dr 
Medical 
Assistant
Ward 1 7 0 0  0  0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0
Ward 2 34 3 1  0 0 0 0 0 2 27 7  0
A&E 1 21 8 1  0 0 0 0 2 5 0 21  0
A&E 2 14 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 14 0  0
Totals 76 15 2 0 0 0 0 5 8 48 28  0
PPE: personal protective equipment
Table 24: Type of equipment failure in organisation A and how they were dealt with
 
Total per item  
(% of non 
availability) 
Type of problem How was problem dealt with
 
Part 
availability Faulty
Not 
available Replaced
Work 
around Postponed
IV Cannula 2 (13%)  1 0 1 2 0 0
Hand 
Hygiene
 0  0 0 0 0 0 0
PPE 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skin prep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dressing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sharps bin 5 (33%) 5 0 0 1 4 0
Tourniquet 8 (54%)  1 0 7 0 8 0
Totals 15 (100%) 7 0 8 3 12 0 
PPE: personal protective equipment
Table 25: Type of equipment failure and the staff group inserting the cannula in organisation D
Organisation D: Type of equipment failure
Staff 
category
Ward
Total 
Lines 
inserted
No of 
equip. 
failures
IV 
cannula
Hand 
hygiene PPE
Skin 
prep Dressing
Sharps 
bin Tourniquet ACP
A&E 62 7 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 62
PPE: personal protective equipment
ACP: Advanced clinical practitioner
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Table 26: Type of equipment failure in organisation F and how they were dealt with 
 Total per 
item (% 
of non 
availability) 
Type of problem How was problem dealt with
 
Part 
availability Faulty
Not 
available Replaced
Work 
around Postponed
IV cannula 2 (8%)  0 0 2 2 0 0
Hand 
hygiene
0  0 0 0 0 0 0
PPE 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skin prep 1 (4%) 0 0 1 1 0 0
Dressing 2 (8%) 2 0 0 2 0 0
Sharps bin 20 (80%) 17 0 3 5 12 0
Tourniquet  0  0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 25 (11.7%) 19 0 6 10 12 0 
PPE: personal protective equipment
In this organisation we studied medical wards, and all cannulae were inserted by medical assistants 
Table 27: Summary of non-availability of equipment across the whole study 
Item
Organisation A 
failures (%)
Organisation D 
failures (%)
Organisation F 
failures (%)
All incidents 
across 
organisations (%)
Hand hygiene facilities 0 0 0 0
Personal protection e.g. 
gloves
0 0 0 0
Skin preparation e.g. 
2% chlorhexidine
0 2/62  
(3.2%)
1/212 
(0.5%)
3/47 
(6.4%)
Clean tourniquet 8/76  
(11%)
0 0 8/47 
(17%)
Intravenous cannula 2/76 
(3%)
0 2/212 
(1.0%)
4/47 
(8.5%)
Specific intravenous 
cannula dressing
0 5/62  
8.0%
2/212 
(1.0%)
7/47 
(14.9%)
Sharps disposal bin 5/76 
(7%)
0 20/212 
(9.4%)
25/47 
(53.2%)
Total failures 15/76 
(19.7%)
7/62 
(11.3%)
25/212 
(11.8%)
0
Reliability 80.3% 88.7% 88.2% 0
Table 28: Professions of participants interviewed
Participant
Profession
Organisation A Organisation D Organisation F
1 Nurse Consultant Medical assistant
2 Ward manager Junior doctor Ward manager
3 Doctor Advanced nurse practitioner 
(ANP)
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Figure 33: Participant opinion of the impact of equipment failure on patient safety
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Work environment
The design of the cannulation packs was noted by 
some to have a potentially negative effect on their 
use:
‘The only thing is, sometimes when you open it up, 
you know the … it’s actually folded, so it’s just quite 
hard ... you can’t use it any more, so you have to get 
a new one, a new ...’ Participant 1, site A
Management and design of the storage of 
equipment was also a concern for many staff and 
can be considered in three areas:
 – Ordering and supply of equipment via the store 
room.
 – Design of the store room.
 – Use of satellite storage or mobile storage units.
Ordering and supply of equipment in the store 
room
Store rooms sometimes ran out of equipment 
because of delays from suppliers.
‘They put itthe order on a Monday and we’re 
expecting it on a Thursday and on Thursday it 
doesn’t come. … then we’ll find out that you know 
it’s out of stock or they have given us different stuff.’ 
Participant 2, site A
Design of the store room
Store rooms were perceived not to be user friendly 
and staff found it difficult to locate equipment.
‘They don’t seem to be very well grouped together 
the things, … So it can be very difficult to put your 
hands on the things you need when you need it 
most.’ Participant 3, site A
 ‘And some store people who stock up rooms will 
put stuff where they think it needs to go and a nurse 
may very well put it completely somewhere else….
all the wards have different layouts.’  Participant 2, 
site F
‘And things are very,... generally tend to be very 
badly labelled.’ Participant 3, site A
‘..have to go up to the other end of the ward to go 
and get stuff but then that’s just a ward base, so that 
gets used up as well..…, but then night shift it’s just 
anywhere.’ Participant 2, site D
‘The store cupboard being downstairs is a problem.’ 
Participant 3, site D
‘Sometimes people, if they’ve got to walk up other 
end, they may very well choose the equipment 
quicker but not the most ideal for the job.’ 
Participant 2, site F
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Use of satellite storage or mobile storage unit:
Satellite and mobile storage units were reported to 
be very helpful for frontline 
staff. However, these storage units have to be 
constantly replenished to be fully useful. 
‘You would expect consistency about stocking level.’ 
Participant 1, site D
‘It’s worse at night time to try and get things. Maybe 
that’s just that they’ve been used up during the day 
and not replenished. ’ Participant 2, site D
‘We’ve got trolleys set up for peripheral insertion, 
the cannulae and syringes, everything, we do have a 
problem with it being stocked,’ ‘Minors, there’s 
problems with the equipment in minors, I think 
because there’s less insertion of IV lines put down 
in there, that stock gets depleted and not 
replenished.’ Participant 3, site D
Availability of equipment
When sharp bins are full, they are sometimes not 
replaced. 
‘And sharps boxes are a problem, …., we used to 
have sharps boxes in every cubicle, which is great, 
then there was a move to take them out because 
they were harmful to the patient, and you tend to 
wander around trying to find a sharps box.’ 
Participant 3, site D
Availability of equipment was perceived to be less 
reliable during bank holidays, weekends and nights, 
although we did not collect data to support or 
refute this assertion.
‘Mostly Bank Holidays, mostly when the holidays 
are coming, mostly and sometimes it’s Saturdays. It 
really depends sometimes, like it’s mostly Bank 
Holidays.’ Participant 1, site A
‘It tends to be based on how busy the department’s 
been…. it is worse over the weekends and bank 
holidays because those are our busiest times, and 
the rest of the hospital is on skeleton staff.’ 
Participant 3, site D
Equipment available was often not standard, brands 
and types may change and this may affect the safe 
insertion of IV lines.
‘In terms of it affecting the patient yes the effect is 
obviously them having to do this procedure twice 
or thrice rather than once. So again in terms of 
familiarity and ease of usage then it’s going to be 
difficult for the staff.’ Participant 2, site A
Staffing levels
Activities for replenishing stock and storage units 
are very dependent on the staffing levels. 
‘Their staffing levels will be better, they’re just more 
organised. … they don’t have that much of a 
turnover so therefore people know what they’re 
doing all the time, including the people that may 
well do their sharps bins… you don’t get many 
emergencies on there so hopefully most of the time 
the day has a routine … it can work quite well.’ 
Participant 1, site F
‘Because sometimes somebody’s off sick …. then 
nobody goes round to stock and, which is why I 
said everybody’s trying to do everybody’s job ...’ 
Participant 1, site D
‘That’s down to a staffing issue really, that there’s too 
many areas and too few staff to do the stocking.’ 
Participant 3, site D
Team factors
On the wards, staff work both in teams and with 
other teams of staff e.g. nurses, doctors and 
procurement officers. If the team is not functioning 
properly, then this may influence the availability of 
equipment 
‘We don’t see if they have placed the order already.’ 
Participant 2, site A.
Staff replenishing the storage units are sometimes 
not aware that stocking up is required: 
‘And the doctors, especially at night time, the last 
thing they’re going to go and do is go and get some 
from somewhere else just so it’s stocked up, because 
their bleeper’s going off. ’ Participant 2, site D
It was also suggested that the staff who are allocated 
the task of ordering equipment or replenishing 
storage units may not comprehend the priority or 
urgency of the task. 
 ‘It might be their job and yet they’re not the ones 
that use it so … that you may not, that wouldn’t be 
your priority because it’s not something that’s on 
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your radar.’ Participant 1, site F
‘The people that do the replenishing don’t realise 
how annoying it is when they’re not there, if that 
makes sense.’ Participant 2, site D
Tasks are generally not allocated to a specific 
member of staff. For example, there is no 
designated person to perform replenishment of 
storage and mobile units.
‘So you actually find that actually translates to 
better stocking where some areas it’s everybody’s 
job instead of, from my experience anyway, if they 
have a system where people have designated line 
manager, designated functions I think it just works 
better because everybody knows if that happens it’s 
yours.’ Participant 1, site D
Individual staff factors
Staff should be knowledgeable about and familiar 
with the tasks they are meant to perform. Some 
tasks are performed very rarely and this may affect 
the staff ’s skills and knowledge.
‘I often end up trying to ask nurses where things are 
stored, and they often don’t know and they vaguely 
know. There’s usually one or two equipment 
cupboards on each ward, often at different ends of 
the ward, so it can be impossible.’ Participant 3, site 
A 
Task factors
Local protocol and guidelines may vary from 
hospital to hospital and are not easily available for 
staff who work in different organisations. The 
differences between the same task in different 
hospitals may not be clear.
‘But I think what is, what does vary is the, are the 
local protocols and guidelines for where the lines 
need to be inserted in terms of location, the ward 
environment.’ Participant 3, site A 
Defences and solutions
It was suggested that standardisation of the 
equipment available for cannulation across the 
trust can help staff become more familiar with the 
equipment used and reduce incidents caused by 
staff not knowing how to use the equipment 
appropriately.
‘Well I think it’s one in terms of equipment, I know 
with us in A&E it’s a bit difficult because we’ve got 
different users, but if we’re going to approach it 
from a Trust point of view definitely having one 
equipment in a sense of let’s say or getting a Venflon 
if that Venflon, specific Venflon is being used in the 
three sites then it would definitely help us.’ 
Participant 2, site A.
Standardising the design of store rooms and 
making them more user friendly can also help 
temporary staff who are unfamiliar with the ward 
to locate the equipment required:
‘Certainly from my point of view, going to each 
treatment room, if each treatment room was pretty 
similar then that would be great’ Participant 1, site 
F.
Allocating a specific staff member to a particular 
task in order to ensure that tasks are being 
performed:
‘I think we just need to have a little more structure 
around who does what. I think it’s great in theory, I 
think it’s very … to say everybody does everything. 
In reality it doesn’t work.’ Participant 1, site D
‘I think a lot of these things would be much better if 
they were done by a designated person who is, I 
don’t know, a stable member of the team.’ 
Participant 1, site F
Although many of these suggestions were relatively 
straightforward, it appeared that none had been 
implemented in practice, suggesting that staff 
accepted the problems as normal.
8.5 Discussion
Summary of results
The reliability of supply of appropriate equipment 
for cannulation, as defined by the DH cannulation 
care bundle, was similar (80.3%; 88.7%; 88.2%) in 
all organisations. However, the causes of failures 
were highly variable. In organisation A the main 
causes were lack of a clean tourniquet and sharps 
disposal bins, in organisation D it was availability of 
dressings and in organisation F it was sharps bins. 
This indicates that the problems are not 
insurmountable, as at least one organisation had no 
failures in each category. The failures were not 
perceived by staff as having serious consequences 
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and were usually resolved with a workaround. This 
reliability rate was relatively high compared to 
some of the other topics studied; this may reflect 
the attention that infection control has received 
nationally. This is also one of only a few topics 
having nationally accepted care bundles so 
organisations have a benchmark to work to.
This study shows that the supply chain to deliver 
the correct equipment for peripheral venous 
cannulation is based on old style routine reordering 
systems. There are no apparent feedback loops to 
ensure replenishment of stocks.
In this study, equipment problems may have 
compromised care in 14% of cases but the harm 
resulting from this is unknown. The availability of 
an empty sharps bin and the correct size of 
cannulae appear common sources of issues.
Comparison with the literature
There is no peer-reviewed literature which assesses 
the reliability of systems that deliver the appropriate 
equipment for peripheral cannulation, nor about 
whether achieving the care bundle does reduce 
infection rates. This work therefore gives the first 
evidence of where failures are occurring and 
potential areas where improvement could be 
focused. In particular, the work highlights the 
many human factors related to the supply chain in 
intravenous cannulation. There are no published 
results of the results of use of the Department of 
Health audit tool for the care bundles, so we do not 
know whether the organisations studied are similar 
to other NHS organisations. 
Interpretation
Development of supply chain systems to ensure 
adequate stock control and availability and 
replenishment of full sharps bins would improve 
the reliability of availability of equipment. The need 
for extra or different cannulae during a procedure 
should also be taken into account when designing 
cannulation packs. The communication along the 
supply chain was reported as a significant issue. The 
ability of those responsible for restocking to be 
aware of the need and the ability to work as a team 
were continually highlighted in interviews.
Storage and restocking are key issues to ensure that 
equipment is always accessible and available. 
Staffing issues can cause problems with restocking, 
particularly if restocking is seen as a particular 
person’s responsibility (or no-one’s) rather than a 
group function.
The lack of sharps disposal bins often resulted in 
staff taking their sharps to another location for 
disposal. Whereas other failures were a potential 
infection risk to the patient, this problem resulted 
in a risk to staff, as by transporting sharps there is 
increased risk of needlestick injuries (Linneman et 
al, 1991).
It may be that staff familiarity with the type of 
equipment used has an impact on patient safety, in 
which case it is important that this be factored into 
the equipment that is available. The usage of 
equipment packs will be influenced by their design 
and way in which they are stored on the ward.
Strengths and limitations
The strengths of our study are that we used the 
nationally-accepted care bundle and so results 
represent reliability against standards that should 
be known by all staff involved and those designing 
the underlying processes. 
In relation to limitations, the availability was 
measured using self-reporting which may be open 
to bias, although we believe that this was minimised 
by anonymity and clear explanation of the purpose 
of the study. The assessment of the impact on 
patient safety has significant limitations as this was 
the subjective opinion of the individual and that 
such events are likely to be rare and often not 
traceable to the cannulation, and so this method 
may underestimate the risk. On site D, due to local 
modification of the data collection form, following 
loss of the original data collection forms, staff did 
not complete the section relating to how the 
problem was dealt with. We also assessed risks from 
the patient’s perspective and so will not have 
captured the risks to staff resulting from 
unavailability of sharps bins. We were unable to 
interview the numbers of staff that we aimed for. 
This was mainly due to the limited time frame 
available to complete all interviews on all sites. Staff 
were very busy and therefore not available for 
interviews which often got cancelled at the last 
minute. 
Recommendations
It appears that the majority of issues would be 
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resolved if:
 – Standardised packs were used but with a variety 
of cannulae available as well as back-up 
supplies. The design of packs needs to be such 
that they contain the necessary equipment 
allowing for individual variation without 
wastage. 
 – Availability of disposable tourniquets was 
increased; this could increase reliability if made 
mandatory and seen as an affordable option.
 – Systems were developed to ensure reliable 
restocking, including systems to inform those 
responsible for restocking supplies when 
supplies are low. These systems could include 
visual methods so it is apparent when restocking 
is required with paper based ordering, to 
complex automated stock level detection 
systems that automate the reordering.
 – Equipment is stored as locally as possible to the 
procedure, including availability of sharps boxes 
at the location where cannulation is being 
undertaken. 
 – Improved communication and joint working 
occurs in the team. Over delineation of roles 
was perceived as a barrier to efficient reliable 
restocking; staff who are responsible for 
cannulation may not feel responsibility for 
either restocking or informing the person 
responsible.
A basic pack of equipment in a trolley containing 
more variable equipment, sharps disposal and 
extras that is taken to the patient and then returned 
to a restocking point may resolve many of these 
issues.
More in-depth study is required across multiple 
organisations to determine whether the failure 
modes in the study organisations are representative 
of the NHS.
NHS organisations should already be auditing their 
compliance against the peripheral venous 
cannulation care bundle using the Department of 
Health audit tool. This audit may not detect 
workarounds which have the potential to increase 
risk as it looks at whether actions are completed 
and may be improved by a simple root cause 
analysis approach to determine whether non-
availability was a contributory factor and how the 
availability could be improved.
It is likely that availability of sharps bins may be a 
significant problem and organisations should look 
at how to make these readily available at the point 
of care.
8.6 Conclusions
Reliability of the supply of correct functional 
equipment for cannulation is generally high and no 
single issue was seen across all organisations, 
suggesting each organisation has resolved some 
issues. Sharps disposal box supply close to the place 
of cannulation and availability of clean tourniquets 
were important issues. It may be possible to 
improve the reliability of the availability of 
equipment for peripheral venous cannulation by 
using supply chain management principles, 
including the presence of feedback loops when 
equipment stocks are low, visual management so 
that low stocks are visible and appropriate design of 
packs and work areas. There are also some issues 
that could be resolved by learning from other 
organisations in the study, e.g. sharps boxes being 
available with equipment trolleys or in cubicles 
were used in the two organisations with no 
problems of non-availability of sharps bins, 
compared to the organisation that did have 
problems. Learning from other NHS organisations 
may therefore be useful when linked to appropriate 
audits and feedback to staff.
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Chapter 9
Discussion
9.1 Discussion overview 
We studied five common but important processes 
and measured the reliability (or in one case, 
standardisation) of each in three NHS 
organisations. The four clinical systems for which 
reliability could be measured had an average 
reliability of 81-87%. However, this apparent 
similarity hides some significant variation between 
organisations for some processes. Reliability 
ranged from 63% for equipment availability in 
operating theatres in organisation D, to 96% for 
availability of clinical information in organisation 
A. No one organisation had consistently higher or 
lower reliability across multiple topics, although it 
is difficult to draw concrete conclusions as only one 
topic was studied at some participating 
organisations (Figure 34). However, the higher 
topic-specific levels of reliability identified in some 
organisations suggest that it is possible to create 
more reliable systems, although even these can be 
improved upon. 
With the exception of prescribing error, there were 
no previous studies of the reliability of the systems 
studied and none studying more than one 
organisation using the same methods. Our work is 
therefore the first of its type. 
Figure 34: Comparison of reliability across topics and organisations
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9.2 Factors contributing to poor 
reliability
Similar contributory factors were often found 
between topics and organisations, these included:
 – Lack of feedback mechanisms, both for 
individuals (for example, to doctors regarding 
prescribing errors) and systems (for example, 
stock control for cannulation equipment).
 – Lack of standardisation, for example in how 
certain drugs are prescribed, how doctors’ 
handovers are conducted, and how equipment 
is stored in theatres.
 – Poor communication, both written (for 
example, poor documentation of medication 
changes in patients’ health records) and verbal 
(for example, handovers interrupted).
 – A perception of over complexity of processes 
(whether or not this was actually the case), for 
example systems for obtaining health records, 
off-site preparation of equipment.
 – Over time, staff have come to accept poor 
reliability and accept this as normal, thus not 
reporting or challenging problems, for example 
acceptance of handovers of varying standards 
by the individuals receiving them. 
 – Lack of ownership of issues, for example 
blaming others for operating tray content.
We therefore suggest that these are the system-wide 
areas that need to be addressed in order to improve 
the reliability of healthcare systems. Many of these 
areas have been identified previously. For example, 
Amalberti et al (2005) highlight lack of 
simplification and excessive worker autonomy 
(leading to lack of standardisation) as key barriers 
to achieving safer healthcare. The present work 
provides further evidence for the existence of these 
factors across a range of processes in NHS 
hospitals. 
When proposing interventions to improve process 
reliability, it is important to bear in mind that these 
system-factors are inter-related and that solutions 
also need to take into account the local context. For 
example, a standardised communication protocol 
may not be effective when critical team members 
are not attending the meeting due to other work 
demands or when people have not received training 
in communication skills (Cleland et al 2009). 
Equally, if a standardised communication protocol 
does not allow for local customisation, it may 
impose an overly rigid structure that professionals 
reject (Patterson and Wears, 2009). Patterson 
(2008) also warns that a focus on standardisation of 
communication may lead to a situation where 
frontline staff are increasingly being blamed for 
communication failures, a strategy that may not be 
helpful in increasing system reliability. 
Some additional organisational factors, while less 
pervasive than those above, were also identified for 
two of the processes, namely reliability of 
prescribing and information availability. These 
were the additional challenges associated with 
managing ‘outlier’ patients on remote wards, issues 
relating to the obtaining key information out of 
usual working hours, and handwriting. The 
similarities between these two topics may relate to 
them both involving ordering care (whether 
medication, tests or investigations) and issues 
involved in communicating these requests in a 
timely fashion. As would be expected, there were 
also common issues identified between the systems 
for obtaining operating theatre equipment and the 
equipment needed for the insertion of IV cannulae. 
As well as lack of feedback about supply, these also 
included lack of communication about 
requirements, lack of clarity about responsibilities 
for ordering and checking stock levels, and lack of 
systems to automatically highlight when stock 
levels were incorrect. Lack of resources was also 
raised as an issue in relation to obtaining 
equipment needed in operating theatres, but to a 
much lesser extent for the other systems studied.
9.3 Patient safety implications 
For four of the five processes studied, we were able 
to explore the perceived impact on patient safety. 
When we studied information availability in 
outpatient clinics, we found that 15% of patients 
had some type of relevant clinical information 
missing. Of these patients 20% had a perceived risk 
of harm. When we studied inpatient prescribing, 
we found errors in 15% of medication orders, of 
which an estimated 19% were predicted to have 
serious consequences to the patient if not 
corrected. In the study of the reliability of 
equipment availability in the operating theatre, we 
found that 19% of operations were affected by 
equipment problems. Of these, 21% were 
associated with threats to patient safety. Finally, in 
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the study of equipment availability for the insertion 
of peripheral IV cannulae, problems occurred in 
13% of cannula insertions, of which 23% were 
judged to have some impact on patient safety. 
In each case, about 20% of reliability failures were 
therefore associated with a potential risk of harm, 
although a more formal validated scale was used to 
assess the clinical consequences of prescribing 
errors, which is not directly comparable with the 
approach used for the other topics.
We were not able to study the clinical consequences 
relating to lack of standardisation in handover, as 
we observed only the information that was handed 
over and were unable to follow up or assess any 
consequences to the patient. However, interviewees 
in our qualitative study suggested that there can be 
serious consequences following poor handover. 
We also noted that solutions were often adopted 
through staff developing workarounds, for example 
by obtaining information from patients rather than 
their health records, or using disposable gloves as 
tourniquets, for which the risks could not directly 
be assessed. In some cases, risks were taken such as 
making clinical decisions without information, and 
transferring used sharps to sharps bins in remote 
locations.
9.4 Economic implications
This section considers some of the implications of 
this study from an economic perspective, and was 
commissioned from David Epstein, a health 
economist from York University. 
A direct financial cost to the NHS can be estimated 
for some of the reliability failures identified in this 
study, for example, if an outpatient attendance is 
rescheduled. Here we estimate some of these direct 
costs from the data presented earlier in this report. 
It is beyond the scope of this report to conduct a full 
economic analysis, however, such an analysis 
would also identify broader or more intangible 
opportunity costs or benefits foregone to the NHS 
organisation concerned, staff and/or patients. 
These broader opportunity costs may be substantial 
and might include, among other things, suboptimal 
care (health foregone), adverse events, loss of 
confidence and goodwill in the hospital by patients 
and GPs, and the potential for civil actions and 
medical negligence claims. Complex, multi-activity 
organisations such as hospitals may also deal with 
problems in an inefficient, piecemeal or duplicative 
way, for example requiring staff in one department 
to correct problems originating in another, rather 
than deal with them at their source. It is beyond the 
scope of this report to quantify these. 
In the next sections we discuss some of the 
economic consequences in more detail for three of 
the five processes studied. 
Clinical information availability in 
outpatient clinics 
Missing information in outpatient clinics might be 
costly to the NHS and patients in several ways. 
There may be a direct financial cost of having to 
book a new appointment. As this research has only 
sampled from three hospitals, the results cannot 
reliably be generalised to the whole NHS. However, 
if 1.7% of 66 million outpatient appointments need 
to be rebooked because of missing information, 
this implies a direct annual cost to the NHS of over 
£110 million, given that an average cost of a 
outpatient attendance is £97 (Department of Health 
2010). This study shows there is variability in 
missing information between the three hospitals 
sampled; this variability may indicate that 
improvements are feasible. Given the variability in 
reliability rates between Trusts, and the many 
different causes of poor reliability identified in this 
report, it is likely that interventions will need to be 
tailored closely to local circumstances. Improved 
training in using the existing systems, and ensuring 
that responsibility for patient records is clearly 
delineated, appear to be common themes. 
Prescribing for hospital inpatients
Among the hospitals sampled, prescribing errors 
were identified in almost 15% of new medication 
orders, and 19% of these could be classed as 
potentially serious. Therefore this study implies 
that serious errors occur in about 3% of new 
medication orders in hospital wards. These errors 
represent an estimate of potential risks to patients, 
which, if not corrected, may result in inadequate 
care and/or adverse drug events (ADE). While 
ADE are rare, they have been found to substantially 
and significantly increase length of stay. One US 
study found 60 preventable ADE in 4108 
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admissions to medical and surgical wards, an 
incidence of 1.5%. It also found that a preventable 
ADE increased length of stay (compared with a 
matched control) by 4.6 days (Bates et al, 1997). In 
the UK, this would cost about £900 per ADE, apart 
from any cost of treating longer term complications 
or malpractice costs.
The current study found that differences in 
prescribing error rates between wards within 
hospitals appeared to be greater than variation 
between hospitals, indicating there may be scope 
for improvement in most organisations. The study 
also finds that many, but not all, of errors are 
detected and corrected, but that there were 
differences between specialities and organisations 
in this respect. These factors indicate that 
interventions to improve prescribing may need to 
be tailored closely to local circumstances and 
perhaps even individual departments or staff. The 
report also highlights that staff perceive an 
important role for the electronic patient record to 
improve the system, albeit acknowledging this 
would not be a panacea. 
Equipment availability in the operating 
theatre
Equipment failures can impose an immediate and 
direct financial cost in terms of additional time 
spent in the operating theatre. The study found an 
equipment failure in 21% of operations, and that 
30% of these resulted in a delay of up to five 
minutes, 14% a delay of five to 30 minutes and 7% a 
delay of 30 minutes or more. The mean cost of an 
hour of operating theatre has been estimated to be 
£1055 in Scotland (ISD Scotland, 2009). On this 
basis, equipment failure added a cost of between 
£90 and £527 to 3% of operations in this sample, 
and at least £527 to 1.5% of operations. This is a 
considerable cost on aggregate to the NHS. The 
study found variation in equipment failure rates 
and the reasons for these between organisations. 
While this variation could be due to random 
chance, if valid it might indicate that in principle 
many of these problems would be preventable in at 
least some organisations. Similar issues will apply 
for the reliability of cannulation which 
demonstrated poor stock control and use of 
multiple packs if failure occurred. Excessive stock 
could potentially result in equipment being 
discarded because it is out of date or because sterile 
protection has been breached. Repeated 
understocking could result in more waste and 
perverse actions (such as ‘secret stashes’) as well as 
the costs of any resultant harm.
Wider context
Where reliability failures are in principle reducible 
by improving processes, managers are likely to 
want to evaluate and compare the costs and benefits 
of interventions that aim to achieve this. Many of 
the solutions proposed in this report will depend 
on local circumstances. However, it is also relevant 
to consider the strategic role of the Department of 
Health (and equivalents in Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland), the main one in this context 
probably being the ongoing computerisation of 
patient records and integration of coding and 
information systems across the various 
organisations of the NHS. Several of the 
respondents in this study in Chapter 4 expected this 
technology to make a positive improvement to 
accuracy of prescribing, although Chapter 3 
highlights some of the perceived disadvantages of 
using electronic patient records in outpatient 
clinics, in particular lack of familiarity and poor 
access to information systems in the clinic. 
Improving reliability fits well with the Department 
of Health’s key QIPP (Quality, Innovation, 
Productivity and Prevention) agenda. Improving 
reliability will mean better quality of care with 
improved outcomes, innovation will help to 
improve reliability (e.g. manufacturing techniques 
to improve stock control, electronic records to 
improve information access and prescribing) 
productivity is increased (for example by less 
duplication because of unavailable test results or 
poor handover) and prevents adverse events and 
harm. In a time of financial restraint a focus on 
improving reliability offers an opportunity for 
saving money whilst also improving the quality of 
care.
9.5 Strengths and limitations 
The strengths of this study are that we studied each 
process in three organisations, often in more than 
one clinical area, using standard methods and 
definitions. While participating organisations were 
not randomly selected, the use of multiple 
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organisations increases generalisability compared 
with most similar studies, which have been based at 
only one site. We have also been able to synthesise 
common factors across more than one process, 
using a published and widely used model of the 
factors that affect clinical practice.
The main limitation is that data collection for four 
of the five processes studied was based on self-
reporting by hospital staff. This has potential 
limitations in terms of the reliability and validity of 
the data collected, especially in relation to potential 
under-reporting. However, we tried to minimise 
the extent of any under-reporting by choosing 
processes where poor reliability is an annoyance for 
the staff involved, and so staff were likely to be 
motivated to report problems. We also kept data 
collection periods relatively short to reduce data 
collection fatigue, and made data collection forms 
as simple to complete as possible. For one of the 
processes studied – the availability of equipment in 
operating theatres – we attempted to quantify this 
by comparing self-report data with that reported by 
a non-participant observer. While agreement was 
high, an equipment failure was identified (by both 
the observer and the theatre staff) in only one of the 
43 operations observed, and so the true extent of 
any self-reporting bias is unknown. Ideally we 
would have collected similar validation data for the 
other topics, but this was not possible within the 
time and resources available. 
There may also be some response bias in the 
qualitative data collected in the interviews, in 
relation to the selection of interviewees and/or 
their responses. Potential interviewees were 
identified by local co-ordinators in each site, and it 
is possible that they may have identified 
interviewees who were interested in this type of 
work or likely to be amenable to participate; their 
views may or may not be representative of other 
staff. It is also possible that there may have been 
some social desirability bias in their responses, 
such as avoiding talking about their own failings. It 
was noted that there were relatively few references 
to lack of resource in the interviews; it may be that 
interviewees did not think that lack of resources 
was the main issue, it may be that they accepted 
lack of resources as normal and did not specifically 
raise this, or it may be that our approach to 
interviewing and coding did not highlight this area.
Specific issues relating to each process are also 
presented in the relevant chapters.
9.6 Recommendations for future 
research
Further research should build on the work 
presented here by using standardised methods and 
definitions to study reliability failures across 
multiple organisations. The identification of 
differences between organisations was useful here 
and suggested that processes can be made more 
reliable. Further studies could also explore the 
economic consequences of poor reliability in 
further depth and quantify the link between 
reliability and harm. Finally, additional research 
could explore the relationships in reliability of 
different processes within each organisation, in 
order to find out whether high reliability in one 
area predicts high reliability in other areas, and 
whether unreliability is linked to any particular 
organisational characteristic. If such ‘higher 
reliability’ NHS organisations exist, work would 
then be needed to identify the factors that support 
this in terms of organisational maturity or safety 
climate, for example.
Our findings suggest that improvement may be 
achieved in many areas. Specific recommendations 
are given relating to each topic, but some more 
general recommendations follow. A system-wide 
approach is likely to be needed rather than viewing 
individual recommendations in isolation (Carroll 
and Edmondson, 2002). 
9.6 Improving feedback 
mechanisms 
Many systems fail to have effective feedback 
mechanisms. This was highlighted as an issue in 
feedback to individuals but also in supply chains. 
For example, better feedback to doctors about their 
prescribing errors may help improve prescribing, 
feedback of low stock levels can prevent non-
availability, and feedback of information received 
in handover could improve quality.
9.7 Standardisation 
Standard formats for undertaking procedures are 
likely to improve the safety of care. Clinical 
freedom can still exist within standardisation but it 
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is suggested that some of the present systems allow 
too much freedom, reducing reliability. 
This would also help in measuring quality. For 
example, a standard format for handover is likely to 
ensure that all essential items are handed over. 
Based on the US IHI’s approach, reliability of less 
than 80-90% (as was the case for most of our 
topic-organisation pairings; Figure 34) indicates 
the lack of any articulated common process, 
whereas reliability of around 95% suggests the 
presence of a clearly articulated process (Resar, 
2006). Only the availability of medical records at 
organisation 
A achieved a reliability of 95%. Standardisation of 
processes might therefore be expected to have 
significant benefit in some of the areas studied. 
9.8 Improving communication 
In several areas there was a failure of 
communication leading to errors not being 
identified at an early stage or systems not being 
corrected. For example, better communication 
between theatre staff and sterilisation units would 
help understanding of the requirements of theatre 
staff.
9.9 Developing a culture of 
challenge 
In many circumstances the interviews revealed a 
lack of a challenge culture, so that poor reliability 
and the potential for errors passed without 
comment. 
This is likely to be a complex area. Staff may need to 
be encouraged to challenge poor reliability, and 
need to see that suggestions are met positively and 
without criticism, and result in change.
9.10 Encouraging a sense of 
ownership 
Individuals tend to blame others or the systems 
rather than seeing themselves as part of the system 
and therefore someone who can help to improve 
reliability. 
In many cases, these recommendations are 
complementary. For example, standardisation of 
handover will only achieve its full potential if 
accompanied by improved non-technical skills 
such as communication and questioning, and 
better feedback about the quality of handover. 
The aim of this research was to describe the extent, 
type and causes of defects in healthcare system 
reliability in a selection of common but important 
healthcare processes that have potential to cause 
patient harm. 
A mixed methods approach was used to study five 
processes in seven acute healthcare organisations 
selected to represent a range of locations, sizes and 
types of organisation. 
Where possible, reliability was measured against an 
obvious ideal. However, for one of the topics, 
reliability could not easily be defined and we 
focused instead on standardisation. 
The four clinical systems for which reliability could 
be measured had an average reliability of 81-87%. 
However, this apparent similarity hides significant 
variation between organisations, suggesting that it 
is possible to create systems with higher reliability. 
A significant proportion of the reliability failures 
were associated with risks to patient safety. For 
example, our findings in outpatient clinics imply 
that almost 10 million British patients are seen each 
year with clinical information missing, 2 million of 
whom are exposed to risks as judged by the clinic 
doctors.
Factors contributing to poor reliability were 
generally similar across the five systems studied 
and across organisations. These included lack of 
feedback mechanisms, both for individuals and 
systems, lack of standardisation, poor 
communication, both written and verbal, 
complexity of healthcare organisation, staff 
accepting systems with poor reliability as ‘normal’, 
and lack of individual ownership of issues. These 
factors suggest that a systems focus is likely to be 
required to improve reliability and patient safety. 
This is the first study of its kind and gives new 
insights into healthcare reliability.
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Appendix 1
Original study brief
The original brief from the Health Foundation was as follows:
This study will describe the nature, type, extent and variation of defects in healthcare system reliability that 
have the potential to cause harm to patients in up to 10 UK hospitals.
We will appoint an organisation or consortium experienced in research into patient safety and reliability in 
healthcare systems. The team will work with health services across the UK and will have expertise in:
 – clinical systems improvement approaches (including but not limited to Lean)
 – patient safety
 – process and outcome measurement
 – knowledge capture and transfer.
The research will last 18 months, beginning in October 2008.
Sample
The sample will include the organisations that have been selected by The Health Foundation for Phase 1of 
SCS. In selecting the remaining sites for the study the selected organisation will ensure that the total sample 
is UK wide and looks at different parts of the care pathway, including primary care.
Safety concerns 
The research will focus on 5 – 10 common safety concerns that have a systems dimension.
We anticipate that the research will focus on specific points in a care process rather than an entire care 
process. 
A convincing rationale must be provided for selecting the specific points in the care process. In addition, the 
study itself must describe each entire care process relating to the point of care studied.
The research strategy must provide a clear rationale for the safety concerns that will be explored, the basis on 
which the sample will be drawn and the recruitment strategy.
  135 HOW SAFE ARE CLINICAL SYSTEMS?
The research team will need to work closely with the four organisations selected for phase 1 of SCS as well 
as the technical team who will have a defined role in capturing what is learned and in developing the full 
specification (including not just the ‘what’ but also the ‘how’) for the interventions that will be taken 
forward for use in the demonstration programme in phase12 of SCS.
The final selection of 4 - 5 of these topics will be determined by the focus of the organisations. We will 
require a final protocol by Friday 19 December that reflects the topics chosen by the four organisations to 
work on during the pilot phase.
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Appendix 2
Details of ethics approvals
Participant Information Sheet: Prescribing errors
The Warwick and Imperial Study to Examine Reliability in healthcare (WISeR)
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being done and what it will involve for you. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Thank you for reading this.
What is the purpose of this study?
Healthcare is associated with avoidable harm. Clinical processes and systems, not bad clinicians, often 
contribute to breakdowns in patient safety. The Safer Clinical Systems project, funded by The Health 
Foundation, was launched in October 2008 to test and demonstrate ways to improve healthcare systems and 
processes in order to improve patient safety. The WISeR study is the research arm of the Safer Clinical 
Systems project. Its aim is to identify the nature, type and variation of defects in specific points of the care 
pathway and their potential for patient harm. As part of this study, we would like to interview some of the 
staff involved with specific clinical processes to find out what can go wrong, and why. 
Why have I been invited?
Your Trust is one of eight organisations taking part in the WISeR study. We are looking at six specific topics 
within these organisations to understand the systems involved. We are inviting you to take part as you are 
working in one of the areas or departments where one of the six topics, in this case prescribing errors, is 
being studied.
Do I have to take part?
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you agree to take part, we will ask you to sign a consent 
form to confirm you have agreed to take part. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. A 
decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part will not affect you, your department or your 
Trust.
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What will happen to me if I take part?
We would like you to take part in a 20-30 minute interview to explore the typical causes of prescribing 
errors in your clinical area, either face-to-face or by telephone, depending on your availability and which 
method you would prefer. This will be conducted at a venue of your choice, for example an office or a 
coffee-shop, or wherever would be most convenient for you. We would like to make an audio-tape of the 
interview, or we can just take detailed notes if you would prefer. Recordings and notes will be stored on 
password-protected computers with access only to research personnel. You can ask the researcher to stop 
the interview at any time if you no longer wish to participate. 
We will also offer you the opportunity to check our notes or interview transcript after the interview to 
identify any errors on our part, and to inform us of any sections that you do not wish to be used as direct 
quotes in our final report. If you would like to do this, we will need to keep a temporary record of your 
identity, but this record will be destroyed once you have approved the notes or transcript.
Should the interviewer be made aware of an error that resulted in patient harm, or was potentially the result 
of a serious breach of practice, they will confirm with the interviewee that the error has been reported on 
the relevant trust’s incident reporting system. If the error has not yet been reported, then the interviewer 
will liaise with the local study co-ordinator to ensure that the error is reported, according to local incident 
reporting procedures.
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
The interviews will focus on the causes of prescribing errors. We understand that this is a potentially 
sensitive topic. However, we will take care to conduct the interviews in a sensitive manner. Although we 
may directly quote your words, you will not be identifiable from those words. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?
The benefit to staff and their organisations will be a better understanding of the systems factors that affect 
reliability of prescribing. This will hopefully lead to improved quality of care and may also have benefits in 
improving efficiency and use of resources.
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?
You may withdraw from the study at any time. A decision to withdraw at any time will not affect you, your 
department or your Trust.
What if there is a problem?
If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation arrangements. 
If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a legal action. Regardless of 
this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been treated 
during the course of this study then you should immediately inform the Investigator Professor Bryony 
Dean Franklin on 020 8383 0503 / 4308. The normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms are 
also available to you. If you are still not satisfied with the response, you may contact the Imperial College 
Clinical Research Governance Office.
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Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
Your taking part in the study may be known by some other members of your Trust, for example if your 
name was suggested by someone who helped us identify potential participants. However any information 
which is collected, or any comments or opinions expressed by you during the course of the research, will be 
strictly confidential, and will not be attributable to you.
What will happen to the results of the research study?
We will present the key findings at meetings of the participating sites, as well as preparing written 
summaries for dissemination to staff. Our findings will be published on the Imperial College and Warwick 
Medical School’s research centres’ websites, published in peer-reviewed journals and presented at relevant 
conferences, as well as being included in a final report to The Health Foundation.
Who is organising and funding the research?
The research has been organised and funded by The Health Foundation (www.health.org.uk). It is 
sponsored by Imperial College London, and researchers are employed by the University of Warwick and 
Imperial College London.
Who has reviewed the study?
This study has been reviewed by the Hammersmith Queen Charlotte’s and Chelsea Research Ethics 
Committee (Ref. 09/H0707/27).
Further information and contact details
If you would like further information please contact the researcher Emmanuelle Savarit on  
e.savarit@imperial.ac.uk. Alternatively, you can speak to Professor Bryony Dean Franklin who is leading 
the project, by telephoning 07940 549167 or on bryony.deanfranklin@imperial.nhs.uk 
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Appendix 3
Example of participant 
information leaflet for interviews
Participant Information Sheet: Prescribing errors
The Warwick and Imperial Study to Examine Reliability in healthcare (WISeR)
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve for you. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. 
Thank you for reading this.
What is the purpose of this study?
Healthcare is associated with avoidable harm. Clinical processes and systems, not bad clinicians, often 
contribute to breakdowns in patient safety. The Safer Clinical Systems project, funded by The Health 
Foundation, was launched in October 2008 to test and demonstrate ways to improve healthcare systems 
and processes in order to improve patient safety. The WISeR study is the research arm of the Safer Clinical 
Systems project. Its aim is to identify the nature, type and variation of defects in specific points of the care 
pathway and their potential for patient harm. As part of this study, we would like to interview some of the 
staff involved with specific clinical processes to find out what can go wrong, and why. 
Why have I been invited?
Your Trust is one of eight organisations taking part in the WISeR study. We are looking at six specific topics 
within these organisations to understand the systems involved. We are inviting you to take part as you are 
working in one of the areas or departments where one of the six topics, in this case prescribing errors, is 
being studied.
Do I have to take part?
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you agree to take part, we will ask you to sign a 
consent form to confirm you have agreed to take part. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a 
reason. A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part will not affect you, your 
department or your Trust.
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What will happen to me if I take part?
We would like you to take part in a 20-30 minute interview to explore the typical causes of prescribing 
errors in your clinical area, either face-to-face or by telephone, depending on your availability and which 
method you would prefer. This will be conducted at a venue of your choice, for example an office or a 
coffee-shop, or wherever would be most convenient for you. We would like to make an audio-tape of the 
interview, or we can just take detailed notes if you would prefer. Recordings and notes will be stored on 
password-protected computers with access only to research personnel. You can ask the researcher to stop 
the interview at any time if you no longer wish to participate. 
We will also offer you the opportunity to check our notes or interview transcript after the interview to 
identify any errors on our part, and to inform us of any sections that you do not wish to be used as direct 
quotes in our final report. If you would like to do this, we will need to keep a temporary record of your 
identity, but this record will be destroyed once you have approved the notes or transcript.
Should the interviewer be made aware of an error that resulted in patient harm, or was potentially the result 
of a serious breach of practice, they will confirm with the interviewee that the error has been reported on 
the relevant trust’s incident reporting system. If the error has not yet been reported, then the interviewer 
will liaise with the local study co-ordinator to ensure that the error is reported, according to local incident 
reporting procedures.
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
The interviews will focus on the causes of prescribing errors. We understand that this is a potentially 
sensitive topic. However, we will take care to conduct the interviews in a sensitive manner. Although we 
may directly quote your words, you will not be identifiable from those words. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?
The benefit to staff and their organisations will be a better understanding of the systems factors that affect 
reliability of prescribing. This will hopefully lead to improved quality of care and may also have benefits in 
improving efficiency and use of resources.
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?
You may withdraw from the study at any time. A decision to withdraw at any time will not affect you, your 
department or your Trust.
What if there is a problem?
If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation arrangements. 
If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a legal action. Regardless of 
this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been treated 
during the course of this study then you should immediately inform the Investigator Professor Bryony 
Dean Franklin on 020 8383 0503 / 4308. The normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms are 
also available to you. If you are still not satisfied with the response, you may contact the Imperial College 
Clinical Research Governance Office.
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
Your taking part in the study may be known by some other members of your Trust, for example if your 
name was suggested by someone who helped us identify potential participants. However any information 
which is collected, or any comments or opinions expressed by you during the course of the research, will be 
strictly confidential, and will not be attributable to you.
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What will happen to the results of the research study?
We will present the key findings at meetings of the participating sites, as well as preparing written summaries for 
dissemination to staff. Our findings will be published on the Imperial College and Warwick Medical School’s 
research centres’ websites, published in peer-reviewed journals and presented at relevant conferences, as well as 
being included in a final report to The Health Foundation.
Who is organising and funding the research?
The research has been organised and funded by The Health Foundation (www.health.org.uk). It is sponsored by 
Imperial College London, and researchers are employed by the University of Warwick and Imperial College 
London.
Who has reviewed the study?
This study has been reviewed by the Hammersmith Queen Charlotte’s and Chelsea Research Ethics Committee 
(Ref. 09/H0707/27).
Further information and contact details
If you would like further information please contact the researcher Emmanuelle Savarit on e.savarit@imperial.
ac.uk. Alternatively, you can speak to Professor Bryony Dean Franklin who is leading the project, by telephoning 
07940 549167 or on bryony.deanfranklin@imperial.nhs.uk 
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Appendix 4 
Example of consent form for 
interviews
Centre Number:
Participant Identification Number:
CONSENT FORM – INTERVIEWS PRESCRIBING 
The Warwick and Imperial Study to Examine Reliability in healthcare (WISER)
         
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 8 July 2009 (version 
1.3) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions 
and have had these answered satisfactorily  
  
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason, without my job or legal rights being affected.   
  
3 I understand that data collected during the study will be looked at by the research team from 
Imperial College London and the University of Warwick, and may be included in the study’s 
final report and any resulting publications. I give permission for these individuals to have ac-
cess to this information.  
  
4 The compensation arrangements have been discussed with me 
  
5 I agree to take part in the above study 
  
6 I would like to read the interview transcript or notes at a later stage to approve them for use in 
the study and to indicate any areas which I do NOT wish to be used as direct quotes.  
_______________   ________________   _________________
Name of Participant   Date      Signature
Emmanuelle Savarit  
Name of researcher
taking consent
__ ______________  __________________
   Date      Signature
When completed: 1 copy for participant; 1 (original) for researcher site file
Please initial box
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Appendix 6
Interview guide - missing clinical 
information
Opening questions for non-medical staff 
Can you tell me about your job ?
When did you start working in this department? 
How are you involved in getting information to the doctors in outpatients?
Opening questions for surgeons
How long have you been a surgeon here? 
How many outpatient clinics do you do a week? Are they all in this hospital or do you visit other hospitals?
-----------------
How often do you think patient information – notes, test results, GP letters and so on, are not available to 
clinicians when they are conducting outpatient clinics?
[This question will allow us to explore the baseline point of view of the participant regarding the reliability 
of the system]
Could you give us an example of an event that you have been aware of whereby necessary patient 
information was unavailable?
[With this question the aim is to obtain a narrative account from the interviewee in terms of remembering 
their own experience of an event when information was missing at the point of clinical decision, if any]
Why do you think this occurred?
Where do you think the system is going wrong in this specific example?
Is there any source of information which is particularly or frequently unreliable?
(e.g., GP, primary care, hospitals within the trust, hospitals from different trusts)
Why do you think this process is unreliable – where are things going wrong in the system?
What needs to be done to put it right?
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Could you suggest any solutions? 
Is there any mode of information transfer which is a particular problem?
(e.g. electronic system, fax, telephone message, internal mail or the postal system)
Why do you think this process frequently fails – where are things going wrong in the system?
 What needs to be done to put it right?
Could you suggest any solutions? 
These are some examples of missing information identified in our earlier study in surgical outpatients here.
[here the researcher will give the interviewee a brief list presenting a selection of the missing information 
identified in the quantitative part of the study – a range of different failures in terms of source and type of 
information and the mode of delivery]
Why do you think these types of error occur?
 Are there procedures to follow to get this information to outpatients?
How useful are these?
Are they always followed [if ‘no’ then explore why]
Are there communication problems between departments that contribute to information not being 
available? [explore where and why]
Are there environmental issues – such as not enough space to keep the notes or records – that contribute to 
information going missing?
How reliant on staffing levels are the processes to get notes to clinics – do you notice for example that some 
information isn’t available when people are off sick or on holiday? [explore where and why]
Do you know who is responsible for getting all the relevant information together?
ENDING
Thank you very much for your time and for being willing to talk to me. Your comments have been very 
helpful and will be used together with those of the other participants to gain an understanding of 
prescribing errors and why they occur. 
[confirm plans for getting interviewee’s comments on the interview transcript or notes]
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Appendix 7
Prescribing error data collection 
instructions
 
The WISeR study
Studying the nature and causes of prescribing errors in hospital inpatients - information for ward 
pharmacists
Data collection: Wednesday 27 May until Tuesday 9 June inclusive
What are we doing?
We are studying the frequency, nature and causes of prescribing errors in hospital inpatients. The study has 
the approval of Hammersmith, Queen Charlotte’s and Chelsea ethics committee, your local research 
department, and the medical director within your trust. 
Why are we doing this?
The data being collected will be used as part of the WISeR study, as well as for local analysis within your 
pharmacy department. The WISeR study is funded by The Health Foundation and is being carried out in 
parallel with the Safer Clinical Systems project which your hospital is taking part in, to collect additional 
data to support the Safer Clinical Systems project. The WISeR study is collecting data on six different 
topics, across eight NHS Trusts within the UK.
The WISeR study is collecting data using standard methods and definitions to facilitate the comparison of 
data with other sites.
This data collection is instead of completing a local intervention audit on this occasion. 
Which wards?
Prescribing errors will be recorded on XXXX and XXXX surgical wards, and on the Medical Admissions 
ward. All pharmacists covering these wards during the data collection period will be asked to collect data. 
Dispensary staff will not be asked to collect data. 
Which dates?
Wednesday 27 May until Tuesday 9 June inclusive
Reminders will be put on the ward files before each of these days, and these days annotated on the ward 
rotas for the wards concerned. Data collection sheets will be put onto ward files, if you run out please ask 
Sue Vaughan for further supplies.
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What do we have to do?
On each of the study days:
Ward pharmacists are asked to record the number of unendorsed ‘regular’ and ‘when required (prn)’ 
medication orders seen, and any discharge items screened, plus any prescribing errors identified in these 
medication orders. The number of previously unendorsed medication orders is needed for EVERY patient, 
even if no errors identified for that patient. 
Which medication orders should be included?
All ‘regular’ and ‘when required (prn)’ inpatient medication orders, and all discharge medication orders (ie 
those written on a TTO or on EDS) should be included. This includes newly written inpatient charts and 
newly transcribed inpatient charts. 
The following types of medication order should not be included: drugs prescribed on anaesthetic charts; 
once only (‘stat’) prescriptions and any drugs or continuous infusions prescribed on the back of the drug 
chart. 
What is a prescribing error?
We are using the following definition:
‘A prescribing error occurs when, as a result of a prescribing decision 
or prescription-writing process, there is an unintentional, significant:
 reduction in the probability of treatment being timely and effective
  or 
 increase in the risk of harm
when compared to generally accepted practice.’
Some notes on this definition:
 – All prescribing errors that meet the definition should be included, regardless of their perceived severity. 
Even ‘minor’ errors such as not signing the prescription or not specifying the strength of an inhaler 
should be included. Many errors occur for which pharmacists remedy the error using a chart 
endorsement (and not contacting the doctor) – these should also be included as prescribing errors.
 – Prescribing errors can originate both in the prescribing decision (eg deciding to prescribe a certain dose 
without taking into account the patient’s renal function) and in the prescription writing process (eg 
accidentally mixing up the doses for two drugs when writing the medication orders onto the drug 
chart). 
 – If a prescribing error is detected (ie. the error meets the above criteria) and an intervention is made by 
the pharmacist but does not result in the doctor changing the erroneous prescription, this should still be 
counted as a prescribing error.
 – Errors that involve the omission of medication on admission should be included as errors
 – If in doubt – record it! We can always decide to exclude it afterwards.
 – An intervention is not necessarily the same as a prescribing error. For example, consider a prescription 
for phenytoin 100 mg three times a day. An intervention may be made to change the dose regimen to 
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300mg once daily if this is more convenient. However, phenytoin 100mg three times daily (if an 
appropriate dose for the patient) cannot be classed as a prescribing error even though an intervention 
has been made. Similarly, if a doctor has missed off the strength of an inhaler and you add this to the 
chart, this is still counted as a prescribing error even if you have not made an intervention.
 – Enforcing local policies such as IV to oral switch policies are not prescribing errors. 
The appendix contains some more detailed examples of what should and should not be considered 
prescribing errors.
How do we complete the data collection forms?
Bed 
Bed number of patient concerned – so that you can keep track of who you have included.
Have you done a drug history today for this patient?
Answer Yes or No. Only answer Yes if you did the drug history today on the date of data collection.
Number of previously unscreened/unendorsed medication orders 
For each patient present on the ward, record the number of unendorsed ‘regular‘ and/or ‘when required’ 
prescriptions, regardless of the date on which they were written, plus any discharge (TTO or EDS) items 
screened. This includes newly rewritten inpatient charts, and initial prescribing on admission. Do not 
include any unendorsed medication orders that have already been crossed off.
Details of drugs involved in errors 
Please provide sufficient detail about the nature of the prescribing error to enable someone else to 
understand the error. It is essential to record the name of the drug, the dose and frequency, as well as a very 
brief description of what the error was. For example:
‘Vancomycin 1g BD, dose for renal function should be 1g OD’
‘Furosemide 1 tablet OD prescribed, strength not specified’
‘Ferrous sulphate 200mg BD prescribed, but only one time circled on drug chart – should have been BD’
If a medication order includes more than one error, please record them both but indicate that they were in 
the same medication order. 
We are considering errors per item, rather than per patient. 
Error Type 
For each error identified, record the error type, using the categories and abbreviations below. These 
categories and abbreviations are also on the data collection form so you do not have to try and remember 
them.
 – Medication omitted (‘Omit’) 
 – No indication for the drug concerned (‘No Ind’) 
 – Duplicate therapy (‘Dup’)
 – Incomplete Rx (‘IncompRx’)
 – Prescribing a drug to which the patient is allergic (‘Allergy’)
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 – Incorrect drug (‘Drug’)
 – Incorrect dose (‘Dose’)
 – Incorrect frequency/dosage schedule (but correct total daily dose) (‘Freq’)
 – Incorrect route (‘Route’)
 – Incorrect formulation (‘Form’)
 – Inappropriate abbreviation (‘Abbrev’)
 – Illegible (‘Illeg’)
 – Missing/ incorrect instructions for use or administration (‘Instruct/Admin’)
If in doubt about the category for a given error, don’t worry, as the research team will check for consistency 
of classification at a later stage. As long as you provide a text description of the error, we can classify them 
later.
Number of doses given before corrected
Record the number of doses given (or omitted) before the error was corrected. 
Was an intervention made?
Please indicate here (Yes / No) if you made an intervention (ie contacted to another (non-pharmacy) 
member of the healthcare team, or wrote in the patient’s medical notes), in an attempt to rectify the error. 
This is to gain an indication of the workload involved in resolving prescribing errors. Clarifying something 
by writing on the drug chart without contacting another member of the team does not count as an 
intervention in this context.
Completed data collection forms should be given to XXXXX in the pharmacy department.
Thank you for your participation!
Bryony Dean Franklin, 11 May 2009
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Appendix
For the purposes of this study, the following SHOULD be considered as prescribing errors:
 –  Failure to give essential information correctly
 –  Writing a medication order for a drug, dose or route that was not the one intended
 –  Writing ‘milligrams’ when ‘micrograms’ was intended - eg writing digoxin 250mg instead of 250mcg
 –  Prescribing ‘one tablet’ of a drug that is available in more than one strength.
 –  Omission of the route of administration for a drug that can be given by more than one route
 –  Writing illegible or otherwise ambiguous medication orders that would be likely to require clarification 
before administration (including the use of ambiguous abbreviations)
 –  Omission of the prescriber’s signature
 –  Omission of duration/review date for anti-infective prescriptions
Errors in transcription
 –  On admission, writing a medication order that unintentionally deviates from the patient’s pre-admission 
prescription. This includes the unintentional omission of medication on the patient’s inpatient drug chart
 –  Continuing a GP’s prescribing error when writing a patient’s drug chart on admission
 –  Transcribing a medication order incorrectly when rewriting a patient’s drug chart
Dosing errors
 –  Prescribing a drug with a narrow therapeutic index in a dose predicted to give serum levels significantly 
above or significantly below the desired therapeutic range
 –  Prescription of a drug in a dose above or below that appropriate for the patient’s clinical condition (including 
renal/hepatic function)
 –  Errors in the calculation of drug doses
Pharmaceutical issues
 –  Prescribing a drug to be given by intravenous infusion in a diluent that is incompatible with the drug 
prescribed
 –  Prescribing two drugs for the same indication when only one of the drugs is necessary
 –  Not taking into account a potentially serious drug interaction
Errors in choice of drug
 –  Prescription of a drug to which the patient has a documented clinically significant allergy
 –  Prescribing a drug for a patient for whom, as a result of a co-existing clinical condition, that drug is contra-
indicated
 –  Prescribing a drug for which there is no indication for that patient 
 –  Prescribing a drug not in the formulary 
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The following MAY be prescribing errors, if the clinical situation means that they fall within the definition of a 
prescribing error:
Choice of drug
 –  Not prescribing a drug for a clinical condition for which medication is indicated
 –  Dosing
 –  Prescribing a dose above the maximum dose recommended in the British National Formulary or data sheet
 –  Prescribing a dose regimen (dose/frequency) that is not that recommended for the formulation prescribed
Administration
 –  Prescribing a drug to be infused via an intravenous peripheral line, in a concentration greater than that 
recommended for peripheral administration
Duration
 –  Continuing a prescription for a longer duration than necessary
For the purpose of this study, the following should NOT in themselves be considered prescribing errors:
Ethical/consent issues
 –  Not obtaining patient consent for the prescription of a given drug
 –  Prescribing a drug without informing the patient of its uses and potential side-effects
 –  Prescribing a drug for which there is no evidence of efficacy, because the patient wishes to receive the drug
Deviation from standard policies and guidelines
 –  Prescribing contrary to hospital treatment guidelines
 –  Prescribing contrary to national treatment guidelines
 –  Prescribing for an indication that is not in a drug’s product license
 –  Prescribing for a child a drug that has no product licence for use in children
Omission of non-essential information
 –  Prescribing a drug to be given by infusion without specifying the duration over which it is to be infused
 –  Minor misspelling of a drug name
 –  Prescribing by brand name
 –  Prescribing a drug that should be given at specific times in relation to meals without specifying this 
information on the drug chart
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Appendix 9
Interview guide - prescribing errors
WARWICK & IMPERIAL RESEARCH INTO RELIABILITY IN HEALTHCARE 
(The WISeR Study) 
EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF PRESCRIBING ERRORS
DATE_________________ INTERVIEW REFERENCE NUMBER___________
INTERVIEWER_________  CONSENT FORM SIGNED __________________
PROFESSION OF INTERVIEWEE_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
As you know, we are studying the nature, frequency and causes of prescribing errors as part of this study into the 
reliability of healthcare systems. The overall aim of the study is to identify the systems factors involved so that 
strategies for preventing errors can be identified. We are studying this in three different hospitals and interviewing 
a sample of staff in each of these hospitals. I would therefore like to ask you a series of questions about the factors 
that you feel contribute to prescribing errors. This should take around 20 minutes. 
As the participant information leaflet explains, your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to 
withdraw. If you do not wish to answer any particular question, then please just say so. There are no right or wrong 
answers and I am interested in your own personal point of view. The identities of all participants will remain 
strictly confidential and it will not be possible to identify individual members of staff, clinical teams or hospitals 
from the final results. 
Would you mind if I taped our conversation so that I do not have to write everything down? 
Do you have any questions before we begin?
QUESTIONS 
Can you tell me a bit about your background - how long have you worked in this hospital?
When did you start working in this speciality?
[add other background questions as needed – the main aim here is to put the interviewee at ease]
How reliable do you think the process of prescribing is?
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[This question will allow us to explore the baseline point of view of the participant regarding the reliability of the 
system]
Could you give us an example of a prescribing error that you have been aware of?
[With this question the aim is to obtain a narrative account from the interviewee in terms of remembering their 
own experience of a prescribing error, if any]
Why do you think this occurred?
Can you tell me about prescribing this medication?
How familiar do you think the prescriber would have been with this medication?
Are there any guidelines for prescribing this drug?
- how useful are these guidelines?
- is there anything you do not like about these guidelines/instructions?
- do users have training in their use?
Were there any communication problems (either written or verbal)?
Was all the required information available?
Were there any unusual circumstances or stressors?
For each relevant factor, use prompts such as:
- How does this affect prescribers?
- What happens?
- Does this occur in general?
What needs to be done to put it right?
Could you suggest any solutions? 
These are some examples of prescribing errors identified in our earlier study identifying prescribing errors on 
this ward.
[here the researcher will give the interviewee a brief list presenting a selection of the prescribing errors identified 
in the quantitative part of the study – a range of different errors in terms of error type and the stage of the 
prescribing process in which they occurred]
Why do you think these types of error occur?
Can you tell me about prescribing on this ward?
How familiar do you think the prescriber would have been with these medications?
Are there any guidelines for prescribing these drugs?
- how useful are these guidelines?
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- is there anything you do not like about these guidelines/instructions?
- do users have training in their use?
Are there communication problems (either written or verbal)?
Is all the required information available?
Are there any particular circumstances or stressors on this ward?
For each relevant factor, use prompts such as:
- How does this affect prescribers?
- What happens?
- Does this occur in general?
What needs to be done to put it right?
Could you suggest any solutions? 
ENDING
Thank you very much for your time and for being willing to talk to me. Your comments have been very helpful 
and will be used together with those of the other participants to gain an understanding of prescribing errors and 
why they occur. 
[confirm plans for getting interviewee’s comments on the interview transcript or notes]
Bryony Dean Franklin
9 June 2009
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Appendix 10
Mean clinical significance scores for 
prescribing errors identified on each 
ward
Site Ward Mean score (range)
A Surgical 5.5 (4.2 to 8.4)
A Admissions 1 5.1 (1.4 to 9.2)
A Admissions 2 5.8 (4.6 to 7.3)
A Admissions 3 4.6 (2.0 to 6.8)
A Admissions 4 5.3 (3.8 to 6.6)
B Surgical 1 5.8 (3.0 to 8.1)
B Surgical 2 3.6 (2.8 to 4.4)
B Surgical 3 5.7 (2.6 to 9.4)
C Admissions 5.3 (1.4 to 9.6)
C Surgical 5.4 (0.8 to 8.8)
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Appendix 11
 The 34 prescribing errors classed as 
‘serious’ in the sample of 183 errors 
assessed for clinical importance
Site Ward Description of error Mean 
score
B Surgical 1 Diclofenac 50mg PR prescribed every 18 hours. Patient already taking di-
clofenac 50mg orally three times daily
7.0
B Surgical 1 Morphine 5-10mg IV/IM prescribed when required; no maximum dose or 
frequency stated, doses not equivalent
8.1
B Surgical 1 Morphine 5-10mg IV prescribed every 2-4 hourly; dose for this patient 
should be 5mg
7.9
B Surgical 1 Morphine 5-10mg IM prescribed when required; maximum dose should 
have been 5mg
7.2
B Surgical 1 Fludrocortisone 100mg four times daily prescribed; dose should have been 
100 micrograms
7.4
B Surgical 1 Tramadol 50-100mg PO/IV when required prescribed; no maximum dose or 
minimum dosing interval stated
7.8
B Surgical 1 Morphine 5-10mg IV/IM every 2 hours when required prescribed. IV and 
IM doses are not equivalent
7.5
B Admissions Lisinopril 10mg once daily was continued for a patient in acute renal failure 7.3
B Admissions Amlodipine 5mg twice daily not prescribed but on drug history 7.8
B Admissions Isosorbide mononitrate 120mg once daily prescribed. Should be the modi-
fied-release form
7.6
B Admissions Tinzaparin 3,500IU not prescribed although clinically indicated 9.4
B Admissions 8 Half Sinemet CR (controlled-release) tablets prescribed once daily. Should 
have been 2 tablets four times daily
7.8
A Surgical Oxycodone (as ‘Oxynorm’) prescribed twice on ‘when required’ section of 
drug chart: 35mg and 40mg, both prescribed for every 4 hours. Correct dose 
should have been 40mg every 4 hours when required
8.4
A Admissions 1 Patient prescribed amitriptyline 10mg once daily but has possible acute 
coronary syndrome and myocardial infarction, therefore amitriptyline is 
contra-indicated
7.0
A Admissions 1 Cefelexin 500mg three times daily prescribed on discharge prescription. GP 
to continue stated as ‘no’ but should have been ‘yes’
7.2
A Admissions 1 Phenytoin 400mg three times daily prescribed. Patient usually takes 300mg 
three times a day
7.8
A Admissions 1 Patient uses Insulin Levemir but it was not prescribed in hospital 8.5
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A Admissions 1 Patient takes theophylline 500mg twice daily but it was not prescribed in 
hospital
7.2
A Admissions 1 Gliclazide 20mg twice daily prescribed; patient usually takes 160mg twice 
daily
8.2
A Admissions 1 Paracetamol 1g prescribed regularly but no maximum dose, frequency, or 
minimum dosing interval stated
7.3
A Admissions 1 Enoxaparin 40mg DVT prophylaxis omitted although clinically indicated 9.2
A Admissions 2 Gliclazide 80mg prescribed at 6am, 2pm and 8pm. Should be at 8am, 12pm 
and 6pm i.e. with meals
7.3
C Admissions Carbamazapine 400mg once daily prescribed but two times of day circled for 
administration on the chart
7.2
C Admissions Patient takes levothyroxine 125mcg but not prescribed it in hospital 7.0
C Admissions Prednisolone 1mg once in the morning prescribed but patient’s usual dose is 
3mg in the morning
7.5
C Admissions Patient prescribed spironolactone 50mg twice daily but usually takes once 
daily
7.0
C Admissions Paracetamol 1g prescribed when required but with no minimum interval or 
maximum dose
7.1
C Admissions Morphine 10-20mg PO when required prescribed with no minimum inter-
val between doses
7.8
C Admissions Flucloxacillin 1g four times daily prescribed to a patient allergic to penicillin 9.6
C Admissions Patient takes anastrazole 1mg once a day but not prescribed it in hospital 7.6
C Surgical Tramadol 50-100mg four times a day prescribed to a patient already pre-
scribed codeine
7.2
C Surgical Morphine 20-30mg when required prescribed with no maximum frequency 
or dose
8.0
C Surgical Morphine 10-30mg every 6 hours prescribed on discharge. Confused patient 
does not require this drug
8.8
C Surgical Patient usually takes atenolol 50mg once daily but was not prescribed it in 
hospital
7.2
C Surgical Digoxin 62.5mcg prescribed to a patient who was taking 187.5mcg once 
daily before admission. Patient also prescribed a loading dose of digoxin 
beforehand which was not appropriate
8.0
C Surgical Codeine phosphate 30-60mg prescribed when required with no maximum 
frequency, dose, or minimum interval
7.4
C Surgical Morphine15-20mg PO when required prescribed but no maximum dose or 
minimum interval stated
7.4
C Surgical Enoxaparin 80mcg SC prescribed at incorrect treatment dose of 1mg/kg 
when should have used 1.5mg/kg
8.4
C Surgical Tramadol 50-100mg PO four times daily prescribed on discharge to a patient 
who does not need it
7.0
C Surgical Oral morphine prescribed when required but dose was unclear 7.6
The 34 prescribing errors classed as ‘serious’ in the sample of 183 errors assessed for clinical importance
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Appendix 13
Interview guide - handover
DRAFT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
NOTE: Italicised comments in square brackets are notes for interviewer only
WARWICK & IMPERIAL RESEARCH INTO RELIABILITY IN HEALTHCARE 
(The WISeR Study) 
EXPLORING THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO 
THE RELIABILITY OF HANDOVER
DATE_____________ INTERVIEW REFERENCE NUMBER__________
INTERVIEWER_________ CONSENT FORM SIGNED _________________
PROFESSION OF INTERVIEWEE_______________________________
INTRODUCTION
As you know, as part of a study into the reliability of healthcare systems, we are researching the frequency and 
nature of problems that occur during the handover process, as well as the factors that are likely to affect the 
reliability of the handover. The overall aim of the study is to identify the systems factors involved so that strategies 
for improving handover can be identified. We are studying this in three different hospitals and are interviewing a 
sample of staff in each of these hospitals. I would therefore like to ask you a series of questions about the factors 
that you feel contribute to the reliability of handover. This should take around 20 minutes. 
As the participant information leaflet explains, your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to 
withdraw. If you do not wish to answer any particular question, then please just say so. There are no right or 
wrong answers and I am interested in your own personal point of view. The identities of all participants will 
remain strictly confidential and it will not be possible to identify individual members of staff, clinical teams or 
hospitals from the final results. 
Would you mind if I taped our conversation so that I do not have to write everything down? 
Do you have any questions before we begin?
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QUESTIONS 
Can you tell me a bit about your background - how long have you worked in this hospital?
When did you start working in this speciality?
[add other background questions as needed – the main aim here is to put the interviewee at ease]
How would you describe the purpose of the handover under consideration? 
How reliable or how accurate do you think the handover process is?
[This question will allow us to explore the baseline point of view of the participant regarding the reliability of the 
system]
What is the impact on patients in terms of patient outcome of a poor handover? 
How standardised is the handover and do you have a formal procedure for the handover? 
To what extent does it depend on the individual / on personal styles?
In your experience, what are the factors that impact on the quality of the handover, what produces good handovers 
and what leads to poor handovers?
Do you have a specific time or time slot set aside for doing the handover and a place where you’re going to do it?
In your opinion, why are information items such as presenting condition and diagnosis communicated more 
frequently than aspects of management of care? 
If you could change something what would you like to change in your handover to improve it?
ENDING
Thank you very much for your time and for being willing to talk to me. Your comments have been very helpful and 
will be used together with those of the other participants to gain an understanding of the factors influencing the 
reliability of handover. 
[confirm plans for getting interviewee’s comments on the interview transcript or notes]
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Appendix 15
Interview guide - equipment failures
DRAFT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
NOTE: Italicised comments in square brackets are notes for the interviewer only
WARWICK & IMPERIAL RESEARCH INTO RELIABILITY IN HEALTHCARE 
(The WISER Study) 
EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF EQUIPMENT/ TECHNOLOGY FAILURES IN THE OPERATING 
THEATRE
DATE_________________ INTERVIEW REFERENCE NUMBER___________
INTERVIEWER_________  CONSENT FORM SIGNED __________________
PROFESSION OF INTERVIEWEE_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
As you know, we are studying the nature, frequency and causes of surgical equipment/ technology failures in 
theatre during surgical interventions. This is part of our study into the reliability of healthcare systems. The 
overall aim of the study is to identify the systems factors involved so that these equipment failures can be avoided. 
We are studying this in three different hospitals and interviewing a sample of staff in each of these hospitals. I 
would therefore like to ask you a series of questions about the factors due to which you feel equipment and 
technology failures occur in theatre. The interview should take around 20 minutes. 
 As the participant information leaflet explains, your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to 
withdraw. If you do not wish to answer any particular question, then please just say so. There are no right or 
wrong answers and I am interested in your own personal point of view. The identities of all participants will 
remain strictly confidential and it will not be possible to identify individual members of staff, clinical teams or 
hospitals from the final results. 
Would you mind if I taped our conversation so that I do not have to write everything down? 
Do you have any questions before we begin?
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QUESTIONS 
[add other background questions as needed in this section – the main aim here is to put the interviewee at ease]
Opening questions for non-medical staff 
Can you tell me about your job in this department?
When did you start working for this department?
Opening questions for surgeons
How long have you been a surgeon here? 
When did you start working in this specialty?
[add other background questions as needed – the main aim here is to put the interviewee at ease]
-----------------
How often do you think surgeons have problems with surgical equipment during a surgical intervention (e.g. 
missing or broken equipment)?
[This question will allow us to explore the baseline point of view of the participant regarding the reliability of the 
system]
Could you give us an example of an incident during a surgical procedure that you have been aware of or witnessed 
whereby surgical equipment was missing or broken?
[With this question the aim is to obtain a narrative account from the interviewee in terms of remembering their 
own experience of an event when information was missing at the point of clinical decision, if any]
Why do you think this occurred?
Where do you think the system is going wrong in this specific example?
Is there any specific equipment or any specific specialty where this issue is particularly common?
At what stage along the process of ordering to delivery of an equipment to theatre you think there may be a 
problem? (e.g. TSSU, ordering, booking, storage, loan equipment etc.) 
Why do you think this process is unreliable – where are things going wrong in the system?
What needs to be done to put it right?
Could you suggest any solutions? 
Do you think there may be processes or systems missing or need improving? (e.g. reporting of missing or broken 
surgical instruments, better surgical instrument tracking during sterilisation, ordering of loan equipment by 
locum doctors etc.) 
Why do you think this process frequently fails – where are things going wrong in the system?
 What needs to be done to put it right?
Could you suggest any solutions? 
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These are some examples of surgical equipment/ technology failures we have found.
[here the researcher will give the interviewee a brief list presenting a selection of equipment/ technology failures 
identified in the quantitative part of the study ]
Why do you think these types of error occur?
 Are there procedures to follow in order to book, order and check surgical equipment?
How useful are these?
Are they always followed [if ‘no’ then explore why]
Are there communication problems between departments that contribute to surgical equipment/ technology 
failures? [explore where and why]
Are there environmental issues – such as not enough equipment storage space within the theatre premises?
How reliant on staffing levels are the processes to order, check and maintain surgical equipment?
 How do you think these problems can be reduced or prevented?
ENDING
Thank you very much for your time and for being willing to talk to me. Your comments have been very helpful and 
will be used together with those of the other participants to gain an understanding of surgical equipment failures 
and why they occur. 
[confirm plans for getting interviewee’s comments on the interview transcript or notes]
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Appendix 17
Interview guide - equipment failures
WARWICK & IMPERIAL RESEARCH INTO RELIABILITY IN HEALTHCARE 
(The WISER Study) 
EXPLORING SAFE SYSTEMS FOR INSERTION OF IV LINES
DATE_________________ INTERVIEW REFERENCE NUMBER___________
INTERVIEWER_________  CONSENT FORM SIGNED __________________
PROFESSION OF INTERVIEWEE_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
As you know, we are studying the nature, frequency and causes of unavailability and failure of equipment 
needed for the safe insertion of IV lines as part of this study into the reliability of healthcare systems. The 
overall aim of the study is to identify the systems factors involved so that strategies for safe systems for 
insertion of IV lines can be identified. We are studying this in three different hospitals and interviewing a 
sample of staff in each of these hospitals. I would therefore like to ask you a series of questions about the 
factors that you feel contribute to prescribing errors. This should take around 20 minutes. 
As the participant information leaflet explains, your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to 
withdraw. If you do not wish to answer any particular question, then please just say so. There are no right or 
wrong answers and I am interested in your own personal point of view. The identities of all participants will 
remain strictly confidential and it will not be possible to identify individual members of staff, clinical teams or 
hospitals from the final results. 
Would you mind if I taped our conversation so that I do not have to write everything down? 
Do you have any questions before we begin?
QUESTIONS 
Can you tell me a bit about your background - how long have you worked in this hospital?
When did you start working in this speciality?
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How often do you think healthcare staff encounter equipment problems while inserting a peripheral intravenous 
line?
Could you give us an example of an incident that you have been aware of or have witnessed while inserting an IV 
cannula whereby an equipment item was unavailable or not working?
Why do you think this occurred?
Where do you think the system is going wrong in this specific example?
 Are there any protocols for inserting peripheral IV lines?
- how useful are these guidelines?
- is there anything you do not like about these guidelines/instructions?
- do users have training in their use?
Is there any specific equipment which more occasionally unavailable or does not work?
Is there any specific wards or specialties whereby equipment problems are more frequent?
Is there any specific activity involved in providing equipment for safe insertion of IV lines which is failing?
What needs to be done to put it right?
Could you suggest any solutions? 
These are some examples of equipment problems identified in the first part of our study during safe insertion of IV 
lines.
 Why do you think these types of error occur?
 Are there procedures to follow in order to order and check equipment needed for safe insertion of IV lines?
Is there any specific person assigned to perform this activity?
How useful are the procedures?
Are they always followed [if ‘no’ then explore why]
Are there communication problems between departments that contribute to failure of equipment needed during 
safe insertion of IV lines? 
Are there environmental issues – such as not enough equipment storage space within the wards?
How reliant on staffing levels are the processes to order, check and maintain equipment involved during the safe 
insertion of IV lines?
ENDING
Thank you very much for your time and for being willing to talk to me. Your comments have been very helpful and 
will be used together with those of the other participants to gain an understanding of prescribing errors and why 
they occur. 
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Appendix 18
Glossary of terms
ACSQHC Australian Committee on Safety and Quality in 
Health Care
CCS Clinical Classification System
CDU Clinical Decision Unit
DH Department of Health
ECG Electrocardiogram
EMAU Emergency Medical Assessment Unit
HF Health Foundation
HSJ Health Service Journal
HSMR Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio
IV Intravenous
MINAP Myocardial Ischaemia National Audit Project
MRSA Multi-Resistant Staphlococcus aureus
MTTF Mean Time To Failure
NA Not Applicable
NNH Number Needed to Harm
NHS National Health Service
NRLS National Reporting and Learning System
PEAT Patient Environment Action Team
QAHCS Quality in Australian Health Care Study
SCS Safer Clinical Systems
SPI Safer Patients Initiative
SPN Safer Patients Network
SPSS Statistical Package for Social Science
UK United Kingdom
WISeR Warwick and Imperial Study to examine Reliability in 
healthcare
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